--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote: <snip> SWM: > >You're kidding, right? > > >Liquidity of water is a "causally emergent system feature of H2O > >molecules" which is "really a claim that liquidity is constituted by > >H2O". > > >And your problem is? > > your claim was "one can use 'constitute' to make a causal claim in > certain cases, too, as Searle does". > > but the evidence from Searle's writing illustrate "uses of 'causation' > to express a point about constitution". > As I said, you're kidding, right? Now you want to argue with me over the difference between "make a causal claim", based on asserting a claim about what constitutes what, and "express a point about constitution" by referencing a "causal" relation? > if you can't see that the evidence supports the exact opposite of the > claim you made; then, you are still conflating constitution and > causation. > This is getting ridiculous. I know you are tenacious and set on forever appearing to come out on top (I've seen it over and over again in our exchanges) but I really think this is going too far. > it's 'causation' not 'constitution that has both a wide and a narrow > meaning. it is the name of a class and the name of the members. > Look at the definitions I placed on-line here for "constitute" for god's sake! That "cause" has a wide latitude of applications doesn't mean "constitute" doesn't and there is PLENTY of evidence "constitute" does. THIS reminds me of our argument about von Neumann's "I,II,III" categorization which you averred you had replaced with your own "1,2,3" categorization and thereby proved that von Neumann's thesis implied dualism even if von Neumann himself wasn't on record as arguing for dualism! Or the argument we had over whether Dennett said what he said; whether, given that there was text that showed he had said it, he was right in having saying it; or, then, whether I had interpreted him correctly in what he had said; or, THEN, whether I was right in thinking what Dennett said was right; or that what I said was what Dennett had really meant when he said what he said! Or whether I was claiming something about Searle's being a full blown apostle of Descartes or whether Dennett was! Give me a break! These examples only touch the tip of the iceberg of our ongoing exchanges. > this stems from Aristotle, used 'causation' as the class name for the > 'four causes' (material, formal, efficient and final). as usual, SEP has > more info: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality > Well, thank you again for another of your ever ready lessons in philosophy/logic. Perhaps you could have spared yourself the effort, though, if you had read some of what I have written on the subject here a bit more closely (i.e., I have made precisely the same point about Aristotle here many times in the past -- but I guess that doesn't count in your mind since YOU hadn't made it). > 'constitution', as we would use it today, derives from Aristotle's > category of material causation; particularly, when speaking about the > material composition of something; and, relative to this linguistic > history, it's only slightly metaphorical to say that nine players > constitutes a baseball team. > Aristotle wrote thousands of years ago and in Greek. The dictionary information I provided was contemporary and in English (and hardly exhaustive). Going on about Aristotle's views on this can hardly be definitive, even it it can often be informative. > 'causation', as we would use it in the context of philosophy of > consciousness or in the context of scientific research, refers to > Aristotle's category of efficient causation. > > Joe > "Causation" and its related terms are English words and we all use them. Aristotle, writing way more than a thousand years ago is not the final word on modern usage. As Wittgenstein pointed out, one of the great errors of philosophers has been to forget about the way words are used in the actual give and take of language, the milieu from which they actually come and wherein they find and define their meanings. Taking them out of these contexts, philosophers have too often applied them to various rarified scenarios and within contexts far removed from their natural habitats, thereby ending up in linguistic muddles. It is, as he pointed out, a case of taking language on holiday. There's really little point, Joe, in hiding behind some particular archaic philosophical approach in order to avoid the perfectly obvious issues raised by contemporary (even philosophically contemporary) usage. But if your whole game is just to appear as if you haven't lost in some debate that you think is being measured by logical points scored, I will say let's call a halt right here. We know you hold a dualist position, that you are committed to sustaining a view that mind is somehow something more than just a part of the physical universe, and we know that there is little anyone can say that will prompt you to reconsider your views, let alone outright change them. And you have made it abundantly clear you will never give up and will keep looking in whatever places you think will serve to find some angle on which to show us you are really right. Frankly, I find this tedious. I do enjoy robust discussions, either on-line or otherwise. And I certainly enjoy exploring an issue like consciousness (what we mean by the term and what the implications are). But I don't really enjoy endlessly rehashing the same issues or following false trails away from the central concerns in the discussion just so you can feel that you still hold a winning hand in the discussion. If we cannot move on, if we are now doomed to reprise the "I,II,III" fiasco, or the nonsense about whether Dennett said what he actually said or whether he really meant it when he said it or whether it meant what it seemed to mean, etc., etc., then I say enough already. If you don't have something new to offer, if it's all going to be about trying to force everything into some pre-existing philosophical mold if it happens to serve your purpose of the moment (i.e., running back to Aristotle while equating Wittgenstein, with whom you apparently take issue, with conversations in a "sports bar") then this goes nowhere and you can find someone else to play with. 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