--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote: > "The prevailing wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is > materialism: there is only one sort of stuff, namely matter --- the > physical stuff of physics, chemistry and physiology --- and the mind is > somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon. in short, the mind is the > brain." [_Consciousness Explained_ p. 33] > is Dennett using the is of identity? possibly. I get lost here. If the mind and the brain are identical, then wouldn't the brain be as much mental as the mind is physical? Would an identity account suggest a state that can be either mental or physical, or perhaps the distinction itself is false? > is Dennett using the is of causation? no. there is no is of causation. Not sure what you mean. Are you saying that Dennett does not see a causal relation between brain and mind? We've been here before. An identity account (materialistic monism) is consistent with the causal accounts of the physical disciplines. bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/