[Wittrs] Re: Constitution vs Causation
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 02 May 2010 02:51:57 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>Dennett would be saying that consciousness is nothing more than what
> >>causes consciousness; specifically, that consciousness is nothing more
> >>than the brain; or, more simply, that the mind *is* the brain.
>
> >In a sense he says just that
>
> in a sense? here is Dennett in his own words:
>
> "The prevailing wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is
> materialism: there is only one sort of stuff, namely matter --- the
> physical stuff of physics, chemistry and physiology --- and the mind is
> somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon. in short, the mind is the
> brain." [_Consciousness Explained_ p. 33]
>
Okay. Good quote. I said "in a sense" because I was too lazy to rush back and
find text but you have, so now we can agree that he says just that. My "in a
sense" should also be taken, though, to express the point that, by saying that,
he is still NOT denying that we have experiences, are conscious beings, have
consciousness, etc., which is what you have constantly (and wrongly) taken him
to be saying.
> >but what "nothing more" means probably is different for you than for
> >him since you imagine it's to say consciousness doesn't exist and he
> >doesn't say that. His book, Consciousness Explained, assumes it exists
> >in order, of course, to explain it.
>
> Dennett certainly assumes that the brain exists. the question is whether
> he assumes that the brain constitutes consciousness or that the brain
> causes consciousness (using 'cause' in the scientific sense of causation
> derived from Aristotle's efficient causation).
>
Aristotle??? Kind of dated, don't you think? What about those heavenly spheres?
> * * *
>
> In reply to Budd's statement, "Well, the meaning of the first premise
> contains a noncausality claim", Stuart wrote [2010-04-26 - #5449]:
>
> >The first premise: "Computer programs are syntactical (formal)". Note
> >the verb "are". It denotes an identity relation (or, another
> >possibility, a predicate relation). It certainly doesn't denote a
> >causal relation. If it did it would say "cannot cause" or some such ...
>
> it is true that, when a statement uses the verb 'to be', we can often
> decide what type of claim it makes by trying to determine the sense of
> 'is' that is being used in the statement.
>
> what sense of 'is' does Dennett use to say 'the mind is the brain'?
>
> clearly we can dismiss the possibility that the 'is' in Dennett's
> statement denotes a causal relation.
No we can't. The fact that he doesn't use "cause" is irrelevant to the point at
issue. It's a matter of word choice, nothing more. Few people speak in the
exact same way. The issue is to find what they have in mind, not try to apply
some external and arbitrary meaning, say Aristotle's, as a kind of absolute.
> hence, Dennett is saying something
> very different from what Searle says ('the mind is caused by the brain'
> --- Axiom 4 put in the passive voice).
>
> is Dennett using the is of identity? possibly. there is a school of
> thought known as the mind-brain identity theory, MBI, which says just
> that.
>
> is Dennett using the is of constitution? possibly.
>
Omigod you are going back to that nutso business you pressed on analytic about
the "is" of "isness" then????
> is Dennett using the is of causation? no. there is no is of causation.
>
> Joe
>
>
I should have followed my instinct and ignored this one!
SWM
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