[Wittrs] Re: The CRA in Symbolic Form (According to Joe)
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2010 14:15:02 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
> >>we know that Searle claims that there is a causal but not an
> >>ontological reduction of consciousness to brain; but, I thought that
> >>you were a little evasive in answering my question as to whether
> >>Dennett claimed that there is a causal and/or an ontological reduction
> >>and/or some other kind of reduction.
>
> >I gave you a straight and simple answer. You mean I didn't give you the
> >answer you where aiming to get?
>
> on 4/25, in response to your comment "if consciousness IS irreducible as
> dualists would think", I asked
>
> "are you saying that *only* dualists think that consciousness IS
> irreducible? if so, then it would follow that Dennett (whom we agree is
> not a substance dualist) thinks that consciousness *is* reducible. in
> what sense(s) of 'reduction' does Dennett say that consciousness is
> reducible? causal reduction? ontological reduction? something else?"
>
I've answered that before, too. I have said that in the text I cited Dennett
does not say "only" and I would not put words in his mouth. However, I also
said I believe he probably would take that view and that I take it as well. My
point about dualism is that it IS the notion that consciousness is irreducible
(and that theses about so-called substances or properties are only variants of
this larger issue because this irreducibility is about what underlies what, the
question of ontological basicness).
> you agreed that "Dennett does think consciousness is reducible, i.e., to
> things (physical events) that are not themselves conscious and are more
> basic than the phenomenon we call consciousnss."
>
> this is an interesting statement and invites an obvious question: what
> part of this do you think Searle disagrees with?
>
Let's try this one more time. MY ARGUMENT WITH SEARLE HAS TO DO WITH WHAT I
HAVE DESCRIBED AS HIS IMPLICIT DUALISM, i.e., that presumption about
consciousness which underlies his claims in the CRA (already extensively
explicated by me). Pointing out that Searle says other things at other times is
irrelevant because I have said what he says explicitly places him in
contradiction with the implications of his argument about the prospects of
computer-based consciousness. Really this isn't all that difficult.
It is no argument to say look he says X here while you say he believes Y there
because by saying he believes it implicitly I have noted that he contradicts
himself.
> however, you evaded the question that I asked:
>
> [Joe]: in what sense(s) of 'reduction' does Dennett say that
> consciousness is reducible? causal reduction? ontological reduction?
> something else?
>
> [SWM]:That it can be explained in terms of the physical processes going
> on in brains.
>
> so, no, there has not been a straight answer to my question.
>
That's a perfectly straight answer. You can interpret it as "causal" or
"ontological", etc., but he doesn't use those terms in that context. Searle
does and we have done so in discussing Searle here.
Of course my view is that causal IS ontological, too, and that Dennett's thesis
DOES entail a causal (and therefore, at one level, an ontological) reduction.
But I will not be drawn into a game of searching out Dennett's exact words
again. We have already seen how you respond to that sort of thing. Even when
the words are find, you squirm and wriggle in ways that will enable you to
avoid their implications. Why should I bother to spend my time searching for
words when you won't acknowledge or recognize their obvious meaning anyway (as
you did when I showed you that Dennett had said it takes a "Cartesian dualist"
to believe the CRA's conclusion that more of the same could not do what less of
the same couldn't do.
> is Dennett alleging a causal reducibility (which Searle would agree
> with);
Searle is in self-contradiction based on a comparison of his CRA and what he
says about brains. He manages it by being vague about brains.
>or, is Dennett alleging an ontological reducibility (which Searle
> disagrees with);
Searle mistakenly thinks "ontology" has no role in reducibility questions as
I've already stated.
> or, is he alleging that there is both types involved;
> or, is he alleging that there is some other unspecified type of
> reduction involved?
>
> Joe
You are really intent on wasting my time here. See above.
SWM
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