[Wittrs] Re: [C] Re: Proper Names --Wittgenstein, Russell, Kripke

  • From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 20:09:30 -0800 (PST)

(J)

WITTGENSTEIN'S LANGUAGE
1. The language from W that led me to the distinction is here:

"44. We said that the sentence 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' made sense even 
when Excalibur was broken in pieces. Now this is so because in this 
language-game a name is also used in the absence of a its beater. But we can 
imagine a language game with names ... in which they are used only in the 
presence of the beater; and so could always be replaced by a demonstrative 
pronoun and the gesture of pointing."

BEARER-CALL AND ASSIGNMENT
You seem to have gotten the bearer-call, bearer-assignment distinction. There 
are just some lingering questions:

1. What description satisfies a bearer-call is whatever makes the bearer-call 
successful. That's the only point of this language game. Whatever establishes 
the correct X of N. Note this works perfectly for "N is dead" in Wittgenstein's 
79. However you tag the body is however you do it. If, "that guy from block 12" 
will do it between any two people, that is as good as "DNA such and such" as 
between another two.  Now, for historical figures like Moses, you are right to 
note the problem with trying to "tag the body," so to speak. But the 
hypotheticals we have been exchanging regarding remains and parents were 
supposed to assume a scenario where a bearer-call could be hypothetically 
created, while a bearer-assignment could too. 

I think what you are asking is when does "Moses" in a conversation actually 
become a bearer-assignment? The answer is NEVER UNTIL TWO APPEAR. Or rather, 
never until you can separate it from the bearer. This is because in the 
language game of bearer assignment, the name and the bearer need to have become 
separated. When they become separated, the name functions like a title. It is 
bestowed upon whoever earns its criteria. This is why we have been inventing 
all these name games. (e.g., batcave) 

2. Your "Bacon is Shakespeare" stuff seems spot on. (You use "rule of grammar" 
which I do not oppose. I prefer simply "name as a rule or title." [I've dropped 
predicate-calculator or "like a predicate-calculator."])  

3. Regarding whether to use the expression bearer-calls or assignments for 
statements or props, etc., I don't see the point. These things are FUNCTIONS 
that names fulfill when used in language. 


4.  On planets.  The Vulcan that is "the planet that occupied such a position 
as to explain Mercury's perihelion precession within Newtonian mechanics" is 
ALWAYS a bearer-call UNTIL THE NAME CAN SEPARATE FROM ITS BEARER. Maybe it 
would be good to say putative or ostensive bearer. You cannot play 
bearer-assignment unless: (a) you can separate the name from its bearer; and 
(b) the name functions as a rule or title. So, "Sally isn't Sally anymore" 
(even though she is). [Note how this plugs into our discussion of "bachelor." 
You might say this is a non-literal sense of Sally. It may be, but that doesn't 
matter. It is nonetheless a SENSE of Sally. One that strips the name from the 
bearer because the latter hasn't earned it anymore]. And so, for Vulcan, all we 
have is an X of N until we can find conditions that can separate them. When we 
say "Vulcan" doesn't exist, it is the same as saying in Witt's 79, "N is dead." 
Here we are saying the X of N
 doesn't exist. These are bearer-calls. 

(Neptune as "whatever planet satisfied what was required to explain the motion 
of Uranus" is a bearer-call until we can separate it from its bearer.) 

AIR FORCE ONE
Air Force One (AF1) is a tough one!!!  Do you see the problem here!!??  On one 
hand, it seems like perfect bearer-assignment. Wherever the president is, is 
the thing. However, we can't separate the bearer from the name here can we? 
This is a NEW LANGUAGE GAME. In this one, we have invented a proper name for a 
VARIABLE. Very f-ing interesting. Imagine the President is on plane X. Imagine 
that midflight, he switches to Y by using new technology where the planes can 
latch midair (like in refueling). He crawls into plane Y. Which plane was AF1? 
Answer: X during its part of the president's voyage and Y during its. You 
cannot separate the name from the bearer here. 

NAME TAGS
I can't agree that the name tag example was stupid. It illustrated the points 
just fine.

SLOGANIZED WITTGENSTEIN
Yes, we both agree that a sloganized Wittgenstein is to be avoided. But I think 
we might disagree on who has one. Glen's ideas, for example, were clearly only 
partial. He just stuffed what he understood and liked about 
Wittgenstein into other packages he liked more (e.g., Skinner and Behaviorism). 
One wants to say: he bent Wittgenstein. Were he able to actually discuss the 
matter, we would gladly have him here to exchange it with us. Tell me, do you 
want to discuss it? Because, right now, it isn't doing any good in its present 
form (a telephone dropping). If you actually want to devote some intellectual 
time to this, maybe open it up as a separate thread and indicate what you think 
are the common pitfalls in understanding meaning as use. We would need 
substance here, not the a.m. radio version. We need people who can actually 
take the other person's idea and come to understand it. 

My sense is that what might come out is something half-blooded or directed 
toward some other idea. E.g., The "meaning-is-the-standard-use" Wittgenstein. 
Or, "no-counter-examples-allowed-if-you-take-common-fences down" Wittgenstein. 
Or, in Glen's case, the reification-branch Wittgenstein who was a 
doctrinal behaviorist who would never allow anyone to to talk about brains or 
minds, and who thought that if you were not using ordinary sense, you had an 
"anything goes" approach that was supportive of nonsense or chaos. 

My sense is that many of these ideas have Russell and abandoned-verificationist 
ideas hiding in the closet, and are a little too friendly to methods of logic 
and science when applied to statements. You know, I posted all sorts 
of Wittgenstein quotes the other day in support of my position, and this is 
what I get in return? 

I know this: I am no longer discussing in here with people who can't do it 
(usually for failings of character). You and I have yet to reach that point. 
Tell you what: why not open a thread about Wittgenstein and behaviorism between 
you and I? I bet we could have a civil discussion that advanced the ball. You 
do agree that the point is to advance the ball, right? You know I usually like 
talking with you because there is substance in the offering. You can catch an 
idea and throw it back. Virtually no one else can really do that.

Why not open up some genuine threads in the future that get into meaning as use 
or behaviorism? (I'd like to have good stuff going to and from on that).      

Regards and thanks

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html 



  
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