[Wittrs] Re: Does pain have a referent?
- From: "blroadies" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 21:03:37 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
> I take LW's point to be that, in the case of sensations, language
> is operating on a different principle to that of "object and
designation"
> -- i.e. pain isn't a "thing" to which language "refers":
and I agree, course. So where is our difference? You think I'm
asking..."how the physical person
and the "what it is like" are related" and by doing so, which I agree
happens,.."posit such metaphysical
hypotheses as materialism, idealism, and dualism."
It is true I've asked that question here, because that is SWM's
question. But then again I've tried to show how that question, when
answered by an ontological posit of substances, gets mired in M, I, and
D. So we are on the same page here.
However, I disagree, if this is what you are saying or think LW is
saying, that "what is it like to be me" cannot be empirically studied.
In sum: while pain isn't a thing to which language refers, it is still a
subject matter which can be worded and studied. And the treatment of an
amputee's pain is no less objective than the medical treaatment of his
stump. This is the work I do.
bruce
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