[lit-ideas] Re: What is a transcendental claim?
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2008 17:10:01 -0330
Continuation of reply to Eric D's post of Sunday, 21 Dec.. Plse scroll down to
"PICKING IT UP HERE" --------------->
Quoting Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> No doubt mistakenly, I sense the approach of clarity about my differences
> with Walter on at least one point...
>
> Walter elaborates what he is referring to with the word 'transcendental':
>
> > [snip]...plausible T analyses/arguments posit as their object of inquiry
> > (reconstruction) a competence, discourse, or some other dimension of human
> > understanding (meaning, language, etc). This object of analysis is
> carefully
> > delineated and the analysis pursues *that* comprehension of the phenomenon
> and
> > no other. Only as such can T analyses yield univocal results.
>
> I think I understand the first sentence here -- plausible transcendental
> analyses (by contrast with, say, Kant's implausible ones?) are about human
> experience (like Kant's were) but are about a defined and limited range of
> such experience, specifically some identifiable competence, discourse or
> other dimension of human understanding.
>
> Can I accurately paraphrase the second sentence thus?: A plausible
> transcendental analysis carefully delineates the topic (the identified
> competence, etc.) and focuses on it as delineated and not on some other way
> of identifying or characterizing the topic. I mean, here, to be making sure
> I understand the antecedent to Walter's 'phenomenon'.
>
> If so, then I think that Walter here is outlining minimum conditions for
> rigor or discipline that an analysis has to meet in order to qualify as a
> (potentially successful) transcendental analysis. Is that right?
>
> I skip over Walter's contrasts with Kant, other than to ask for (preferably)
> a sketch or alternatively a reference explaining why we all know Kant's
> 'project' failed. I don't quite see that it failed, though I certainly don't
> think everything the man wrote limned the nature of reality either.
>
> Walter walks through an example:
>
> > -----> ...Take "argumentation" (P). A T analysis of
> > argumentation has the following premises:
> >
> > P1: If P is to be possible, it must satisfy conditions x, y, and z. (The
> latter
> > are the posited conditions necessary for the possibility of P. These
> conditions
> > are "internal" to P - they are not empirical conditions which, as
> empirical,
> > would be external to, contingent to, and independent of P. Hence, we are
> not
> > dealing with causal conditions. X, y, and z are thus hypothesized to be
> > necessary conceptual presuppositions of P. Note that T claims and arguments
> are
> > fallible.)
> >
> > P2: P is actual. (People actually do engage in argumentation; argumentation
> is
> > a public, social practice.)
> >
> > C: Therefore, x, y and z constitute necessary conditions for the
> possibility of
> > P.
> >
> > This is the form of a T argument. Subsequent argument attempts to provide
> > warrant for the premises. Another example, this time from Heidegger (HIM
> again):
> > "Only agents are able to make causal claims, since such claims presuppose
> an
> > understanding of counterfactual conditionals that only a being in the mode
> of
> > human being could comprehend.)
>
> I think I take the general point here, though I am skeptical that Walter's
> argument template is sound as it stands.
>
> The crux, as it seems to me, is in the premise and I'm also not sure I
> understand the premise fully, so what follows may be off base, in which case
> I would appreciate a clarification about the premise (with thanks to Donal
> for his clarification about my over-hasty modal logic).
>
> The premise is that x, y and z are necessary conditions (and perforce (per
> Walter) therefore not empirical conditions) for the phenomenon P. If I
> understand it, the transcendental argument is that given that P is real, x, y
> and z must really be the necessary conditions for the possibility of P (this
> is the move I don't think is quite correct or clear as Walter has laid it
> out), which then, it would seem, encourages the further exploration of x, y
> and z irrespective of what might otherwise appear as their empirical heft.
PICKING IT UP HERE
ED:
> Or so, anyway, I can explain to myself why one would use the term
> 'transcendental' for what seems to me a fairly straightforward matter, namely
> the exploration of whether some phenomenon has necessary conditions or
> prerequisites.
>
> But once I put it thus plainly, it is a bit easier for me to explain my view
> that Wittgenstein was not making transcendental claims in the various
> passages Walter cites and/or paraphrases from Philosophical Investigations.
> Here's how I would put it now:
>
> While I can imagine one treating as transcendental an assertion such as
> "Reference to an experience of a sensation by the use of 'S' is possible only
> if I can check my use of 'S'", there are other, equally reasonable readings
> of that assertion which do not meet the conditions that define
> 'transcendental'.
---------> From a love of mankind, I am willing to accept the view that some of
W's assertions could legitimately be understood as T claims though there are
other possible interpretations of those same claims. (This independent of W's
own understandings of what we was doing.) Because I read W as a philosopher, I
look for T analyses and arguments since these constitute the only analyses and
arguments that accord with a justifiably univocal conception of philosophy as a
unique discipline of inquiry.
ED:
> For example, to use Walter's terminology (perhaps ineptly), one can read this
> sentence as an empirical assertion. Consider: "Riding a bike is possible
> only if you sit on the seat and push the pedals" spoken in response to
> someone who wants to discuss the role of the distributor cap in bicycle
> riding. It's a clarification of terminology and a directing of attention
> towards the empirical phenomenon under discussion (which is why I called it
> 'empirical'), not a definition of necessary conditions for bicycle riding,
> except possibly in a purely formalistic sense.
----------> Not clear on what the "purely formalistic sense is about" and even
less clear on distributor caps (though I think my Volvo has at least one of
them things.) But surely, Eric's T analyses if his assertion is incorrect: I
remember giving Sharon Flaschner - my grade 5 sweetheart - lots of rides on my
bike, the handlebars to be precise. She enjoyed these adventures tremendously
and I dare say would have found it quite odd for someone to say to her that she
really didn't go for a bike ride with Walter (to the cemetary). I also recall
riding my bike after someone stole my banana seat. Not very comfortable to be
sure, but certainly within the conceptual bounds of "riding a bike." Finally,
imagine Walter and Sharon coasting down a hill at breakneck speed. Neither of
them is pushing the pedals. Are we not "riding a bike?"
ED:
> I, for one, think Wittgenstein intended something more like the latter,
> non-transcendental reading, and whether he did so intend or not, I also think
> it is a reasonable sort of reading.
>
> I therefore said that Wittgenstein did *not* make a transcendental claim,
> though those interested in transcendental claims can, without grotesque
> distortion of these individual assertions, coin transcendental claims from
> them which can then be discussed on their merits as such.
>
> However, I also think that such handling radically misses the point
> Wittgenstein was making, as I read him. There may well be topics in which
> something like a transcendental understanding is available -- mathematics
> comes to mind, theoretical physics, etc. But when it comes to considering
> human life in toto, even a specific aspect of human life like language, I
> think that Wittgenstein was at pains to illustrate why it might be imprudent
> (i.e. practically not very useful in any context he could imagine and
> therefore also not intellectually compelling) to imagine that such
> transcendental understanding was to be had. It is because I read him this
> way that I was so emphatic that he was not making transcendental claims.
----> I understand Eric's position. But again, I want to seek refuge in the
hermeneutic distinction between what the meaning of a writer's claims can
plausibly and legitimately be taken to be, and his or her own interpretations
of those claims - assuming that the post-TLP W actually did eschew the view
that some of his assertions did (intend to) identify universal and necessary
conditions of different aspects of human experience/phenomena. Does anyone know
if W ever made a pronouncement of such a sort?
ED:
> Perhaps, though, I would do better sticking to my own case. I do not believe
> I was making a transcendental claim when I asserted that to understand a
> moral judgment one had to understand how the words refer to real
> interactions. I can understand why one who finds transcendental analysis
> useful might read my claim as such, but I deny that the claim can only be so
> understood or even that it can best be so understood.
------> Fair 'nuff. Though the hermeneutic that applies to our reading of W
also
applies to our reading of Eric's claims.
ED:
> I was, instead, trying to make a practical point about the practical
> experience of understanding moral judgments, like the one about riding a
> bike. I think that if we're discussing 'understanding moral judgments' then
> we're discussing something that involves understanding the reference to at
> least potentially real human interactions in the terms used in such
> judgments, just like talking about riding a bike involves, at least
> indirectly, talking about sitting on the seat and pushing the pedals.
--> I tried to chase down the "riding a bike" example above. On the other
matter: Eric has altered his initial position to now read that the meaning of a
moral judgement is conditioned for its possibility by a "reference to at *least
potentially real human interactions* [emph. mine]." As a native Canadian, I am
genetically predisposed to seek conciliation, solidarity and coalitions at all
times - even with parties ultimately intent on dismantling the unity of our
great country. (You wanted democracy? You got it.) Hence, for the present, I
will rest content with Eric's small concession and register my agreement.
ED:
> I
> think it is simply a mistake in usage, not a profound intellectual point, to
> think there is something called 'riding a bike' that doesn't involve sitting
> on the seat and pushing the pedals, and a similar mistake in usage to think
> there is something called 'understanding a moral judgment' which does not
> involve understanding how real human interactions work.
-----> Here Eric provides a summary of his above claims - claims which I have
addressed above in my reply.
ED:
> But perhaps the way forward is to for me to say, OK, let's assume my
> assertion was a transcendental claim, what would follow from that?
--------> Eric asks what follows from philosophical truth. Which I take to be a
query regarding the value (i.e. benefit) of such truth. Surely I need not
answer such a question.
Continuing thanks to Eric for raising important critical questions regarding
these matters.
Walter O
MUN
>
> Regards to one and all,
> Eric Dean
> Washington DC
>
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