[lit-ideas] Re: What is a transcendental claim?
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2008 17:12:04 -0330
A remark or two at the end of John's post ------->
(Btw, in saying that "Kant's projects failed" I was referring in the context of
my remarks to the epistemology of Kant's First Critique. Kant's T'l
reconstruction of the nature and conditions of morality as developed in the
Groundwork and the Second Critique has much to offer us still.)
Quoting John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>:
> First, a word of thanks to Eric and Walter for a very enlightening
> discussion. Second, Happy Holidays to all.
>
> On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 6:13 AM, <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >
> > Quoting Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
> >
> >
> > > I've been going back and forth with Walter and, to some extent, others
> > about
> > > whether various assertions are or are not transcendental claims. I
> > thought I
> > > understood what that term meant, but perhaps I don't.
> > >
> > > As I understand it, a transcendental claim is a claim that asserts
> > conditions
> > > for the possibility of experience in general. If a successful claim, it
> > > 'transcends' experience in the sense that its assertion is independent
> of
> > all
> > > experience because it establishes conditions for all experience.
> >
> > ----> No, this would be to assimilate T arguments/analyses to Kant's
> highly
> > peculiar conception in the First Critique. As I have laboured to make
> > clear,
> > plausible T analyses/arguments posit as their object of inquiry
> > (reconstruction) a competence, discourse, or some other dimension of human
> > understanding (meaning, language, etc). This object of analysis is
> > carefully
> > delineated and the analysis pursues *that* comprehension of the phenomenon
> > and
> > no other. Only as such can T analyses yield univocal results. Kant
> believed
> > he
> > could identify "apriori" conditions for the possibility of experience
> > itself
> > (ueberhaupt!)- which is to say that it is the entire
> > possible network of *objects* of experience that is being delineated for T
> > inquiry. As we all know, Kant's project failed. I don't use the term
> > "apriori"
> > for that reason. ()At this juncture, it may be said that Robin George
> > Collingwoood had something important to say on this topic. As did the
> > philosopher of education Richard S. Peters. I'll postpone commentary on
> > these
> > authors until requested.)
> >
>
> A particular thanks to Walter, coupled with a withdrawal of some of my more
> odious remarks about transcendental reasoning and religious belief. Had I
> known that Walter would say, "As we all know, Kant's project failed," and
> that he was pursuing more modest objectives, I would have been more
> temperate.
>
> >
> > ED:
> > > Either way, there seem to be perfectly mundane, well-established terms
> > that
> > > do the work 'transcendental' would be doing, which is why I think
> > construing
> > > the term this way renders it otiose.
> >
> > -------> I don't think there is any other word in English with the same
> > meaning. It is a philosophical construct. As such, no other natural
> > language
> > would have equivocal expressions for it either. (Philosophy is not
> > semantics;
> > we're not playing word games. Philosophy is concerned with concepts -
> > usually
> > with concepts that construct the phenomenon of investigation. Then the
> > empirical sciences take over and all our philosophical work goes under
> like
> > water under the bridge. But that's OK, nobody goes into philosophy in
> order
> > to
> > feel the heat of the limelight.
> >
>
> Here, now, is a substantive problem: How does one sustain the assertion that
> "Philosophy is not semantics: we are not playing word games"? Is not
> philosophy an entirely verbal activity? It is easy to see a distinction
> between specialized languages, like those of logic and mathematics, in which
> the semantics are artificially and rigorously defined, as opposed to natural
> languages, which are sloppier in this regard. But surely, as philosophers'
> continuing arguments over what they say means clearly demonstrates, rigorous
> definition is, outside of fully formalized logic and mathematics, more an
> ideal than reality. And even in the case of what are intended to be fully
> formalized systems, lacunae appear, stimulating further debate. When push
> comes to shove, we have no access to concepts but language and talk about
> concepts is inevitably talk about the semantics of the terms used to
> describe them.
> Or, am I missing something here?
>
> P.S. I look forward to seeing the answer. Please note, however, that I leave
> Japan today to spend a white Christmas with geysers and in-laws in
> Yellowstone National Park, where there is no Internet, no cell phone
> coverage, not even TV. For the first time in a decade, Ruth and I will be
> completely offlne.
>
> P.P.S. Once again, Happy Holidays and best wishes for the New Year to
> everyone.
>
> John
--------------> I would say that philosophy is a "verbal activity" in the sense
that it can only be pursued within a language. But I don't believe that
philosophy is "entirely" amatter of language since some features of language
are of no necessary relevance to philsophical analysis. "Semantics," understood
(somewhat naively, I grant) as an empirical study of the meanings of words is
one such feature. From a philosophical perspective, what tribe A means by a
word such as say, "coercion," and its possible uses of the term in such
statements as "Paul was successfully coerced into believing the truth
(rightness) of P"" is of semantic interest, but not philosophical interest.
Philosophy deals with concepts and while concepts are only possible in a
language, uses of language have no final authority over what is conceptually
sensible and what not. That one cannot be coerced into believing that a
statement is true, or a prescription an obligatory one, is a philosophical
claim about the possibilities and limits of the concepts involved.
I was also differentiating philosophical analysis from what students will now
and again aver about conceptual reflection: (Paraphrasing:) "Teachers'
understandings of 'professional accountability' vary, Walter, as do judges'
ideas about a teacher's 'right to a private life' and as do curriculum guides
on 'critical thinking.' All we're really doing is playing word games here;
words are defined by people in power - they tell us what's 'rational' and what
not - and as pre-service teachers we have to learn those words and
ideas if we want to succeed. .... I know you don't see these things like me,
like us, but that's because you're here in the university, and not in the
schools where life is alot diifferent."
(Give me 2 or 3 like those in a class of 40 and I'll be more than happy.)
Walter O
MUN
P.S. Oh, a final word, about what John says about "philosophers' continuing
arguments over what they say means:" This happens, more times than not, because
a philosophical concept hasn't been clearly understood by one's
auditors/readers. Thomas Scanlon or Immanuel Kant or Jurgenm Habermas are quite
clear on what they mean by "morality." Seemingly endless disputations over the
meanings of concepts should not be attributed to some intrinsic ontological
feature of vagueness or imprecision in our concepts and language - an
attribution often motivated by a hidden realist metaphysics. And of course some
conceptual disputation is healthy as it serves to clarify the sense of a concept
in its possible applications to contexts and principles raised by one's
critics.
>
> --
> John McCreery
> The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
> Tel. +81-45-314-9324
> jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://www.wordworks.jp/
>
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
