-- On Tue, 23/12/08, wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote: > Please scroll down to "non sequitor:" > ---------------> > > > We might agree that for anything to be actual it must > be possible (i.e. > > 'possibly actual'):- this means that from (the > truth of) 'a.' we can deduce, > > trivially, that _it is possible_ that there is no > occasion on which this > > particular stove will ever work right. After all if it > is not possible, it > > cannot be actually the case that 'a.'. > > ---------------> Non Sequitor: > > It is surely true, as Donal writes, that if P is actual, > then P > must be possible. But Donal goes on to claim in his example > that from 'a' > ("There is no occasion on which this particular stove > will ever work right") we > can "trivially deduce" the conclusion: "It > is possible that there is no > occasion > on which this particular stove will ever work right." > As such, Donal maintains > that from the actuality claimed in 'a', the > possibility claim in the conclusion > necessarily follows. > I believe that the deduction is neither trivial nor valid, > and I also am > prepared to go on record for saying that I believe the > Toronto Maple Leafs > have a better chance of winning the Stanley Cup this year > than Donal's > deducation has of being sound. Where have things > gone wrong. Surely in incorrectly rendering equivalent the > expression "it must > be possible" and "it is possible." Perhaps this is too subtle for me, but I don't see the non sequitur as yet nor do I see _in this context_ the importance of a distinction between (1) "It must be possible that [x]..." and (2)"It is possible that [x]..." What might be the distinction between these two expressions? Here is one possibility:- '(2)' merely asserts that [x] may be the case but '(1)' goes further and asserts that it is by some kind of necessity - or _must_ - that [x] may be the case. That is, '(2)' claims that [x] may be the case contingently whereas '(1)' claims [x] may be the case of necessity. Put another way, '(1)' asserts that the impossibility of [x] is, by some kind of necessity, not possible; '(2)' merely asserts that the impossibility of [x] is not actual i.e. that it is the case, though it need not be the case, that [x] is possible. This kind of distinction might make sense when we are dealing merely with questions of modality without any futher givens. But in my deduction 'a' is a given. Given (the truth of) 'a' then, so I suggested, we can deduce that (the truth of) 'a' is possible; and we can equally deduce that - given 'a' - 'a' must be possible, as the _must_ here is the _must_ of a logical deduction from 'a is actual' to 'a is possible'. This must be a valid deduction because the negation of 'a is possible' is that 'a is not possible'; but if 'a is not possible' then we cannot logically maintain that 'a is actual'. In the context of a given 'a', the distinction between deducing 'a is possible' and 'a must be possible' is without a difference because the deduction derives from a logical 'must'. So I really don't understand why Walter's comments below are correct:- as to claim the actuality of P would, on my view, be to necessarily claim the possibility of P and necessarily to claim that P "must be possible" where the "must" is one of logical deduction. That is, I don't get the distinction between P "is possible" and "must be possible" in any useful way here; and since Walter concedes the actuality of P entails P "must be possible", how can it be that P "must be possible" though it may not be the case that P "is possible"? > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > OK, where were we?, oh yes: > > To claim the actuality of P is not necessarily to claim the > possibility of P. > Although, as mentioned above, to claim the actuality of P > is indeed to claim > that P "must be possible." An honest pre-owned > car dealer - yes, we know what > he > really is - may well aver: "Friend, don't even > think about it. That heap will > never run again." On the other hand, a somewhat less > than fully candid and > scrupulous dealer may well tell you: "Friend, > she's a good lookin' > machine, ain't she. A real Z-28. But I should tell you > that it's possible, only > possible, mind you, that she'll never run again." > > Walter O > MUN Donal Johnny's in the basement Mixing up modalities ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html