[lit-ideas] Re: Try a Logic Problem
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2006 16:15:01 +0100 (BST)
Before getting our (false)teeth into Tarski, here is an interesting
development that should perhaps be addressed first.
At least two people seem to be suggesting that the distinction between a
?linguistic entity (or object)? and a ?non-linguistic entity (or object)? is
at least ?dubious?, if not non-existent.
[Phil Enns writes at one point, ?The 'linguistic entity' is as much a myth as
the 'non-linguistic entity?].
My problem starts perhaps with the fact that I?m currently rather of the view
that I am sitting on a non-linguistic object and typing this on a
non-linguistic object and that this is so even if we can refer, and perhaps
only refer, to such non-linguistic objects using language (and, thus, using
linguistic ?entities? or ?objects? or words or concepts etc.).
Am I confused in this commonsense belief? What arguments do the philosophers
have to overthrow this commonsense belief? And are their arguments valid or
themselves a product of some confusion and likely only to promote confusion?
Well let?s look at what they so far say?[i.e. ?the facts? of what they say]?
[My comments will be inserted here and there].
OK writes:-
" This seems to me like a largely semantic dispute
turning around the meaning of "facts."
It seems to me it can be treated this way ? as a definitional point. But it
can also be treated, and is better treated, as a point of substantive
metaphysics.
As a merely definitional point, for example, we can insist that a false
statement never can express ?facts? because ?facts? must actually be the case
and a false statement does not state what is actually the case.
But this definition of ?facts? depends on using ?facts? to denote only
?actually existing states-of-affairs?. Even if we define ?facts? this way, we
can surely say that a false statement expresses ?alleged facts? ? that is, it
has content that ? if true ? would express ?the facts?. It has ?factual
content? or ?content of a factual nature? in some sense (in terms of its
content and what it alleges to be the case) even if it lacks ?factual
content? or ?content of a factual nature? in some other sense (because what
it alleges is not in fact the case).
Whether we accept this definition (or not) does not seem to me to alter the
substantive issues at stake e.g. Can a linguistic entity be distinguished
from a non-linguistic entity? Can a linguistic entity refer to a
non-linguistic entity?
OK writes:-
The term ?facts" seems to entail truth or correspondence to
reality, thus there cannot be false facts.
This is only one way of defining ?facts?, and not very helpful here ? because
the question is not so much whether there can be ?false facts? but whether
there can be ?false statements? i.e. statements with (alleged) ?factual
content? in some sense but which are nevertheless false.
OK continues:-
Facts are also a human construct so it seems to me that Walter
is right that statements express facts rather than
correspond to statement-independent facts.
This point seems to me confused because there is no clear reason why the
sense in which ?Facts are a human construct? (e.g. because any assertion we
make of ?fact? is a ?human construct? in some sense) means that the
?construct? or statement by which we might make such an assertion therefore
cannot ?correspond to statement-independent facts?.
OK?s assertion/statement is entirely question-begging on this key point and,
we shall see, no good argument is given for it. It is also, I think ?false?.
The opposition it sets up is also false:- for a statement can (given its
content) ?express facts? and also (given its content) ?correspond to
statement-independent facts.? Why not? [Why is Walter so obviously ?right? in
denying this when he has so singularly failed to explain ?Why not??, despite
being asked to do so]
In fact, if we do restrict ?facts? to mean ?actually existing
states-of-affairs?, how can a statement ?express? ?actually existing
states-of-affairs? (where, as is typical, these are statement independent
?states-of-affairs?) without corresponding to ?statement-independent facts??
OK continues:-
There must be however a statement-independent reality (or at
least independent from the particular statement) to
which true or fact-expressing statements correspond,
as opposed to false or fictional ones.
This is putting it too strongly for me. I think there is a
?statement-independent reality?. Of course. But is this a ?must?? In what
sense?
It seems, on reflection, possible that there is no ?statement-independent
reality?. It just so happens that this is not the case ? and that, which is
different, the balance of argument is against this being the case. [This
argument takes us into realism vs. anti-realism, and at a highly general and
metaphysical level].
Yet, from the fact that we can make statements that appear to posit ?facts?
outside of the statement, we cannot argue conclusively that therefore there
?must be?a statement-independent reality.? For the appearances to us might be
deceptive. This is a possibility we cannot entirely discount.
OK?s next point seems to me irrelevant to the main issue (and perhaps merely
addresses Walter?s ?ad hominems?)?
The subsequent claims, e.g. that the ability to make truth claims
requires such or such personal qualities, would seem
to be empirical and as such would require empirical
evidence before we could determine whether they are
true or false.
Phil Enns writes:-
Finally, how is a correspondence between a
linguistic phenomenon, the 'statement', and a presumably non-linguistic
entity, the 'fact', possible?
I would suggest that this is not a
helpful approach to a "theory of truth".
Earlier in a thread I tried to make the point that we must distinguish
different kinds of explanation: for example, we must distinguish an
explanation of how x and y interact from a further explanation of how it is
even possible that x and y can interact.
We can have the first kind of explanation, one that is perfectly satisfactory
for most reasonable purposes, without having much of an explanation of the
second kind.
This point is, I think, very important, though its importance does not seem
to be reflected in subsequent discussion:? it is important because it is
important to be clear what kind of explanation we are asking for. In
particular we cannot reason from the fact that we cannot explain how
?correspondence? between language and reality is even possible [in some
?deeper? metaphysical sense] to the conclusion that therefore such
correspondence does not exist. To warrant the last conclusion we would have
to show either (a) such correspondence does not exist or, even more, (b) such
correspondence is impossible.
But that we cannot, in some sense, explain how it is possible does not mean
it is impossible or does not happen (after all, who can explain in some very
deep sense how even ?existence?, the ?existence? of ?anything?, is possible?
Or, to take something perhaps only slightly less general, how is the
?universe? even possible?).
In this light Phil?s comments that speaking of ?correspondence? is not
?helpful? does not seem particularly helpful [in fact, it ?helps? in all
kinds of practical situations to speak of ?correspondence? and lack of it].
He does not explain why it is unhelpful, and to suggest it is ?unhelpful?
because we have not explained how it is possible is as fallacious as
suggesting talk about the universe is not ?helpful? until we have explained
how the universe is ?possible?.
Note also: Phil does not spell out a more ?helpful? alternative. This is a
pattern. Phil expresses his dissatisfaction with this and that but does not
put a clear alternative on the table to be weighed against what he is
dissatisfied with. This is not ?helpful? (it is, some might say, quite
?Wittgensteinian? though).
Phil is not alone, I think, in being waylaid onto the rocks of metaphysical
?possibility?. Even Robert Paul writes:-
That there 'is not and cannot be an answer' to how a correspondence is
possible between statements (sentences, propositions, judgments) and an
alleged 'non-linguistic entity,' viz., in the ordinary language of
detectives, lawyers, various parties to various disputes and negotiations, a
fact, seems to fly in the face of plain facts, to use an _expression on which
philosophers do not hold the copyright.
I think I agree with the tendency of this insofar as it expresses a ?realism?
that we do actually use language to refer to non-linguistic (and not just
linguistic) reality. But I do not think it is quite right to suggest that the
?plain facts? of ?ordinary language? show ?how a correspondence is possible?
between language and non-linguistic reality.
These ?plain facts? are, as RP I am sure knows better than I, often not so
?plain? ? but, in any case, they are at best an argument (perhaps very strong
but nevertheless inconclusive) that such correspondence is possible; they are
not (necessarily) an explanation of how such correspondence is possible.
Robert Paul continues:-
And why, for that matter, isn't there a similar puzzle about inter-linguistic
correspondence?
I agree. Why should this kind of ?inter-linguistic? ?correspondence? be any
less (or more) ?mysterious? than correspondence between language and a
non-linguistic reality?
However, while I do not disagree with the following, I do think there is an
arguable mystery here (this is of course where Popperians of a hue tend to
disagree with Wittgensteinians of a hue: for us ?the riddle does exist?)
though of course this mystery does not favour the argument that because
?correspondence? is (in some sense) mysterious it therefore does not, or
cannot, happen. [After all, the absence of any correspondence would be at
least as ?mysterious?] .
'Die Katze ist auf der Matte' corresponds to 'The cat is on the mat.' But of
course the physical makeup one sentence does not correspond to that of the
other. 'You don't understand. It isn't that kind of correspondence I meant.'
And the same for 'zed' and 'zero,' no doubt. Then what kind of mysterious
correspondence are you looking for? 'The same meaning'?
Phil Enns subsequently writes, in reply to Robert Paul:-
In other words, and it couldn't be otherwise, X is caught out in a false
claim by other true claims. At no point do we encounter this mythological
being, the 'non-linguistic entity', that dances through the dreams of so many
philosophers.
Now, as stated at the outset, I think I am sitting on a ?non-linguistic
entity? and do not think I am alone in this or that this entity is merely a
?mythological? something that ?dances through the dreams of so many
philosophers.?
Does Phil offer a shred of argument in favour of his view? Not really,
certainly not yet.
Let?s be clear about one thing:- that fact that I need to use language to
refer to what I am sitting on [a ?sofa?], and therefore that to do this I
need to use a linguistic object of some sort [perhaps the concept ?sofa?],
does not mean that what I am sitting on becomes merely a linguistic object.
Nor does it mean that in referring to the sofa I am merely referring to the
linguistic object or concept ?sofa? ? I could actually be referring to the
non-linguistic object I am sitting on.
Robert Paul later writes, in direct response to Phil?s last quoted point:-
.
> At no point do we encounter this mythological being,
the\'non-linguistic entity', that dances through the >
dreams of so many philosophers.
Again, I'm not sure what's being denied here. I say:
'There are four
dots in a row.'
The world says: ? ? ?
Phil says: 'What you said isn't true.'
Phil is right, but his grounds for saying it would (I
think) be that
there are three, not four dots, which is supported by
? ? ?
I'll call this a state of affairs, an arrangement of
things in the world
outside the sentence, a non-linguistic entity,
perhaps.
To paraphrase RP, I think I?m with Robert here.
Taking this up, Phil replies:-
"I'll leave it to Phil to explain how 'No, that is not
true,' doesn't
involve some reference to how things are"
It does. At the very same time as, and precisely
because, it involves a
reference to a sentence. Which is why I find the
fact/language distinction dubious.
It may not be obvious, but it is implicit in the above why this is not a good
argument and one that clarifies nothing.
Let?s make another thing clear. One and the same statement [e.g. ?The cat is
on the mat?] can (in some sense) refer both to another statement [e.g. ?The
cat is not on the mat?, and a ?linguistic entity? as such; ?refer? in that,
for example, it is a response to this claim] and at the same time (though not
necessarily in the same way or same sense) refer to ?how things are? [which
is a non-linguistic entity - as whether the cat is on the mat, or not, is not
merely language-dependent or a linguistic entity].
But so what? How does this make the ?fact/language distinction dubious??
Or does Phil have something different in mind? If he does perhaps he can
clarify the gnomic claim that the statement ?No, that is not true? ?involves
reference to a sentence?. What sentence? Itself? What other kind of sentence?
What kind of ?reference??
That Phil can offer this kind of gnomic utterance as showing ?why I find the
fact/language distinction dubious?, and offer no further clarification,
perhaps shows why so many people find so-called philosophers ?dubious?.
Especially when they are pontificating on matters where they are quite
against commonsense (insofar as commonsense can even be bothered to be
against them).
In thinking many philosophers are logic-chopping, shape-shifting,
obscurantists who are quick to nit-pick on the unimportant but slow to make
themselves clear on the important, the general public (insofar as they are
interested) may well be right (and here Wittgenstein, Russell and Popper, to
name but three important philosophers, agree with them).
Phil ends up offering this ?argument?:-
However, the world does not separate out, does not
say, '? ? ?' as
being a state of affairs or an arrangement of things.
That is what we
do when we say 'This is called three dots in a row'
and point
accordingly. So when we see '? ? ?' it is that
"arrangement of things
in the world" along with the English sentence 'This is
three dots in a
row' that makes it possible to say, "It is not true
that there are four
dots in a row". A straightforward solution that drops
out unnecessary
causes like that mythological 'non-linguistic entity'.
Let?s have a closer look at this, step-by-step as it were.
However, the world does not separate out, does not
say, '? ? ?' as
being a state of affairs or an arrangement of things.
Yeh, the language-independent reality (here [?]) ?does not say? ???. So what?
This is only to say that language-independent reality does not ?say?, or
?separate out?, the formulation in language that might correspond to it.
Of course it bloody doesn?t. It?s language-independent reality. It?s not a
?language-independent-reality-that-nevertheless-states-itself-in-language?.
Get a grip, anyone who denies this and to whom Phil must think he is
speaking.
That is what we
do when we say 'This is called three dots in a row'
and point
accordingly.
Yeh, we are the ones who make statements about language-independent reality.
Language-independent reality does not make these kinds of statements. Not
about itself (or even about us). In fact, I might even generalise (perhaps
further than Phil in his wisdom would go):- language-independent reality
makes no statements.
So when we see '? ? ?' it is that
"arrangement of things
in the world" along with the English sentence 'This is
three dots in a
row' that makes it possible to say, "It is not true
that there are four
dots in a row". A straightforward solution that drops
out unnecessary
causes like that mythological 'non-linguistic entity'.
Now, there is a perhaps an important underlying point here ? very important ?
that we may need to come back to. This important point might be put in
various ways ? for example, to what extent is our understanding of reality
?subject-dependent? and in what ways?
But let?s look as this as it stands:- does it supply an argument so that we
can do without ?that mythological ?non-linguistic entity???
I don?t think so. Except in the Pyrrhic sense in which we can eliminate
bedbugs (or buggery) by refusing to ever mention them. For Phil says nothing
that shows that the question ?Whether there are three dots in a row (is a
fact or not)?? is not a question where the truth of the answer depends on the
non-linguistic facts, or a non-linguistic state-of-affairs or a
non-linguistic entity.
The most Phil?s point might indicate is that without the necessary language
or ?conceptual apparatus? we might not recognise the facts ? we might not
recognise a ?dot?, a ?row?, the concept of ?three? etc.
But this would not show that the facts as to ?Whether there are three dots in
a row?? are a ?language-dependent entity? rather than a language-independent
entity.
Put another way ? there were ?100? ?dinosaurs? in a certain ?area? on ?earth?
long before humans developed a conceptual apparatus that included the terms
?100?, ?dinosaurs?, ?area? and ?earth?. And ?there were? these facts, and
still would be these facts, even if humans and their ?conceptual apparatus?
had never subsequently evolved.
Phil suggests that:-
The 'linguistic entity' is
as much a myth as
the 'non-linguistic entity'. As I said earlier, I
find the
fact/language distinction dubious.
He suggests the contrary suggestion is just ?handwaving?.
I suggest Phil?s (vague) suggestion that he has managed to dispense with or
dissolve the distinction between language and reality, or between
language-dependent statements/claims about ?facts? and the
language-independent ?facts? upon which depend the truth-value of many such
statements/claims, is not supported by any clear argument ? and to be gulled
by Phil?s post is to be gulled by a ?handwaving? of a conjuror?s kind ? the
kind of conjuror who can seemingly make metaphysical rabbits disappear into
?mythological? silk hats.
The last word may go for now to Phil, since it corroborates my suggestion
that his postings take the underlying argument nowhere and are mere
?handwaving? ? at least until Phil can properly spell out what is wrong in
the alleged ?wrong way? of talking as though ?facts exist? [they do] and
leaving aside Aunt Sallies like the idea that this means ?The world says?
anything in any language-dependent sense of ?says? [it doesn?t]:-
All the other stuff about whether chairs are facts or
whether sentences
about chairs express facts is handwaving. To
paraphrase Robert, people
are able to talk about chairs and even, remarkably,
use chairs, despite
not having read philosophy.
This is not to say that there isn't a place for
philosophical discussion
regarding facts, just that all this 'facts exist' and
'The world says'
business is the wrong way.
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