Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>: > Finally, how is a correspondence between a linguistic phenomenon, > the 'statement', and a presumably non-linguistic entity, the 'fact', > possible? I would suggest that this is not a helpful approach to a > "theory of truth". I think Phil's question is a very astute one. I wish I had an answer. Or: perhaps I shouldn't wish for an answer since there is not, and cannot be, an answer. (Note that philosopers are much more interested in in the latter sort of claim than in the former.) Perhaps the only way to show that a belief or statement is true is through its relation(s) to other beliefs or statements. This is of course Richard Rorty's position. (I'm not clear on whether Habermas would concur, however, regarding rightness claims.) Is it construction, not discovery, all the way down? And is it true that Mike Geary is a Russian Orthodox priest? (Imagine someone were to say: "Well, let us examine the facts, here." As if, "Russian Orthodox priest" were a mind- and language- independent fact. One cannot be a Russian Orthodox priest, unless one understood oneself as being that (Heidegger, *So Much Being, So Little Time*). We cannot exist as we are independently of our understanding of who/what we are. Perplexed, WCO MUN P.S. What do you get when you cross a philosopher with somebody who watches over sheep? (Would that be a suitable name for what Habermas refers to as a "guardian of rationality"?) Off to see Deutschland vs. the Bad Guys. Oy! ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html