[lit-ideas] Re: Show and tell
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 13:28:35 +0100 (BST)
The ‘say/show’ distinction is admittedly problematic – even
highly problematic. But that does not mean it is wrong (it does not mean it is
right either of course). This post is to say a few things by way of defence of
W’s fundamental POV – and that it is a POV to be taken seriously and not
dismissed as silly. It wants to stress that some of the opposition to this POV
arises from not taking seriously enough the idea that there are “limits of
language”. Unless we take very seriously the idea that there are “limits of
language”, it is almost inevitable that we shall not take an idea like a
‘say/show’ distinction very seriously.
It seems to me that W is on the right lines in thinking most
of us are largely blind to the “limits of language” as he is concerned with
them. We (unconsciously or otherwise) tend to the view that language can do
whatever we want or need it to do: after all, we might think, specify something
that language cannot
do? But this challenge would be naïve (naïve like Turing’s challenge): for, in
being able to specify, we would have
to be able to put into language the challenge language must meet – and it is
not surprising that language can meet (most or all of) the challenges that can
be
put into language.
To understand W’s very different POV we need to understand
that, for W, language is very limited in fundamental ways: the “limits of
language” are extremely severe, but they are often inconspicuous to us,
particularly because those limits are not themselves expressed in language – so
we use language blind to its limits. They are also invisible to us because
language by and large does what we ordinarily try to do with it: so we
ordinarily do not experience or run up against its limits.
Here is an analogy with a machine-builder. The machine-builder
has a whole range of items with which to build machines – nuts and bolts,
springs and coils, levers and buttons, cylinders and pumps etc. The
machine-builder may not experience any “limits to
machines”: he may even challenge anyone to specify any kind of machine,
claiming that he can always make a machine to that specification.
But this challenge would be naïve (as per Turing’s ‘machine argument’) to show
there are not “limits to machines”: for, in being able to specify, we would
have to be able to put the specification in terms
so that the challenge could be met by a machine-builder. If we did not, the
machine-builder might object that what we were specifying was not a machine
[say we specified that he build us a novel]: and the specification of something
that is not a machine, he might insist, cannot be used as an argument as to
there being “limits to machines”.
Is the machine-builder right in his attitude and response?
One view is this: there may be an infinity of combinations of machine-parts so
as to build different machines and in this sense there may be no limit to
machines – there may be an infinite number of unique machines that may be built
(though we may find their uniqueness is often negligible compared to their
similarity as types); yet each of the
various parts of machines – each component – may be seen to have limited
properties, and also limited properties in terms of how it can be combined with
other components so as to make a machine. These limits may be understood as
“logical limits” to the building of machines. Not every combination of
components can make a machine: we do not make a machine by tipping components
into a barrel – for such a barrel of components lacks the (logically) necessary
relationships to constitute a working machine or a machine at all.
Language with “sense” also consists of various components
aligned in various combinations: these components have limited properties, and
they are also limited in the combinations they can have so that they make
sense. Not every combination of components makes language with “sense”: we do
not make language with “sense” merely by randomly throwing together various
components. There are “limits” to how we can combine components of language and
even to how we can use individual components (insofar as these may have “sense”
in a way that stands alone: though we may see that, for Wittgenstein, no
component of language – not even a name – has its “sense” in a truly
stand-alone way). These “limits” may be understood as “logical limits”. These
“logical limits” may be understood as setting the “limits of language”, just as
the “logical limits” of machine-components and their combinations may be
understood as setting the “limits of machines” (we cannot build a machine that
is a novel: that is a “logical limit” on what we can do with machines).
Now can we build a machine that maps these “logical limits”
of machine-building? Most of us would intuitively sense that we cannot: we
could not use the limited components and their limited combinations to map out
what a machine cannot be built to do – a machine cannot be built to show what a
machine cannot be built to do. We can use the limited components and their
combinations to map out (from the ‘inside’ as it were) what machines can do –
every machine is an example of what it is logically possible for a machine to
do. But we cannot make a machine that maps out what machines cannot logically
do: and we cannot make a machine that maps out the line between what machines
can do and what they cannot do.
By analogy, this is W’s view in relation to the “limits of
language”. We can use examples of language with “sense” to map out what
language has “sense” – every example of language with sense is an example of
what it is logically possible for language to do with sense. But we cannot use
language to map out what language cannot logically do: and we cannot use
language to map out the line between
what language can do and what language cannot do.
The “limits of language” are therefore inexpressible in
language. But Wittgenstein does not think we must stop there – otherwise he
would himself have “passed over in silence” on the many issues raised by the
“limits of language”: W, both early and later, thinks these limits make
themselves “manifest” and that they may be shown.
To further understand how Wittgenstein thinks we can grapple
with what is beyond the “limits of language”, we need to turn to his work. But
I want to suggest that this POV is far from outrageously silly: in particular,
the
idea that there are “limits of language” that cannot be drawn in language
should no more be dismissed as outrageously silly than the idea that there are
“limits of machine-building” that cannot be illustrated by building a machine.
P.S. Another point that ‘silly-ists’ should be bear in mind:
Wittgenstein gives many examples to show his POV – for example, he begins
Investigations by showing how the
naming-relation is shown: his fundamental point being that it is shown rather
than said (and it is beyond the “limits of language” to explain this
naming-relation so that language itself expresses or says the explanation: that
is, we can (obviously) use language to
name objects, but we cannot use language to capture how names name objects –
this is something that can only ever be
shown). What would be impressive would be for “silly-ists” to explain the
naming-relation in a way that rebuts Wittgenstein’s POV – I think they may find
it much harder than they might think.
On Thursday, 8 May 2014, 10:44, "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
In a message dated 5/7/2014 5:20:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes about show and tell.
Both O. K. and W. O. have replied to this, focusing on the falsity of the
Wittgensteinian thesis, but without drawing the conclusion that perhaps this
may count as a 'reductio ad absurdum'. I mean,
if the show/say distinction is a consequence of the Tractatus holding that
only scientific propositions are sensical.
And this consequence is false.
--- Therefore the generalisation in the Tractatus -- that only scientific
propositions are sensical -- is itself false.
There are other options, which I will pursue here.
McEvoy is using a primary school (American primary school at that)
practice, 'show and tell'. I would strongly argue that to tell is not to say.
"Show and tell", as it happens, is the title of a favourite essay of mine
by D. W. Stampe. He is arguing for a causal account of 'show' and 'tell',
rather than 'say'.
----
McEvoy writes:
"According to the most cogent reading of the Tractatus" every proposition
in the Tractatus is an example of statements, or pseudo-statements if you
will, that show the truth but say nothing with sense, as only the
propositions of the natural sciences say anything with sense, and the
propositions of
the Tractatus are not propositions of the natural sciences".
Wittgenstein, like, for that matter, Grice (at his worst) does use 'object'
sometimes, when he deals with 'predicate' logic:
F a
involving the proposition 'p'.
I'm NOT sure this applies only to natural science -- or natural sciences as
McEvoy pluralises, but cfr. Grice, "Do not multiply natural sciences
beyond necessity").
Thus,
"The ball is red"
"The blue ball is next to the red cube."
are hardly scientific propositions (belonging to Natural Science). It is SO
easy to undestand Witters as talking about PERCEPTUAL experiences in
general, that involve the 'physical' senses -- the five of them, not just
vision.
I don't think he gives EXAMPLES of 'natural science' propositions. And I
don't think he is INTERESTED in what the 'natural scientist' is saying.
Granted, he was at heart an Austrian engineer, as Russell (Lord Russell or
Baron Russell if you mustn't) once called him -- but the epithet stuck. And
it may be argued that Austrian engineering IS a natural science. He
learned engineering, Witters did, at Manchester, so I guess Russell could well
have called him a Mancunian engineer. Remember this was in correspondence by
Russell
Dear Ottoline [Lady Ottoline Morrell],
I met a Mancunian engineer whom I'm
thinking of bringing to your party. Would THAT
be okay?
Love,
Bertie
-----
McEvoy goes on:
"In Investigations the various remarks about how "sense" is taught [how we
learn names, how we learn the sequence of natural numbers, how we learn the
sense of "Take n and continue to add 2" etc.] are part of showing how
"sense" is shown - rather than said."
McEvoy started his post with a reference to the 'most cogent reading' or
readings, as I prefer ("Do multiply readings even if they are beyond
necessity") of the Tractatus. But then the most cogent reading of the
Investigations (a book actually published by Anscombe) is that in which
Witters expands
the uses of language to apply to something more than:
"The red sphere is to the right of the blue cube."
to apply to things like imperatives ("Brick!") or "I've got a headache".
--- Since we are dealing with an alleged reductio ad absurdum of the
Tractatus, the most cogent reading of Witters's life is that he changed his
'mind': there are 'language games' (representing 'forms of life') that are
OTHER
than those of the 'natural science' -- or the world of indicative sense
experience report (perception).
McEvoy goes on:
"As to how we would further explicate the distinction, I think we must take
seriously that the say/shown distinction is a distinction that can at best
be shown - we cannot capture it in language so that we reach a point where
we may conclude "There we have said, in a way that captures it in
language, what constitutes the distinction between saying and showing."
Wittgenstein did not believes such a point could ever be reached. In both the
earlier
and later philosophy, his view is that the saying/showing distinction may
only be shown."
Still, of course McEvoy is _Saying_ or _Telling_ (if you mustn't) something
about it. And perhaps Omar's question did not refer to Witters's own
INABILITY to deal with this. Given the McEvoy IS telling or saying stuff about
the 'say-show' distinction, this may again be a 'reductio ad absurdum' of
Witters's claim if understood as personal:
"Personally, I'll be damned if the show-say distinction can be said,
rather than shown"--Witters.
Versus:
"I trust someone, someday, will succeed in the endeavour, though."
----
Wittgenstein seems to be mystifying (if that's the word), 'show'. But
there's nothing mysterious about it. We show things all the time. Things show
things. The rainbow 'shows' that rain has occurred. Smoke shows that a fire
is taking or took place somewhere.
"Tell" originates with 'number' (cfr. German 'zahl'), and it's best to
avoid it. 'Sagen' is even perhaps MORE problematic (it's cognate with 'say')
and it should be avoided, too. 'Sense' (Sinn) as used by Witters, was
overused (or 'abused', as some would prefer) by FREGE (who was not really a
philosopher, but more like a 'logician' or 'mathematician'?) and should be
avoided too.
This leaves us with common sense.
English is provided with verbs like 'show', 'say' and 'tell'.
Consider the idiom,
"Say it with flowers".
Wittgenstein would argue that the IMPLICATURE is "show" it with flowers.
But I would disagree. The 'it' here is obviously, "I LOVE YOU".
By showing a bunch of roses, the shower shows that he loves the showee.
It may be argued that 'say' in, "Say it with flowers", is metaphorical, or
figurative (as in "You're the cream in my coffee") and I would agree.
If there are figurative uses of 'say', there may well be figurative uses of
'show'.
It may be argued that 'saying' is a sort of 'showing'. If you communicate
that the cat sat on the mat, by saying, "The cat sat on the mat", it is the
case that you SAID-THAT the cat is on the mat, and you did show something.
Surely not that the cat sat on the mat. Because there are OTHER ways of
showing that -- by pointing how the cat sat on the mat -- (showing a
photograph of how the cat sat on the mat -- although it may be argued that
this
shows a photograph, and not THAT the cat sat on the mat).
But by saying that the cat sat on the mat one shows various things: that
one can articulate an English sentence, that one is displaying a belief to
the effect that one thinks that the cat is on the mat (the sentence that is
being said SHOWS or is indicative of the belief that the cat is on the mat).
It shows an interest in transmitting this belief ('exhibition') and
perhaps the further intention that one's addressee will acquire the same
belief
('protrepsis').
For the record, Grice discussed all this before Witters had his
Investigations published -- in "Meaning" (1948) -- and while the 'show-say'
distinction belongs to the Witters of the Tractatus primarily -- although
McEvoy is
right in looking for a presence of the distinction and attending thesis
(what can be shown cannot be said, notably 'sense') in Investigations, Oxford
philosophers of Grice's generation were pretty familiar with what they saw
as terribly restrictive constraints for ordinary language that Russell's
favourite Mancunian engineer was proposing (That the Mancunian engineer ends
up as Cambridge professor of philosophy was perhaps the limit for J. O.
Urmson, "Philosophical Analysis between the Wars.")
On top of that is whistle -- and Ramsey _knew_ (how to whistle -- for a
whistle SHOWS and, figuratively, 'says'.
Cheers,
Speranza
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