[lit-ideas] Re: Show and tell
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 09:57:53 -0400 (EDT)
My last post today!
In a message dated 5/8/2014 8:29:05 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"The ‘say/show’ distinction is admittedly problematic – even highly
problematic. But that does not mean it is wrong (it does not mean it is right
either of course)."
Well, if you are, like Grice, a bivalentist, then if p is not right, it is
wrong, and unlike 'double negation', two wrongs don't make it right.
"This post," McEvoy goes on,
"is to say a few things by way of defence of [Witters]’s fundamental POV –
and that it is a POV to be taken seriously and not dismissed as silly."
Or 'blessed', as I prefer. ""Silly", etymologically, is blessed." ("She is
silly is, etymologically, she is blessed" -- cfr. the Oxford Dictionary on
the Silly Virgin Mary).
McEvoy:
"It wants to stress that some of the opposition to this POV arises from
not taking seriously enough the idea that there are “limits of language”.
Unless we take very seriously the idea that there are “limits of language”,
it is almost inevitable that we shall not take an idea like a ‘say/show’
distinction very seriously."
But cfr. is a cosmologist were to argue:
"The problem with you, Newton, is that you don't seriously recognise that
the Universe is FINITE". "There are LIMITS OF THE UNIVERSE".
----
Since one of the teachings of Chomsky is that language is open-ended,
generating every day brilliancies like the poetic line from a quatrain,
Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.
it is HARDER to argue that language HAS limits -- or rather the onus
probandi lies with the 'finitist'.
McEvoy:
"It seems to me that [Witters] is on the right lines in thinking most of us
are largely blind to the “limits of language” as he is concerned with
them. We (unconsciously or otherwise) tend to the view that language can do
whatever we want or need it to do: after all, we might think, specify
something that language cannot do?"
Well, good ole Witters once infamously, perhaps he had a cold that day,
invited one of his many friends, to 'try and describe the aroma of coffee'.
--- I think he was sceptical about one's KNOWING other minds, too ("I know
you have a headache, so I won't ask").
McEvoy:
"But this challenge would be naïve (naïve like Turing’s challenge): for, in
being able to specify, we would have to be able to put into language the
challenge language must meet – and it is not surprising that language can
meet (most or all of) the challenges that can be put into language."
I think there are undecidability issues that may be counter-examples to
that.
There are two distinct senses of the word "undecidable" in contemporary
use. The first of these is the sense used in relation to Gödel's theorems,
that of a statement being neither provable nor refutable in a specified
deductive system. The second sense is used in relation to computability theory
and applies not to statements but to decision problems, which are countably
infinite sets of questions each requiring a yes or no answer.
McEvoy goes on:
"To understand [Witters]’s very different POV we need to understand that,
for [Witters], language is very limited in fundamental ways: the “limits of
language” are extremely severe, but they are often inconspicuous to us,
particularly because those limits are not themselves expressed in language –
so we use language blind to its limits. They are also invisible to us"
metaphorically
"because language by and large does what we ordinarily try to do with it:
so we ordinarily do not experience or run up against its limits. Here is an
analogy with a machine-builder. The machine-builder has a whole range of
items with which to build machines – nuts and bolts, springs and coils,
levers and buttons, cylinders and pumps etc. The machine-builder may not
experience any “limits to machines”: he may even challenge anyone to specify
any
kind of machine, claiming that he can always make a machine to that
specification. But this challenge would be naïve (as per Turing’s ‘machine
argument’) to show there are not “limits to machines”: for, in being able to
specify, we would have to be able to put the specification in terms so that
the challenge could be met by a machine-builder. If we did not, the
machine-builder might object that what we were specifying was not a machine
[say we
specified that he build us a novel]: and the specification of something
that is not a machine, he might insist, cannot be used as an argument as to
there being “limits to machines”. Is the machine-builder right in his
attitude and response? One view is this: there may be an infinity of
combinations
of machine-parts so as to build different machines and in this sense there
may be no limit to machines – there may be an infinite number of unique
machines that may be built (though we may find their uniqueness is often
negligible compared to their similarity as types); yet each of the various
parts of machines – each component – may be seen to have limited properties,
and also limited properties in terms of how it can be combined with other
components so as to make a machine. These limits may be understood as “
logical limits” to the building of machines. Not every combination of
components
can make a machine: we do not make a machine by tipping components into a
barrel – for such a barrel of components lacks the (logically) necessary
relationships to constitute a working machine or a machine at all. Language
with “sense” also consists of various components aligned in various
combinations: these components have limited properties, and they are also
limited
in the combinations they can have so that they make sense. Not every
combination of components makes language with “sense”: we do not make language
with “sense” merely by randomly throwing together various components. There
are “limits” to how we can combine components of language and even to how
we can use individual components (insofar as these may have “sense” in a
way that stands alone: though we may see that, for Wittgenstein, no
component of language – not even a name – has its “sense” in a truly
stand-alone
way)."
Well, we need a "Treatise on Machines", which is not a machine.
And we need a "Treatise of the Logico-Philosophical kind", about what
Language is, which, alas, IS Language.
----
So THAT's one feature where a machine is not like a language.
Russell of course saw this in the "Preface" to TLP when he mentions the
language hierarchy that Witters denied. For he felt he could be BETTER than
Russell, and that Russell "was not going to teach him not one thing".
McEvoy:
"These “limits” may be understood as “logical limits”. These “logical
limits” may be understood as setting the “limits of language”, just as the “
logical limits” of machine-components and their combinations may be
understood as setting the “limits of machines” (we cannot build a machine that
is
a novel: that is a “logical limit” on what we can do with machines)."
The machine builder is working with an implicit definition of 'machine'.
For example, Descartes allegedly misused the word 'machine' when he said that
animals (like my aunt) are machines.
The language speaker is also working with an implicit definition of what
'language' is. If I go to Mars and they display signs to me, I have to start
by ASSUMING that they are 'saying' things. That is, I need my own
'implicit' definition of what a language is, and assume that the
interlocutionary
Martian also has one, which HAS to overlap, in aspects, with mine.
Similarly, if I say, "Aren't you hungry today?" to my cat (or dog) I have
to assume that I share an implicit definition of language with cats and
dogs.
(It's different with _plants_, as Prince Charles showed).
McEvoy:
"Now can we build a machine that maps these “logical limits” of
machine-building? Most of us would intuitively sense that we cannot: we could
not
use the limited components and their limited combinations to map out what a
machine cannot be built to do – a machine cannot be built to show what a
machine cannot be built to do. We can use the limited components and their
combinations to map out (from the ‘inside’ as it were) what machines can do –
every machine is an example of what it is logically possible for a machine
to do. But we cannot make a machine that maps out what machines cannot
logically do: and we cannot make a machine that maps out the line between what
machines can do and what they cannot do. By analogy, this is [Witters]’s
view in relation to the “limits of language”. We can use examples of
language with “sense” to map out what language has “sense” – every example of
language with sense is an example of what it is logically possible for
language to do with sense. But we cannot use language to map out what language
cannot logically do: and we cannot use language to map out the line between
what language can do and what language cannot do."
Again, this seem a bit of a stretch, in that, say, Descartes says that my
aunt is a machine. Therefore, he is relying, albeit implicitly, on a
"Tractatus machinisticus", let's call it (pompously).
Witters says that 'what we cannot say, we better stay silent about' -- and
that the limits of the language are the limits of my world -- in a
"Tractatus logico-philosophicus" which IS a set of English sentences (as first
translated by Ogden).
McEvoy: "The “limits of language” are therefore inexpressible in language.
But Wittgenstein does not think we must stop there – otherwise he would
himself have “passed over in silence” on the many issues raised by the “
limits of language”: [Witters], both early and later, thinks these limits make
themselves “manifest” and that they may be shown. To further understand
how Wittgenstein thinks we can grapple with what is beyond the “limits of
language”, we need to turn to his work."
I fail to see the distinction. I am a functionalist. Suppose you say to
Aristotle: "We cannot know the essence of 'plant'; we must direct our
attention to how plants work."
Some items are 'functional' in this sense: what they are is what they do.
Or, to use what Grice called 'ontological Marxism':
"If they work, they are".
"I work; therefore, I am."
-----
(* For Marx, work was important in the creation of what he called 'the
capital' -- neuter in German, "Das Kapital").
----
INTERLUDE ON "WORK":
Grice:
"I am not greatly enamoured of some of the motivations which prompt the
advocacy of psychophysical identifications; I have in mind a concern to
exclude such ‘queer’ or ‘mysterious’ entities as souls, purely mental events,
purely mental properties and so forth."
Add: Language.
"My taste is for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions of
entities, just so long as when they come in they help with the housework."
KEYWORD: HOUSEWORK.
"Provided that I can see them WORK [emphasis Speranza's], and provided that
they are not detected in illicit logical behaviour (within which I do not
include a certain degree of indeterminacy, not even of numerical
indeterminacy), I do not find them queer or mysterious at all…. To fangle a
new
ontological Marxism, they WORK [emphasis Speranza's] therefore they exist,
even
though only some, perhaps those who come on the recommendation of some form
of transcendental argument, may qualify for the specially favoured status
of entia realissima. To exclude honest WORKING [emphasis Speranza's]
entities seems to me like metaphysical snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in
the
company of any but the best objects."
----- END OF INTERLUDE ON "KEYWORD: "WORK"" --
McEvoy goes on:
"But I want to suggest that this POV is far from outrageously silly"
or blessed.
--- INTERLUDE ON "SILLY" --
Old English gesælig "happy, fortuitous, prosperous" (related to sæl
"happiness"), from Proto-Germanic *sæligas (cognates: Old Norse sæll "happy,"
Old
Saxon salig, Middle Dutch salich, Old High German salig, German selig
"blessed, happy, blissful," Gothic sels "good, kindhearted"), from PIE *sele-
"of good mood; to favor," from root *sel- (2) "happy, of good mood; to favor"
(cognates: Latin solari "to comfort," Greek hilaros "cheerful, gay, merry,
joyous"). The word's considerable sense development moved from "happy" to
"blessed" to "pious," to "innocent" (c.1200), to "harmless," to "pitiable"
(late 13c.), "weak" (c.1300), to "feeble in mind, lacking in reason,
foolish" (1570s). Further tendency toward "stunned, dazed as by a blow" (1886)
in
knocked silly, etc. Silly season in journalism slang is from 1861 (August
and September, when newspapers compensate for a lack of hard news by
filling up with trivial stories). Silly Putty trademark claims use from July
1949.
----
McEvoy:
"In particular, the idea that there are “limits of language” that cannot
be drawn in language should no more be dismissed as outrageously silly than
the idea that there are “limits of machine-building” that cannot be
illustrated by building a machine."
Well, if the machine BUILDER **FAILS** (blatantly) in showing the 'limits
of machine-building' BY BUILDING A MACHINE, he did succeed, after all.
By the same token, a stone, who doesn't speak, illustrates the 'limits of
language' -- by showing them. (But one wonder about Ali Baba, who did speak
to stones).
McEvoy:
"Another point that ‘silly-ists’ should be bear in mind: Wittgenstein
gives many examples to show his POV – for example, he begins Investigations by
showing how the naming-relation is shown: his fundamental point being that
it is shown rather than said (and it is beyond the “limits of language”
to explain this naming-relation so that language itself expresses or says
the explanation: that is, we can (obviously) use language to name objects,
but we cannot use language to capture how names name objects – this is
something that can only ever be shown)."
For some reason, the point was nicely communicated to Gilbert Ryle, who
dubbed Witters's theory, the "Fido"-Fido theory of naming, and Urmson, the
'picture theory' of meaning.
So it seems that for Ryle and Urmson, Witters successfully communicated, in
words, the naming relation.
---
McEvoy concludes his post:
"What would be impressive would be for “silly-ists” to explain the
naming-relation in a way that rebuts Wittgenstein’s POV – I think they may find
it much harder than they might think."
"Fido"-Fido
was a Rylean geniality.
It failed, slightly, to emphasise that dogs are not ARBITRARILY named
'Fido'. They are after all, loyal.
As I read elsewhere,
""Fido" deriva dall'aggettivo latino fidus, "fidato"... "
"Fido" derives from the Latin adjective, 'fidus'.
In Romance Latin (Italian), Classical Latin 'Fidus' becomes Romance "Fido".
"di cui mantiene il significato anche nell'italiano moderno. Dalla forma
base Fido si sono originate molte varianti attraverso processi diversi:
Fidalma e Fidalba possono essere un incrocio con i nomi Alma ed Alba."
----
It may be argued that when I call my dog "Fido" I am using "Fido" as a
'noun', rather than as an adjective.
fido adj. (fedele, leale) loyal, faithful, trusty
fido -- masculine noun -- (limite di un credito bancario) overdraft n
credit limit n
But I would not be surprised if a banker called his dog "Fido" to refer to
an overdraft. ("Sit, overdraft").
Cheers,
Speranza
From Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Descriptivist_theory_of_names
"A type of simple descriptivism was originally formulated by Frege in
reaction to problems that confronted the predominant theory of names of the
19th
century due to John Stuart Mill. Mill's theory is often referred to as the
"Fido"-Fido theory because it suggests that the meaning of a proper name
is simply its bearer in the external world (its direct referent, as we would
say now)."
"There are several significant problems with this proposal, however."
"First, it does not explain how and why names without bearers can still be
meaningful even though they have no reference."
"Take the following two sentences."
(A) There is no Santa Claus.
(B) Santa Claus does not exist.
"According to Mill's theory, these sentences must be meaningless."
"Another problem for Millianism is Frege’s famous puzzles concerning the
identity of co-referring terms. For example:
(V) ”Hesperus is Phosphorus.”
"In this case, both terms (“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”) refer to the
same entity: Venus. The Millian theory would predict that this sentence is
trivial, since meaning is just reference and “Venus is Venus” is not very
informative."
"Other problems for Millianism are those of negative existentials (e.g., “
Batman does not exist”) and statements such as “Fred believes that Cicero,
but not Tully, was Roman.”"
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