[lit-ideas] Re: Post the letter or burn it

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 13 Aug 2011 10:54:48 EDT


In a message dated 8/12/2011 3:02:13  A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
Still it  passeth my understanding how the square root of anything is 
involved here. Also  I am not sure you have understood my argument why "Post 
the 
letter or burn it"  does not follow logically from "Post the letter": the 
latter singular imperative  does not imply that burning the letter (or 
anything other than posting) is also  morally valid. Next we'll be told "Feed 
your 
children" implies "Feed your  children or burn them".  

---
 
I think what is going on, and I've been on this elsewhere (at the Grice  
Club?) is whether to accept Getzen (Natural deduction) for the introduction of 
 'or'. Grice would say that 'or' is OK as introduced in indicative  
discourse:
 
My wife is in the kitchen; therefore, my wife is in the kitchen or in the  
garden. (His example in 1961, Arist. Soc. Proc.)
 
In 1967, Hare, in Mind, applies Grice's argument to Alf Ross's  objection.
 
"You can post the letter; therefore you can post the letter or you can burn 
 it".
 
So, the oddity is here as to the utterance of
 
"My wife is in the kitchen or in the garden", when utterer KNOWS it's in  
the kitchen, say. Grice explains this oddity in terms of an unusual 
implicature  flouting the maxim, 'be as informative as you can'. It's a 
'paradox' of 
"or"  that gets resolved when pragmatic factors are taken into question.

The same should proceed with "You can feed the children or burn them".  
While indeed, from "You can feed the children" does follow "You can feed the  
children or follow" it would be some illogical type who ERRADICATES 'or' from 
 the complex utterance, and infer from "You can feed the children or burn 
them"  that he can burn the children. Or something.
 
It's true that the square root comes in rather subtly. But the point is  
that the introduction of 'or' should be neutral with respect to the force of 
the  utterances. If we represent p and q as the phrastics (or radixes) of 
what is  being said -- CHILDREN FED, CHILDREN BURNT --, then we add an 
indication of  mood. Children-fed seen as desirable object of an imperative 
utterance, say;  these mechanisms should be force-neutral.
 
Grice's campaign, believe it or not, is for the AEQUI-vocality of human  
reason. He thinks that indicatives and imperatives follow the same patterns of 
 reason, and he thinks he is following Aristotle and Kant in thus thinking. 
I  agree. 
 
In this respect, the truth-functor that "or" is is re-labelled  
"satisfactoriness-functor", in that, in the case of "Feed the children!", or  
"Bun the 
children!", it is surely what A. J. P. Kenny calls the 'fiat' that is  at 
play. And so, the issue that the square-root device is meant to elucidate is  
whether: "Feed the children!" or "Burn the children!"" is equivalent to 
"Feed  the children or burn them!" -- i.e. whether 'or' has scope inside or 
outside the  force-indicating devices that "!" represent. I tend to think that 
it's best to  see the whole thing as imperative with "or" as having minimal 
scope. This may  relate to De Morgan Laws, only in imperative contexts. Thus,
 
"Touch the monster and it will bite you", or "Touch the monster and you'll  
regret it", perhaps includes an 'if', as Grice notes, and it's NOT the  
conjunction of an imperative and an indicative (!p & .q), even if that is  the 
surface form of what you say. Or something like that. In any case, Grice  
would consider that the 'if' (or 'if'/'or') utterance may be explained out of 
an  implicature of what you actually put forward, which is an 
"and"-utterance. Or  something like that. 
 
Hare cites examples by Ryle on 'or' from the 1929 paper on Negation, Arist. 
 Soc. The example being that a train can go via Berwick or Crewe (I forget 
the  cities he mentions). The idea is that the utterance of a disjunction, 
"The train  can take the Berwick or the Crewe route", are paradoxical only at 
the level of  what is being expressed, but that this paradox can be 
resolved in terms of  pragmatic implicature. Or something.
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
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