Donal wrote: "Now this tenet means that we can perhaps have rules that seem "clearly articulated" or whose sense is clear. But, and it is a fundamental but for W, their sense is not said in 'what is said' but can only be shown. So all the apparent clear articulation or expression of "rules" is beside the point and philosophically deceiving if we think 'what is said' contains the sense of the 'rules'." For Wittgenstein, a rule does not have a sense but rather contributes to establishing sense. The rules of grammar for the English language make it possible for English sentences to have meaning. The rules of chess make it possible for a chess move to make sense. The rules themselves have no sense apart from the role they play in cases of rule-following. Furthermore, it is essential that these rules be 'said' insofar as people must be able to refer to the rule when the rule is not being followed. For example, we can argue about whether it is acceptable for an English sentence to end with a preposition, or we can argue about whether a particular chess piece has been moved properly. In my opinion, the said/shown distinction continues in PI in his discussion of rule-following, particularly in his discussion of use/custom/habit. If I were to make a longer argument, the texts I would lean on heavily would be: §142. It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they actually are - if there were for instance no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency - this would make our normal language-games lose their point. §198. "But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule." - That is not what we ought to say,but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. "Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?" - Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule - say a sign-post - got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? - Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. But this is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign-post really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. (See also §85) §217. "How am I able to obey a rule?" - if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." §271. "Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' meant - so that he constantly called different things by that name - but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain" - in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism. Now, I would argue that the content of the said/shown distinction in PI is very different from that in TLP, but in my opinion Wittgenstein is still working with that distinction. Sincerely, Phil Enns ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html