[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online - amplification re TLP
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 7 Apr 2012 09:35:52 +0100 (BST)
Previously I wrote:-
>4. There is a key piece of thinking that links W of the
TLP and the PI and his two different views of 'what can be said and what can
only be shown':-
what gives 'what is said' its sense is never 'said' in
'what is said' - what gives 'what is said' its sense cannot be said but can
only be shown.>
Some comments below by way of amplification of this in relation
to the TLP:-
(1) In
the TLP only the propositions of “natural science” have sense in what they say.
But surely the sense of ‘what is said’ by the propositions of “natural science”
is said by ‘what is
said’? No, according to the TLP: rather the sense of such propositions arises
from their having a structure that is isomorphic with the structure of reality.
This is what gives them sense: how they picture reality; and how they picture
reality is by way of this isomorphism. Yet this sense – their fundamental sense
– is not ‘said’ in ‘what is said’. Nor it is even ‘said’ by way of further
analysis,
such as the kind of ‘explication’ of the underlying ‘philosophical logic’ of
‘the proposition’ that the TLP is concerned with. Nor can their sense, their
fundamental sense, ever be said. Rather this sense can only be shown, as it is
shown by the propositions [or pseudo-propositions] of the TLP
itself. This amplifies how in the TLPwhat gives 'what is said' its sense is
never 'said' in 'what is said' - what gives 'what is said' its sense cannot be
said but can only be shown.
(2) It was suggested that this POV is absolutely
crucial to the TLP. This is confirmed by a letter to Russell, where
Wittgenstein wrote, "The main point is the theory of what can be expressed
(gesagt) by prop[osition]s—i.e. by language—(and, which comes to the same
thing, what can be thought) and what can not be expressed by
pro[position]s, but only shown (gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal
problem of philosophy."
(3) In
the Preface to TLP, Wittgenstein explains that "The book will, therefore,
draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but to the expression of
thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able
to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think
what cannot be thought)." This
is concerned to emphasise that what the book deals with, by way of examining
‘the proposition’, is not “thinking” per se “but…the expression of thoughts”.
But it also contains the germ of what in the TLP is an important idea of wider
application: this is explained later in the TLP by way of an analogy that
points out that the eye is not seen as part of its visual field, indeed the eye
is
not part of its visual field. This analogy may be taken to point out that we
cannot think the limit of thought “for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we
should have to be able to think
both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what
cannot be thought).” It may also be taken to suggest that we cannot express the
limit to the expression of thoughts, for to
do this we should have to express “both sides of this limit” and we should
therefore have to express what cannot be expressed (which would be impossible).
In the light of this fundamental point, it may be understood why Wittgenstein
regards the enterprise of the TLP not as expressing but as showing the limits
to the expression of thoughts (for to claim to
be expressing the limits would be to claim the impossible). It may also be
understood why Wittgenstein feels driven to the conclusion that the sense of
‘what is expressed’ [or ‘what is said’] must lie beyond the realm of ‘what is
expressed’ [or ‘what is said’]. And so the sense of ‘what is said’ cannot be
said by ‘what is said’ but must lie beyond ‘what is said’ in ‘what can be
shown but not said’. This again amplifies how in the TLPwhat gives 'what is
said' its sense is never 'said' in 'what is said' - what gives 'what is said'
its sense cannot be said but can only be shown.
Donal
Salop
Other related posts:
- » [lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online - amplification re TLP - Donal McEvoy
