Yes, I noticed that, but I kind of didn't want to press it down. As I pointed out before, the statement: "There are snakes in Ireland" may not be easily falsifiable, but it is certainly verifiable. If we find even one snake in Ireland, the statement is verified. Compare to: "There are lions in Africa" which is not only verifiable but actually verified and well-documented, and we can see that a position which holds that this kind of statement is not scientific is difficult to defend. For Popper's account to be coherent then, it seems that it must be argued that the statement is also falsifiable. (Since falsifiability rather than verifiability is considered the relevant criterion, although I reckon that Popper has scientific theories in mind rather than simple factual claims, but still it's hard to separate these.) That was I guess the point. Btw, I finished reading The Open Society and Its Enemies, it's quite an interesting book although the assault on Hegel strikes me as a little simplistic. O.K. ________________________________ From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2013 9:10 PM Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Patrick and the Snakes: the logic of falsification [errata] Deeper breath... The error made in my post is mine btw and not Popper's, and its correction means the post better reflects Popper's account of science. The error does not, I think, affect the rest of the post from which it may be excised. ________________________________ From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> >From "Here (specified) is a snake" we can deduce "There exists a snake >(somewhere)": so the latter statement, though unscientific per se, may be >accepted as 'scientific' where it is deducible from a scientific statement. >But this deduction is not a matter of 'verification by observation'. Strictly >speaking, the latter statement is not per se 'verified' or 'verifiable' (for >that 'there are snakes' is too broad a statement to be 'verified', or >falsified, by any observation) - rather its truth may be deduced or deducible >from the truth of a test statement like "Here is a snake". It is only the test >statement that may be 'verified' or 'falsified' by observation, not the purely >existential statement (even though the truth of the purely existential >statement is deducible from the truth of the test statement). [Though a >digression is here avoided, it is important to note that talk of 'verifying' a >test statement does not amount here to any inductive theory of 'verification' - in truth, a test statement is only ever 'verified' to the extent that its truth is not falsified by observation, and so when we speak of 'verifying' a test statement by observation we are really speaking of whether it survives attempts to falsify it by observation.]> This contains an error when it suggests that,"Strictly speaking, the latter statement is not per se 'verified' or 'verifiable' (for that 'there are snakes' is too broad a statement to be 'verified', or falsified, by any observation)". The latter statement is per se 'verified' (and hence 'verifiable') whenever we verify a test statement from which its truth can be deduced: for an observation that 'verifies' "Here is a snake" must equally 'verify' "There exists a snake" - and indeed 'verify' any other statement (like "There exists something") which can be deduced from "Here is a snake". What I should have said is that "the latter statement" (viz."There exists a snake (somewhere)") is not scientific because it is too broad - too unrestricted - to be falsified by observation; and the fact it is 'verifiable', and is 'verified', is not enough to render the latter statement scientific per se. The error is then repeated, in kind, in the next paragraph: >As above, from "Here (specified), in Ireland, is a snake" we can deduce "There >exists a snake in Ireland (somewhere)": so the latter statement, though >perhaps unscientific per se, may be accepted as scientific where it is >deducible from a scientific statement. Strictly speaking, the latter statement may not per se be verified or verifiable (for that 'there are snakes in Ireland' may be too broad a statement to be 'verified', or falsified, by any observation) - rather its truth may be deduced or deducible from the truth of a test statement like "Here, in Ireland, is a snake".> Again:- the latter statement is per se 'verified' (and hence 'verifiable') whenever we verify a test statement from which its truth can be deduced: for an observation that 'verifies' "Here, in Ireland, is a snake" must equally 'verify' "There exists a snake in Ireland" - and indeed 'verify' any other statement (like "There exists, in Ireland, something") which can be deduced from "Here, in Ireland, is a snake". Here what I should have said is that "the latter statement" (viz. "There exists a snake in Ireland (somewhere)") may not be scientific because it may be too broad - too unrestricted - to be falsified by observation; and the fact it is 'verifiable', and is 'verified', is not enough to render the latter statement scientific per se. But here it is important to emphasise the "may not be", because it may be scientific: it depends on whether it is restricted in such a way that, given the methods used to defend it, it is falsifiable by observation. So this error does not affect the gist of the post or its conclusion, which indicates how "There are snakes in Ireland" may be defended in a way that is scientific (in which case it would appear falsified) or may be defended in a way that renders it unscientific (in which case it appears unfalsifiable):- so that, correcting the following from the original post where I inadvertently switched from "snakes" to "swans", >...if a sufficiently exhaustive search of Ireland turns up no example where it is true, by observation, that "Here is a snake", then we may conclude that we have tested and falsified the claim that "There are snakes in Ireland".> What is said here about "Here is a snake" can be said, with the appropriate changes, about "Here are the remains of a snake": and if we take "snake" to include its remains after death, then we may use the same kind of exhaustive search to conclude that we have tested and falsified the claim that "There were ever snakes in Ireland". >What matters in the case of "There are snakes in Ireland" is, then, what >always matters - the methodology that underpins its defence from possible >falsification. If that methodology accepts a search of a high degree of >exhaustiveness as determining the matter (so if no snakes were found, the >claim is falsified), then the claim might be deemed scientific (because >falsifiable). But if, no matter the exhaustiveness of fruitless searches, the >claim is defended on the basis that searches are inadequate to find the >snakes, then it becomes an unfalsifiable, untestable, unscientific claim - for >the claim is, in effect, being defended as beyond our powers of observation to >test it by falsifying it. > Donal Getting in his own refutation first And this serves me right London