[lit-ideas] Re: Patrick and the Snakes: the logic of falsification [errata]
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 10:21:22 +0000 (GMT)
________________________________
From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
>(Since falsifiability rather
than verifiability is considered the relevant criterion, although I
reckon that Popper has scientific theories in mind rather than simple
factual claims, but still it's hard to separate these.>
In Popper's account there is no need to separate these, as their "logic" is the
same: thus a seemingly "simple factual" claim like "My car is parked outside my
house now" is "scientific" as it is falsifiable - for it is falsified if we
look outside my house and do not see the car there. A test statement like "The
solution boiled at 98 degrees" is scientific, because it is checkable by
observation; but equally everyday "simple factual" claims, where they are
checkable by observation, are "scientific". Of course, neither "The solution
boiled at 98 degrees" nor "My car is parked outside my house now" are that
important in themselves "scientifically": no one gets into the Royal Society by
compiling a notebook, however rigorously, of such "scientific" observations.
Their lack of importance is connected to their having a low degree of
falsifiability: but these test statements become important where they can be
used to test theories of much greater
falsifiability and thus much greater content and importance. Here we may
intuit that, while logically on a similar level as statements testable by
observation, the claim that "The solution boiled at 98 degrees" is much more
likely to play a role in testing some important scientific theory than "My car
is parked outside my house now": but while this intuition may be right, it does
not alter their equivalent "scientific" status as claims in themselves.
Yet vox-pop someone whether it is a scientific claim to assert "My car is
parked outside my house now" and some might reply 'No' - they may be thinking
it is not the kind of the claim that features in scientific textbooks or that
programmes on television show scientists working on. But if we start to ask
what it is that characterises a statement as "scientific" and take the answer
as lying in its testability (which equates to its 'falsifiability') we may see
that many of our ordinary beliefs are "scientific" because testable by
observation. Conversely, someone, if asked, might say that the claims of
super-string theorists are "scientific", because they are the the kind of the
claim that features in scientific textbooks or that programmes on television
show scientists working on. But if we find their super-string claims lack
testable consequences we might conclude that, at least as yet, their claims are
not "scientific" - for they cannot be put to the
test.
Here Popper's 'falsifiability' criterion has a clarifying role that takes us
beyond unreflective (and uncritical) application of the term "scientific".
Not only is there no need to separate so-called "simple factual claims" from
"scientific theories", but it is not tenable to do so: Popper's position is
that all "factual claims" are "theory-laden": they embody theories of some
sort, even if these are not consciously held. So even a "simple factual claim"
will always be 'theoretical' [it will have no 'theory-free' aspect]; and, if
the claim is testable by observation, it will be scientific-theoretical - even
if (as per "My car is parked outside my house now") its scientific-theoretical
content is of such a low character in itself, and unconnected to testing
theories of high content, that it not worth that much scientifically.
>As I pointed out before, the statement: "There are snakes in Ireland" may not
>be easily falsifiable, but it is certainly verifiable. If we find even one
>snake in Ireland, the statement is verified. Compare to: "There are lions in
>Africa" which is not only verifiable but actually verified and
>well-documented, and we can see that a position which holds that this kind of
>statement is not scientific is difficult to defend. For Popper's account to be
>coherent then, it seems that it must be argued that the statement is also
>falsifiable.>
Yes, the statement "There are lions in Africa" is scientific and it may be so
in two ways. In one it is "scientific" because - irrespective of whether it
itself is falsifiable - it is deducible from a true "scientific" statement like
"Here (before my very eyes), in Africa, there is a lion". That statement is
"scientific" because it is falsifiable - if there is no lion before my very
eyes then it is false. But if we imagine there are no lions in Africa to be
seen (and thus we cannot observe"There are lions in Africa"), then "There are
lions in Africa" may yet be "scientific" if it is itself falsifiable - and it
is 'falsifiable' if we accept that it is false that "There are lions in Africa"
if we have looked exhaustively but found no observable evidence of them.
There is no lack of "coherence" here in how its 'falsifiability' underpins
whether "There are lions in Africa" is "scientific" or not. 'Falsifiability'
explains why "There are lions in Africa" would not be "scientific" if the fact
we have looked exhaustively but found no observable evidence of them is not
taken to falsify the claim; but if we have found observable evidence of them,
that observable evidence arises from falsifiable 'test statements' (like "Here
(before my very eyes), in Africa, there is a lion"), and it is because such
'test statements' are falsifiable by observation that "There are lions in
Africa" is "scientific" where it is deducible from the truth of such 'test
statements'.
>Btw, I finished reading The Open Society and Its Enemies, it's quite an
>interesting book although the assault on Hegel strikes me as a little
>simplistic.>
It is "a little simplistic", even scherzo - refusing to take Hegel seriously at
an intellectual level. That there is more of interest and worth in Hegel, than
might be gleaned from Popper's chapter, might be readily admitted - and yet the
POV that underpins Popper's approach is of great interest and worth: that
Hegelian philosophy is a betrayal of Kant's critical philosophy, constitutes a
shocking decline in importance intellectual values, and leads (if taken to
seriously) to a kind of moral and intellectual corruption - with disastrous
consequences in the field of politics.
Donal
London
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