Le 10 ao=FBt 04, =E0 21:52, Robert Paul a =E9crit : > I'm way behind on this thread and bookless to boot. Two things, = though. > > 1. Pythagorean 'opposites,' which seem to be some sort of original=20 > stuff, are > invoked in Phaedo as part of an attempted argument for the immortality=20= > of the > soul. The argument is roughly that of conceptual dependence (not=20 > Plato's words!) > such that, for example, out of sleeping waking comes (waking and=20 > sleeping are > 'opposites'), and in the important case, life from death and=20 > conversely. Life > and death are 'essentially' paired: death comes from life, life comes=20= > from > death. One of the important verbs is something like 'generated=20 > (from),' which I > blurrily remember as 'gegnesthai.' (Mike will I hope clear this up.) M.C. I think you're referring to the first of three arguments for the=20 immortality of the soul in the Phaedo, the one that takes place from=20 70c-72e. The verb in question is *gignesthai*, and it does indeed recur=20= constantly in this passage. A coupl of minor quibbles=A0: it's not clear=20= that the opposites in question are Pythagorean. It's true that Socrates=20= refers to an "old story" (70c ; *palaios logos*), I agree with Robin in=20= his Bude edition that its origin is likely to be Orphic > To say that > the soul could be just alive, or just dead, won't do, because neither=20= > term can > be understood except by way of contrast with the other. Real=20 > opposites, and some > quasi-opposites, seem to have this necessary feature; one cannot learn=20= > one of > them without understanding that it is opposed to the other. Genuine=20 > opposites > are not just contingently opposed, but _really_ opposed. What this=20 > means, Mike > will also I hope explain. M.C. I'm not sure I understand this passage in the same way as Robert.=20= I don't think we have to do with "conceptual dependence" : it simply is=20= an observed fact that when we have two "contraries" like sleeping and=20 waking, big and small, etc. they appear to come about or derive from=20 one another. Socrates infers by induction, I take it, that the same is=20= true with life and death, which everyone agrees are opposites. Now, in=20= the case of most contraries A and B, we observe two processes or=20 "comings-into-being" (Greek *geneseis*) : one from A towards B and the=20= other from B towards A. Chances are, therefore, that this is true of=20 the contraries life and death as well. Now, everybody knows there is a=20= path from being-alive towards being-dead ; this intermediary state or=20 process is called "dying", as the path from being-small towards=20 being-big is called "increase". But this implies there is a converse=20 path as well, this time from being-dead to being-alive; it's called=20 "coming back to life" (*to anabi=F4skesthai*, 72a). That we have to do not with conceptual but with ontological = notions=20 is, I think, confirmed by two considerations Socrates tacks on at the=20 end. First, if there was only a path from life to death and not=20 vice-versa, nature would be "lame" (*khol=EA*). This is an aesthetic=20 consideration, but Socrates also has a more metaphysical notion : if=20 the processes of becoming (*geneseis*) - that is, all change in the=20 universe - were in one direction only, then everythng would assume the=20= same figure and all generation would cease. This seems to me pretty=20 reasonable, if we add the premiss Plato omitted, no doubt because he=20 thought it was self-evident=A0: that is, given that the world has been = in=20 existence since eternity. If the world has existed from eternity, and=20 all change or motion is in one direction only, then all change or=20 motion would presumably *already have reached its goal*, so that there=20= would be no more motion. > > <snip> > > When life is said to come from death there must be a process of=20 > becoming between > them, and when death 'comes from' life, a similar process the other=20 > way. The hot > becomes the cold, the cold becomes the hot. This is true of all = genuine > 'opposites,' and as living and dead are genuine opposites there must=20= > be such > reciprocal causal processes here too. (We 'see' one of the processes,=20= > death from > life, and we're meant to infer that there's a 'way back,' from death=20= > to life, a > way back for a kind of thing, the soul, from one state to the other.) M.C. Yes, that's it precisely. > The > argument doesn't exactly knock your socks off, but it does reveal=20 > another aspect > of Plato's indebtedness to Pythagoras. M.C. I'm not sure the argument is all that bad, nor am I sure that it's=20= Pythagorean (although it may be, and Pythagoreans are notoriously hard=20= to discern from Orphics anyway). Critics have dealt harshly with it, as=20= with all the argments for immortality in the Phaedo; Gadamer writes=20 that the proof is "obviously unsuited to prove the point which it is=20 supposed to prove" ("The Proofs of immortality in Plato's Phaedo", in=20 Dialogue and Dialectic. Eight hermeneutical studies on Plato, trans. P.=20= C. Smith, Yale 1980, p. 25), and he suggests Plato meant us to see how=20= bad they are. Clearly Plato thought the argument was not strong enough=20= to *prove* immortality all by itself, for he offers two more=20 alternative arguments in what follows. Best, Mike. > > > > Michael Chase (goya@xxxxxxxxxxx) CNRS UPR 76 7, rue Guy Moquet Villejuif 94801 France ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html