[lit-ideas] Re: Negative Polarity

  • From: Michael Chase <goya@xxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2004 20:32:50 -0700

Le 10 ao=FBt 04, =E0 21:52, Robert Paul a =E9crit :

> I'm way behind on this thread and bookless to boot. Two things, =
though.
>
> 1. Pythagorean 'opposites,' which seem to be some sort of original=20
> stuff, are
> invoked in Phaedo as part of an attempted argument for the immortality=20=

> of the
> soul. The argument is roughly that of conceptual dependence (not=20
> Plato's words!)
> such that, for example, out of sleeping waking comes (waking and=20
> sleeping are
> 'opposites'), and in the important case, life from death and=20
> conversely. Life
> and death are 'essentially' paired: death comes from life, life comes=20=

> from
> death. One of the important verbs is something like 'generated=20
> (from),' which I
> blurrily remember as 'gegnesthai.' (Mike will I hope clear this up.)

M.C. I think you're referring to the first of three arguments for the=20
immortality of the soul in the Phaedo, the one that takes place from=20
70c-72e. The verb in question is *gignesthai*, and it does indeed recur=20=

constantly in this passage. A coupl of minor quibbles=A0: it's not clear=20=

that the opposites in question are Pythagorean. It's true that Socrates=20=

refers to an "old story" (70c ; *palaios logos*), I agree with Robin in=20=

his Bude edition that its origin is likely to be Orphic



>  To say that
> the soul could be just alive, or just dead, won't do, because neither=20=

> term can
> be understood except by way of contrast with the other. Real=20
> opposites, and some
> quasi-opposites, seem to have this necessary feature; one cannot learn=20=

> one of
> them without understanding that it is opposed to the other. Genuine=20
> opposites
> are not just contingently opposed, but _really_ opposed. What this=20
> means, Mike
> will also I hope explain.

M.C. I'm not sure I understand this passage in the same way as Robert.=20=

I don't think we have to do with "conceptual dependence" : it simply is=20=

an observed fact that when we have two "contraries" like sleeping and=20
waking, big and small, etc. they appear to come about or derive from=20
one another. Socrates infers by induction, I take it, that the same is=20=

true with life and death, which everyone agrees are opposites. Now, in=20=

the case of most contraries A and B, we observe two processes or=20
"comings-into-being" (Greek *geneseis*) : one from A towards B and the=20=

other from B towards A. Chances are, therefore, that this is true of=20
the contraries life and death as well. Now, everybody knows there is a=20=

path from being-alive towards being-dead ; this intermediary state or=20
process is called "dying", as the path from being-small towards=20
being-big is called "increase". But this implies there is a converse=20
path as well, this time from being-dead to being-alive; it's called=20
"coming back to life" (*to anabi=F4skesthai*, 72a).

        That we have to do not with conceptual but  with ontological =
notions=20
is, I think, confirmed by two considerations Socrates tacks on at the=20
end. First, if there was only a path from life to death and not=20
vice-versa, nature would be "lame" (*khol=EA*). This is an aesthetic=20
consideration, but Socrates also has a more metaphysical notion : if=20
the processes of becoming (*geneseis*) - that is, all change in the=20
universe - were in one direction only, then everythng would assume the=20=

same figure and all generation would cease. This seems to me pretty=20
reasonable, if we add the premiss Plato omitted, no doubt because he=20
thought it was self-evident=A0: that is, given that the world has been =
in=20
existence since eternity. If the world has existed from eternity, and=20
all change or motion is in one direction only, then all change or=20
motion would presumably *already have reached its goal*, so that there=20=

would be no more motion.
>
> <snip>
>
> When life is said to come from death there must be a process of=20
> becoming between
> them, and when death 'comes from' life, a similar process the other=20
> way. The hot
> becomes the cold, the cold becomes the hot. This is true of all =
genuine
> 'opposites,' and as living and dead are genuine opposites there must=20=

> be such
> reciprocal causal processes here too. (We 'see' one of the processes,=20=

> death from
> life, and we're meant to infer that there's a 'way back,' from death=20=

> to life, a
> way back for a kind of thing, the soul, from one state to the other.)

M.C. Yes, that's it precisely.




> The
> argument doesn't exactly knock your socks off, but it does reveal=20
> another aspect
> of Plato's indebtedness to Pythagoras.

M.C. I'm not sure the argument is all that bad, nor am I sure that it's=20=

Pythagorean (although it may be, and Pythagoreans are notoriously hard=20=

to discern from Orphics anyway). Critics have dealt harshly with it, as=20=

with all the argments for immortality in the Phaedo; Gadamer writes=20
that the proof is "obviously unsuited to prove the point which it is=20
supposed to prove" ("The Proofs of immortality in Plato's Phaedo", in=20
Dialogue and Dialectic. Eight hermeneutical studies on Plato, trans. P.=20=

C. Smith, Yale 1980, p. 25), and he suggests Plato meant us to see how=20=

bad they are. Clearly Plato thought the argument was not strong enough=20=

to *prove* immortality all by itself, for he offers two more=20
alternative arguments in what follows.

        Best, Mike.
>
>
>
>
Michael Chase
(goya@xxxxxxxxxxx)
CNRS UPR 76
7, rue Guy Moquet
Villejuif 94801
France

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