Donal McEvoy spots a regressus ad infinitum (if not a _reductio ad absurdum_) in claims like Geary's, trying to delimitate what philosophy is (from what philosophy is not): >Mere description of >[philosophers] cannot work because we would >have to select who we should regard >as [philosophers] and select which of their >activities are [philosophy]-related (their >toilet habits might have no bearing on >whether or not they are [philosophers]). Plus, >'Meta-philosophy' has a somewhat pretentious title. And then there's meta-meta-philosophy. No entry or quotation for it in the OED, or for any other meta-meta, other than 'meta-meta-language'. Below. Cheers, JL Pretend pretension quotes for 'meta-meta-language' 1945 Mind 54 217 To express what a set of symbols means.., a..second such set or meta~language that speaks about them and about what they speak about is required. â?? â??Chienâ?? bedeutet Hundâ?? -- for instance, is such a metastatement, where (part of) French serves as the first..language, (part of) German as the second. But what if we do not understand German? Then a third, or meta-metalanguage, say English, is needed. 1957 N. Chomsky Syntactic Struct. vi. 54 Linguistic theory will thus be formulated in a metalanguage to the language in which grammars are Linguisa metametalanguage to any language for which a grammar is constructed. 1976 Contemp. Sociol. 5 520/2 To separate statements in the object language from those in the meta-language, the meta-meta-language, and so on. 1990 Mind 99 209 One idea would be to repeat for the meta-language the account of NEGATION in terms of joining and separating. But this is pointless since the problem will then recur in the meta-meta-language. ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html