[lit-ideas] Re: Meta-Philosophy
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2004 12:27:42 +0100 (BST)
Don't go for gold, silver or bronze - you might just fail the obligatory drug
test and get a life-ban. I note that below you interpolate the word
"ramblings" into my post, giving it a more personal and offensive tone than
it has, and equally you have been quoting RP's words as if they were Geary's.
Also you write in a way that could easily be interpreted as meaning that I
said your comments re art were a "load of crap" or that art itself is a "load
of crap", when I actually was saying that dismissing art or philosophy as a
"load of crap" (as many do) is itself a philosophical position - even if not
a very sophisticated or developed one - because it is not a view that is
falsifiable by observation ie. by a test statement that contradicts what must
follow from a generalisation in the presence of certain 'initial conditions'
(here I assume, no doubt quite wrongly, that you are familiar with Popper's
terminology and analysis in, say, Logik der Forschung).
I am not really interested in whether you "respect" what Popper says, I am
interested in what counter-arguments you have. Below I look for them and
reply.
--- Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx wrote:
>
>
> In a message dated 8/22/2004 2:40:23 PM Eastern Standard Time,
> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> I don't see how this addresses Pop's demarcation criterion argument -
> according to which if the answer is not falsifiable/testable by
> observation
> then it is not scientific and is then, ipso facto,
> metaphysical/philosophical
> - even if if is not _quality_ metaphysl./philosl, as per above answer.
>
> Btw, among other errors, I did earlier mean to say that scientists agree
> with
> the norms Popper proposes, not "opposes" as I in fact wrote.
>
>
>
>
>
> ----
>
> Actually, I thought your 'opposes' ran (oh so) very smoothly:
>
>
> [McEvoy name-drops scientists here: Hawking, Medawar, Eccles]
>
> and added
>
> >[These people] agree with the norms that Popper
> >is opposing even though one might argue (wrongly)
> >these norms are refuted by
> >actual scientific practice.
>
> Since we were recently discussing the 'ought/can' paradoxes, I thought
> McEvoy was trying to say that Popper proposes something that _opposes_ what
>
> scientists (like Hawkin, Medawar, Eccles) are doing (as a sort of
> counterfactual).
>
> Regarding my apropos comments on art (which McDevoy qualifies as "load of
> crap"), he writes:
>
> >[In any case] I don't see how your ramblings address Pop's demarcation
> criterion argument -
> >according to which if the answer is not falsifiable/testable by
> observation
> >then it is not scientific and is then, ipso facto,
> metaphysical/philosophical
> >- even if if is not _quality
Now the counter-argument begins...
> --- I have little respect for what Popper says about philosophy.
This is not an important counter-argument that needs discussing.
>Note that >
> he never held a post _related_ to 'philosophy'. (He was "professor of
> scientific method" in London -- a big paradox seeing that he himself was
> no scientific
> method).
First, you are right that Popper was not himself a "scientific method" - he
was in fact a human being. Second, you may mean to say that Popper's
professorial title was somewhat paradoxical because he argued that
"scientific method" did not exist - but this is only true in that he argued
that in several (traditional) senses "scientific method" did not exist, and
this is not a logical paradox for it is possible to be professor of a
non-existent subject, nor is it any kind of "paradox" that substantiates your
main claim that his post was not related to philosophy. On the contrary,
according to his demarcation criterion his post was one in philosophy, and so
I understand the LSE classified it. You offer no valid counter-argument here
against that view.
> In a way, it's very reminiscent of what the Israeli Bar-Hillel said about
> 'pragmatics', being the trash bag (or dustbin) of linguistics (until
> pragmatics
> struck back with a vengeance -- see L. Horn, 'Intro' to Handbook of
> Pragmatics, Blackwell).
It may well make you reminisce in this way, but this is hardly a valid
counter-argument of any sort.
> Popper is just saying that if a question cannot be answered scientifically,
>
> then it _may_ (for all it's worth) be answered philosophically.
He does say something along these lines. But what is wrong with it? - you
fail to tell us.
>He goes on
> to
> confuse (in a grand manner) 'philosophy' with 'metaphysics'.
His confusion in this regard is here merely asserted (in a somewhat grand
manner) - it is not specified in a sufficiently specific and rational manner.
> Philosophy is -- for Heidegger, etc. -- wisdom of love (or knowledge of
> eros, if you wish -- see Phaedrus). Metaphysics is the general structure of
>
> ontology. Two separate fields of inquiry (or one a subset of the other, if
> you
> like).
All this means is that Popper's way of viewing philosophy and metaphysics
(his 'definition' as it were) is not the only way - but this is not itself a
valid argument against his way of looking at things. You may as well here be
banging your shoe on the table and shouting 'BUT HEIDEGGER DOES NOT AGREE!'
> If by 'philosophical'/'metaphysical' answer, Popper means plain
> 'normative',
> then he should say _it_.
The actual situation is not as plain as that, so he would not say it. I refer
you back to my previous post where I mentioned some of things he would say
about there being a normative element in stipulations as to what counts as
philosophy or what counts as science etc ie. he denies such stipulations are
straightforward descriptions of given 'facts'.
>Given his negative view of philosophy and
> metaphysics, it is understandable he would regard all metaphysicians and
> philosophers
> as deceiving people
But this was not his view - he once described himself in reply to Putnam, who
was a leader of a new generation of logicians, as being just a "tottering old
metaphysician". Kant is one example of a metaphysician whom Popper would be
at pains to point out tried to enlighten rather than deceive (of course,
Popper did have an opposite view of Hegel and Heidegger). And his whole
philosophy of science stresses the importance of metaphysics for science; and
his philosophy of poliltics stresses the crucial, inescapable (if sometimes
disastrous role) of metaphysical beliefs in our political life and even daily
living. So no marks for this, in my view.
Or this...
>somewhat sneakily propounding an
> "x is y"
>
> definition for something which is, rather, of the logical form
>
> "x SHOULD be y"
>
> -- but not all philosophers or metaphysicians are like that, as Popper did
>
> not care to know.
I am far from knowing why you think Popper did not care to know anything to
the contrary to this point about so-called "logical form", or why you think
he even made any such general claim about "logical form" (which I do not
recall reading in any of his works). In fact, my feeling is that Popper
disliked the kind of 'philosophical logic' that dresses up what Popper would
regard as metaphysical intuition or guesswork, as if it were the only logical
analysis of some "logical form" or some "concept" etc. His opposition to
"conceptual analysis" is, in fact, what he thought most divided him from
contemporary philosophers, and that is why he did not offer his views on
science, and in particular what makes it most valuable, as a "conceptual
analysis" of the concept of science. As far as he was concerned one is free
to define science, or anything really, as one likes - what matters is what
follows from the definition and the arguments that underpin its adoption.
Of course, I may be mistaken, but I see no valid argument in this post about
the views of a philosopher you feel able to express no "respect" for but
whose actual views you do not seem able to present accurately. I would
recommend Magee's 'Confessions of a Philosopher' as a corrective, as he
explains that this practice of dismissing Popper from a position that is
either invalid or which misrepresents Popper's position is widespread in
academic philosophy. It's eye-opening, if not also jaw-dropping, stuff.
Best,
Donal
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