[lit-ideas] Making sense of the TLP?
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2008 09:23:12 +0700
Donal McEvoy wrote:
"What is not contained in these quotations is any explicit statement
that shows that, for W, 'elements' contribute nothing to the 'sense'
of a picture"
My goal is not to convince Donal but rather to show the reasoning for
my argument. If Donal disagrees that the texts I provide lead to the
conclusions I draw, that is fine. However, merely stating that he is
not convinced is insufficient, since his being convinced is not the
point. This is doubly so since my argument is in response to his
initial post. What I would like to see from Donal is textual support
for his initial argument. I would be interested to see Donal defend
his own argument, since I assume this space is about the interaction
of ideas rather than convincing Donal.
In lieu of Donal defending his own position, I will continue with
mine. What follows is lengthy but contains a significant number of
quotes from TLP along with my own brief bits of commentary. At the
end I summarize the commentary, so some readers may want to just jump
to that if they wish. (Perhaps wiser readers will dispense with all
of this nonsense and get on to other more useful pursuits.)
2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not
any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that
material properties are represented - only by the configuration of
objects that they are produced.
2.0232 In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless.
2.024 Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.
2.025 It is form and content.
2.0251 Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects.
It seems to me that here Wittgenstein is giving us a straightforward
Kantian position. There are objects in the world and they are the
things that make the world constant. However, these objects only have
a determined form, that they occupy space and time, and have colour.
In this sense, objects don't have colour, only the form of being
coloured.
The material properties of an object, the particular space it occupies
in time, its colour, etc. are only possible through representation.
For Wittgenstein, and here he differs from Kant, representation is
through propositions. Further, propositions represent a configuration
of objects, relations between objects, rather than a representation of
an object.
2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.
2.03 In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links
of a chain.
2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to
one another
2.032 The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of
affairs is the structure of the state of affairs.
The relations between objects produces facts about the world. These
facts are not about individual objects but rather the determinate
manner in which individual objects relate to other objects. The
structure of these facts lies in the relations being determined, as
being the case.
2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world
2.05 The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which
states of affairs do not exist.
2.06 The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
(We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and
their non-existence a negative fact.)
2.061 States of affairs are independent of one another
2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it
is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.
The world is comprised by the determinate relations between objects.
The world is not made up of objects but rather the relations between
objects. Furthermore, these relations are independent of one another
so that the limit of states of affairs marks the limits of what does
not exist. Possible facts cannot be postulated from existing facts
since a fact does not tell us anything beyond the states of affairs,
the set of relations, it represents.
2.1 We picture facts to ourselves
2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence
and non-existence of states of affairs.
2.12 A picture is a model of reality
2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture
corresponding to them.
2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives
of objects.
2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to
one another in a determinate way.
2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one
another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one
another in the same way. Let us call this connexion of its elements
the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this
structure the pictorial form of the picture.
2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one
another in the same way as the elements of the picture.
A fact is a picture of states of affairs that model reality. In the
picture there are elements that correspond to objects and the
relations between elements in the picture represent determinate
relations between objects. This correspondence is possible because
the form that allows a picture to picture states of affairs opens up
the possibility that it may also picture relations between objects.
Put differently, the representational character of a picture allows
for the presentation of a determined set of relations between elements
in the picture, but it also opens up the possibility that these
relations might also represent relations between objects.
2.1511 That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
2.1512 It is laid against reality like a measure.
2.15121 Only the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch the
object that is to be measured.
2.1514 The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the
picture's elements with things.
2.1515 These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the
picture's elements, with which the picture touches reality.
2.161 There must be something identical in a picture and what it
depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all.
2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be
able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in the way it does, is
its pictorial form.
A picture, therefore, somehow matches up with reality. The points of
contact between the picture and reality are between elements in the
picture and objects. What makes this correlation possible is that the
picture has the form of re-presentation.
2.201 A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of
existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.
2.21 A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or
incorrect, true or false.
2.22 What a picture represents it represents independently of its
truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial form.
2.221 What a picture represents is its sense.
2.222 The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality
constitutes its truth or falsity.
The picture, by virtue of its form as representational, represents
states of affairs that may or may not exist. What is represented in a
picture may or may not agree with reality, and therefore may or may
not be true. The sense of the picture is its representation. Whether
this sense correlates to reality determines whether it is true or
false.
Summary:
1. Objects only possess their form, not material properties. For
example, an object may possess the form of colour but does not possess
any particular colour. Material properties are possible only through
representation.
2. Facts about the world concern the relations between objects, not
the objects themselves. What makes these relations facts, is that
they are fixed.
3. The world is made up of these relations between objects, rather
than the objects themselves.
4. What is pictured in a fact are states of affairs that correspond to
reality. This correspondence lies between elements in the picture and
objects and the possibility that the relations between elements in the
picture correspond to relations between objects.
5. The points of contact between the picture and reality are between
elements in the picture and objects, a correlation made possible by
the re-presentational form of pictures.
6. The sense of the picture is what it represents. The form of the
picture is to represent, regardless of whether the representation
agrees with reality.
So, I restate my claim: For Wittgenstein in the TLP, the sense of a
picture lies in the states of affairs, that is the relations between
things, that are represented. The elements in the picture are
necessary within the picture since the representational form of the
picture requires the possibility that the picture corresponds to
reality. However, for two reasons, the elements cannot contribute
materially to the sense of the picture. First, elements in a picture
are only possibly true and therefore cannot have a determined quality
independently of the relations within the picture. Putting it in
Wittgenstein's terms, the picture cannot determine whether it is
itself true. Second, objects have only the form of material qualities
so they cannot determine the material qualities of elements in a true
picture. That a picture is true depends on whether elements in the
picture correspond to objects, but the sense of the picture is
independent of its truth. A picture cannot be a picture without
elements, but the element is what it is, occupies this particular
space at this particular time, having this particular colour, because
of the place it has in the states of affairs represented in the
picture.
If Donal disagrees, I hope he will do me the courtesy of giving
textual evidence for any errors I have made in presenting
Wittgenstein's arguments from TLP.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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