[lit-ideas] Re: Griceian Numbers
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 20:53:01 -0400 (EDT)
>>One wonders if Witters was a mathematical philosopher.
McEvoy:
>Well, gee. So?
In "Ayer on Wittgenstein I", McEvoy quotes from Ayer:
“It would be wrong, however, to say that he was being shown numbers in the
way he was being shown specimens of building materials. The difference
lies not the different character of the ‘objects’, but in the different roles
that the two sorts of signs play in the language game."
And comments,
"This conclusion, I suggest, is Ayer’s own interpolation and not a
paraphrase of W’s text."
----
Yet cfr. this from Stanford:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/
"Wittgenstein stresses that he is trying to ‘warn’ us against this‘aspect
’—the idea that the foregoing proposition about fractions “introduces us
to the mysteries of the mathematical world,” which exists somewhere as a
completed totality, awaiting our prodding and our discoveries. The fact that
we regard mathematical propositions as being about mathematical objects and
mathematical investigation “as the exploration of these objects” is “
already mathematical alchemy,”claims Wittgenstein (RFM V, §16), since “it is
not possible to appeal to the meaning [‘Bedeutung’] of the signs in
mathematics,… because it is only mathematics that gives them their meaning [‘
Bedeutung’].”"
So, it may do to interpret Ayer's criticism in terms of Witters's broader
anti-objectual view of mathematics, as per the Stanford entry -- and all.
(Or not!)
I append for the record the reference sections.
Cheers,
Speranza
---
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