[lit-ideas] Re: Grice and the Four-Category Ontology

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2013 16:17:34 -0400 (EDT)


In a message dated 4/20/2013 8:55:53 P.M. UTC-02,  
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
in what way may ordinary language tell us  what type of ontology we need? 
 
Well, I think the point is neatly made, by an Oxonian as Lowe is, in his  
distinction, in phrases like "red apple" between "red" and "apple".
 
Lowe, who learned at Oxford and teaches at Durham (or Durhamshire, as I  
prefer), writes:
 
"We should gravitate towards the FOURTH system of ontology  identified 
earlier, the system which acknowledges the following  distinct ontological 
categories as 
being fundamental and   indispensable:
 
1) the category of objects, or 
individual substances
2) the category of tropes, or, 
as I shall henceforth prefer to   call them, modes. 
 
 
Then there's the alleged univocal category of universals. Here Lowe hastens 
 to add:

"It is then but a short step to my own [and indeed Grice's]  variant of 
this system,  which distinguishes between two fundamental  categories of 
"universal", 
 
3) universals whose  instances are objects and 
4) univresals whose instances are modes. 
 
-- hence the keyword: four-category ontology.
 
The linguistic justification provided by Lowe, as per the query by McEvoy,  
echoes Grice in more than one respect (or mode):
 
"This distinction -- between universals whose instances are objects and  
universals whose instances are modes-- is mirrored in language [or "ordinary  
English", as Grice prefers ("I speak English, not Language") by 
the  distinction between general terms being either
 
i) sortal 
 
or 
ii) adjectival.
 
That is, 
between such general terms as 
 
'planet' 
 
and
 
'flower' 
 
on the one hand and such general terms as
 
'red' 
 
and 
 
'round' 
 
on the other."
 
"The former denote kinds of object, while the latter denote properties  of  
objects.". 
 
McEvoy:
"in what way may ordinary language tell us what type of ontology we  need?"

Part of this may be online, but I'll see if I can quote. In "Reply to  
Richards", Grice jokes on Russell's idea of a stone-age physics or metaphysics  
as embodied in ordinary English. 
 
"Me Tarzan, you Jane" -- that is not ordinary English. But the idea remains 
 there.

As in that cartoon showing two cavemen in Palmer, "Grammar". One tells  the 
other: remember the good old days when all we had to care was verbs and  
nouns?
 
----
 
So, the point by English is that there is a stone-age PHYSICS reflected by  
Ordinary English.
So we have 
 
LINGUISTIC CATEGORIES
 
and 
 
ONTOLOGICAL categories.
 
And it's via the refining of things like 'sortal' vs. 'adjectival' as  
applied to LINGUISTIC categories that sheds light (metaphorically) on the types 
 
of ONTOLOGICAL categories needed.

When Richard Grandy and Richard Warner (that Grice calls, collectively,  
"Richards") thought of a sobriquet for their book, they came up with
 
PGRICE --- Philosophical
-------------------Grounds of
--------------------- Rationality
-------------------------Intentions
---------------------------Categories
------------------------------Ends.

For Grice, the idea of 'category' is basic. He joked on Kant's four  
categories when discussing maxims of conversation (quantity, quality, mode,  
relation), and so on.
 
I don't think it fits with Popper's scheme of the three worlds, because  
here we are only dealing with Popper's FIRST world.
 
The second world corresponds to the psychological, and in terms of  
first-world entities, it's like a mode (a mode of experience, "I'm feeling  
happy", 
"I'm thinking of vacationing in Sardinia", etc.) The ontology of the  THIRD 
world is not interesting for the pure metaphysician. Although it may do  
with things like:

"I was reading Plato yesterday".
 
Where what he read was not ONE PARTICULAR specimen of a book by Plato, but  
Plato's Republic.
 
Similarly, "I was litening to a "Pomp and Circumstance" by Elgar,  
yesterday, as set with lyrics by Benson, Hope and Glory". We have the 
particular  
performances of "Hope and Glory", but we have like an item in the third world 
of  objectived knowledge, or something.
 
But again, the type of ontology Lowe and Grice are interested are is more  
basic since it concerns categories in language that justify the positing of 
a  category of ontology.
And so on.
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html

Other related posts: