[lit-ideas] Re: Grice and the Four-Category Ontology
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 20 Apr 2013 23:55:34 +0100 (BST)
If one adds "or not" as a qualifier to everything, does that mean we are right
about everything or not? Or does it just mean that by claiming both an
assertion and its negation we are not taking the risk of being wrong about
anything we claim, or not?
Btw, in what way may ordinary language tell us what type of ontology we need?
[Without the answer ever going beyond what we might consider ordinary language?]
Donal
________________________________
From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Saturday, 20 April 2013, 13:33
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Grice and the Four-Category Ontology
The idea is that by examining our 'use' or 'natural dealings' with what
Grice calls "ordinary language -- if I may be ordinary enough to call it
thus", we arrive, as Popper may not have realised, at the type of ontology we
need.
For there is a distinction between 'flower' and 'red', and Popper's
worlds-theory may find this problematic ("or not").
----
"It may be argued that English represents a four-category ontology. Or
not."
--- On the other hand, Symbolic Logic alla Russell/Whitehead is more
complicated. Or not."
In a message dated 4/20/2013 9:44:22 A.M. UTC-02, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx
writes:
There is the scene in Spinal Tap where the guitarist is explaining that
while most amps only go up to 10 his goes all the way up to 11 ["that's one
louder"]: in that spirit, and while acknowleding that Popper wished to avoid
the term "ontology" (essentially because of its "essentialist"
connatations), Popper's Worlds 1-2-3 may be regarded as a three-category
ontology of
sorts, but does this "ontology" possibly go way up to 11 and even beyond?
Apparently so: see Popper's Emory Lectures, now published as "Knowledge and
the Mind-Body Problem". Ockham might be spinning in his grave except such
motion might multiply entities needlessly.
---
I like the idea of "11, one louder". For the record, most credit should go
to Lowe, who learned (*) at Oxford and teaches at Durham.
I quote from one of his papers, below.
(*: "Only the poor learn at Oxford" Arnold -- cited in Oxford Dictionary of
Quoations -- of course Arnold is generalising, and, as Parmenides said,
"all generalisations are dangerous if not odious, including this one -- sorry
about that").
Cheers,
Speranza
A commentary on E. J. Lowe (University of Oxford, &c).
entities
|
__________|__________
| |
| |
universals particulars
| |
______|______ ______|______
| | | |
| | | |
properties relations | |
| |
| |
objects tropes
|
___________|__________
| |
| |
abstract objects concrete objects
| |
______|______ ______|______
| | | |
| | | |
sets propositions masses organisms
The distinguishing features of the four different ontological systems:
____________________________________________
| | | |
| objects | universals | tropes |
_______|______________|______________|______________|
| | | | |
| 1 | R | E/R | F |
|_______|______________|______________|______________|
| | | | |
| 2 | F | F | E |
|_______|______________|______________|______________|
| | | | |
| 3 | F | E/R | F |
|_______|______________|______________|______________|
| | | | |
| 4 | F | F | F |
|_______|­______________|______________|______________|
Four ontological systems
F = Fundamental
R = Reduced
E = Eliminated
"We should gravitate towards the fourth system of ontology identified
earlier, the system which acknowledges three distinct ontological categories
as
being fundamental and indispensable — the category of objects, or
individual substances; the category of universals; and the category of tropes,
or,
as I shall henceforth prefer to call them, modes. It is then but a short
step to my own variant of this system, which distinguishes between two
fundamental categories of universal, one whose instances are objects and the
other whose instances are modes. This distinction is mirrored in language by
the distinction between sortal and adjectival general terms — that is,
between such general terms as
'planet'
and
'flower'
on the one hand and such general terms as
'red'
and
'round'
on the other."
"The former denote kinds of object, while the latter denote properties of
objects.".
"The four-category ontology ...provides, I believe, a uniquely satisfactory
metaphysical foundation for natural science."
"The figure that I draw below helps to highlight the main structural
features of the four-category ontology."
"In this diagram we use the term 'attribute' to denote the category of
property-universals and, for simplicity of presentation, we are ignoring (as
Geary does not) relational universals.
Kinds characterised by Attributes
instantiated by exemplified by instantiated by
Objects characterised by Modes
References
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).
Armstrong, D. M., What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge
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Westview Press, 1989).
Armstrong, D. M., A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge
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Simons, P. M., 'Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories
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