Geary was wondering about the essence of language.
While a functional approach to language ("language serves Function F1,
Function F2, ..." and so on) might shed light on this, and even shed an answer,
it is not coming from McEvoy. He mentioned burping as an 'expression', as
when Popper (influenced by Buehler) said that lingo is _expressive_.
Perhaps that's its essence? Benedetto Croce thought so. But McEvoy following
Popper doesn't.
In a message dated 1/18/2016 11:59:53 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
The disinquisition on Heidegger [on the functions of burping and its
expressive value] is unlikely to throw light on Popper's view: which is not
merely that language has many "functions" but there is a hierarchy, with some
functions higher than others. This view of argument-description-sig
nalling-expressing [where the higher functions always presuppose the lower,
but not
vice versa] dovetails with the view that human language is distinguished by
its use to convey W3 content."
But I wonder if Geary did mean "human" language. Surely it is not unlike
that if Martian exists (Matt Demon plays one) they speak some sort of
language. Also dolphins.
Even Darwin allows that human lingo EVOLVES from expression ("The
expression of emotions in man and animals.")
McEvoy:
"the higher kinds of W3 content involve description and (higher still)
argument. When we view language in terms of its W3 content, it is obvious this
content is not an "essence" of language;"
This may equivocate. For one thing is to say that this content is not an
essence of language, and another, and possibly true thing to say, is to claim
that the ability of humans to reach, via language, what Popper calls w3 (I
don't capitalise on 'w') is _essential_. (I.e. that we wouldn't call a
human someone who cannot _see_ w3 or _speak_ about w3.). Grice distinguishes
here between a mere human and a _person_ (alla Martin Buber, but I suspect
Popper finds the human/person distinction inhumane).
McEvoy concludes:
"and that the more developed or higher-level the content, the more that
content moves away from anything like an ever-present essence. The truth, for
Popper, is that our capacity to use language to engage with W3 and convey
W3 content is far too remarkable to be acounted for in terms of an "essence"
of language."
This reminds me of Christopher Kirwan ("How strong are the objections to
essence?" in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society). Kirwan, an
Oxonian, implicates that one should not confuse
1. essence
with, to use a noun out of the adjective used by McEvoy above:
2. remarkableness
i.e. an essence can be a very boring thing -- nothing remarkable about it.
McEvoy is implicating that the ability, via linguistic means, to engage in
w3 is "too remarkable" to be called "essential".
But while essences can be boring (the essence of a donkey, say), essences
can be remarkable, and the onus probandi seems to be on he who claims that
this remarkableness is _not_ essential.
Cheers,
Speranza
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