[lit-ideas] Re: Counter-Suggestion

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2009 19:51:42 EDT

In a message dated 6/8/2009 6:54:05 P.M. Eastern  Daylight Time, 
guimbarde9@xxxxxxxxx writes:
This is not how I learned it. (I  am weirded out by the smoked salmon 
example./ 5n 'Meaning,' there are (Grice  claims) two sorts of meaning, natural 
('Dark clouds mean rain,' 'These spots  mean measles,' and non-natural, which 
is  mostly talk, with a few gestures  thrown in. But I could be wrong. 
Maybe that's not what he meant.  


---

I know there is _another_ post by you in my mailbox!  

When I get a reply to one of my posts (in that case, "The worst opera  
ever") I re-read my post, before opening the mail, to ask  myself,

"What could I possibly be meaning by  that?"

Having re-read my post, and not yet having opened R. Paul's _I_  guess and 
hope it will be some nice comment on Philippa Foot, hoping he was able  to 
find that great site by one S. Pike.

Anyway, this one I first read  because I thought, "An outsider", -- when i 
opened and it read, "Guille" -- I  thought: Another Jorge Sexer, an 
Argentine. It was R. Paul.

So this  merits a philosophical reply:

>This is not how I learned it.  

Never mind how you learned it, as long as you never taught it! (Just  
joking! Friendly) but _some_ people. I recall meeting McFarlance, of 
UC/Berkeley  
-- he was giving a talk on something or other. I approached him during the  
coffee break and I said, "I see from your website you have also taught 
Grice" --  and since I was with people, I said, "McFarlane is our expert in  
Grice".

He got so offended! "I only taught _one_ seminar on Grice --  hardly an 
expert" etc.

Anyway, I find that philosophy of education is all  about learning, never 
teaching. So following the Toad's "We have to learn them",  I use 'learn' to 
mean 'teach' now, i.e. make learn.

----

>(I am  weirded out by the smoked salmon example./ 5n 'Meaning,' 

I fail to  understand the "/5n"

But I guess it was a joke, I heard  somewhere.

Smoke means fire.
Smoke means smoked salmon.

If  there's smoke, there's fire.

The joke went, "Where there's smoke, there's  smoked salmon", or something.

But consider Grice's use of 'utterance'  (artificial, in part)

By that utterance ("BOOOOM") -- the noise the stone  made upon falling from 
the mountain -- the mountain meant that it was not safe  to climb it (her).

Surely Grice means _anything_ by utterance (any  'vehicle of meaning-nn' -- 
as I wrote in my PhD dissertation -- putting the onus  on my Evaluating 
Committee to judge the circularity). 

--- A burp, a  fart, etc. can _all_ mean things.

Whether naturally or non-naturally  seems sometimes immaterial to Grice. I 
was once browsing a Chinese online link  on Grice. Since I don't read 
Chinese, most of the ideographs escaped me, but at  one point the scholar  went,

"'meaning'  _naturally_ is an oxymoron in most  languages,
including Chinese and French -- if not Gricean."

-- The whole enterprise  of _semiotics_ is about _non-natural_ meaning... 
etc. 

>there are  (Grice claims) two sorts of meaning, natural 

Oddly, the one to blame  here is Strawson who _typed_ the thing. 
Colloquially, Grice says there are two  'senses' (puaj!!!) of 'mean'!

>('Dark clouds mean rain,' 'These spots  mean measles,' and non-natural, 
which is  mostly talk, with a few gestures  thrown in. But I could be wrong. 
Maybe that's not what he meant.

Well, in  "Meaning Revisited" -- I wrote about this in my PhD, I claim it's 
Hobbes's  Computatio Sive Logica.

Grice (1948) wanted to avoid talk of 'artificial'  and 'sign' -- but the 
discussion is in Hobbes between 'artificial' and 'natural'  signs. Grice's 
objections are very good:

--- I wouldn't say "English" is  _artificial_ or "that" artificial. 
"non-natural" sounds, he thought better (but  this struck back with a vengeance 
with Dennett had his Causes of Philosopher's  Deaths -- as "of non-natural 
causes" for Grice).

--- I wouldn't say a  word is a _sign_ ("Stop" is a sign -- a 'traffic' 
sign)

---

Hobbes  says it's all "consequence" by which he possibly meant something 
like  'empiricist-construed' effect as in  

cause                         effect

Hobbes prefers to speak of 'consequence' instead of  'effect'.

Ditto Grice.

Grice arrives at the  formula

y    means   x

and analyses it in a way that is  _common_ to both 'natural' (mainly 
'factive', he realises -- cfr. "The present  budget means that we're gonna have 
a 
hard year, but I don't mean to suggest we  will" -- discussed and criticised 
by Martinich -- if we could only hear Obama!)  and non-natural meaning:  
"'cat' means _felis  domesticus_".

-----

The analysans is,  simply,

y    is a consequence  of x


-- Not very  illuminating, but 'mean' _is_ an anglicism. As C. Bruce should 
testify,  'meinen', in German, either means opinion or goobledegook. It is 
cognate with  _mind_, but in Spanish, 'mentare' (in Latin) gives 'mentir', 
to lie. The  opposite of Gricean  'mean'!

"And I mean it".

-----

But there is of course a lot of truth in  Grice's claim.

I had the big discovery when reading S. R. Chapman's bio  of Grice 
(Palgrave -- now paperback).

Chapman quotes from Stevenson at  length -- that Grice used. I did consult 
Stevenson once, but had not noticed  this important use:

Stevenson (1944) is using 'mean' in _scare  quotes_:

The barometer 'means' that the  humidity in the room is high.

Surely a barometer cannot _mean_ -- neither  can a computer (vide 
Haugeland/Grice).

Stevenson, a latter-day  pragmaticist, like G. H. Mead, that Habermas uses 
extensively -- are important  only with reference to Morris, but ultimately, 
PEIRCE.

The other day I  was reading a call of papers for the Peirce society, but 
they make so many  requirements, that I thought, what the fuck! Let them 
investigate the  thing.

Grice used the very same article by Peirce that I was fascinated  with. 
Theory of Signs. Grice read extensively on this in the early 1940s in  Oxford. 
Hence his "meaning". Indeed, the UC/Berkeley at Bancroft Library holds  
unpublished lectures by Grice on Peirce.

Grice is interested in Peirce's  'index' -- on account of possible 
factiveness.

One day I was browsing the  Philosopher's Index and found a lot of 
references to Grice by one Facione -- it  particularly intrigued me that 
Facione was 
claiming that Grice's theory is a  pre-sequel of H. L. A. Hart -- and some 
other obscure philosopher Facione  mentions.

I found the Hart paper: Philosophical Quarterly, 1952 -- before  "Meaning" 
(1948) by Grice was published in 1957.

But the thing, though of  historic interest -- this was before Hart became 
a lawyer -- is minor: it's a  'critical review' of Holloway, Language and 
Intelligence. And to my pleasure,  there was a footnote crediting Grice:

"I owe this to discussion with H.  P. Grice".

Owe what? Well, the 'smoke means fire' example. 

----  So it's been a long Gricean story.

I would think that Grice's big  philosophical contribution is 'factiveness' 
and notably, 'non-factiveness' as a  feature of human intentionality. To 
the last of his days, he opposed crude  versions of empiricism. 

So while black clouds may mean rain, that's  factive and of lesser 
importance. If a man farts, he has some issue with normal  evacuation, but 
that's 
factive and unimportant.

But when a man starts to  burp INTENTIONALLY, it no longer can mean, "he 
has some issue with normal  digestion". He is _meaning_ something, non 
factively.

Grice notes that  first systems of signs are _iconic_: a fake burp sounds 
exactly like a natural  burp. But that would limit languages enormously. We 
need freedom from iconicity.  So that's when "god" started to mean _god_ in 
English, but not in, er,  Spanish.

I once wrote a long letter to Martinich with a derivation. He  wrote back, 
"Interesting. I'll give it some thought". What I derived was, using  Grice's 
example of NATURAL meaning ("to mean to"  e.g. I mean to go to  London) as 
a basis for further elaboration of intentions so that my displaying  the 
raincoat may mean that I mean to go to London.

The raincoat episode  is due to Stevenson. But again, he is working 
behaviouristically. If a man puts  on his raincoat, it means he is about to 
leave, 
and if he further grabs his  umbrella -- I think is Stevenson's example), 
that may further mean that he  thinks it might rain.

But if he _does_ say, "I'll take the umbrella in  case it rains", he 
_means_ that he will take the umbrella in case it  rains.

My mother says, "Philosophers!"

Cheers,

JL  Speranza
Buenos Aires, Argentina  

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