--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote: > > > The short version is that there must be a "language of thought", > > Wittgenstein to the contrary, and that the formal (aka > > computational) and semantic (aka conceptual) aspects of that > > language are a "dual aspect all the way down". > > If I understand this right, he's arguing for something going on in brains > that has a one-to-one relationship with the referents outside of brains and > he is further saying that the languages we speak and think in and the > meanings our thoughts embody are the flip side(?) of the causal events in > brains, i.e., that there's a precise parallel of brain event with every > meaning, every thought we think linguistically without which our thoughts > would lack meaning (content)? Oh, ... if I put in Fodor's own words, it would give us both headaches, and I'm not sure I quite understand yours, either. Of course his books are there for your perusal, if you like. But I warn you, even as Fodor concedes in his most recent, he is very easy to misread. Certainly he's a physicalist in that physical brain state corresponds with meaning, but just what that means (!) is not necessarily clear, in regards to balancing "methodological solipsism" and correspondence with distal objects. > How does this Fodorian view (if I've got it right) sit with the account I > gave earlier of meaning as connection in a complex web of conserved > connections? I'm not sure if I read your message. Fodor's term of choice is "modularity", which he corresponds roughly to the idea that you must have symbolic and semantic genericity a la Chomsky. It's Fodor's mention of semantics that is easiest to misread, and that happens to be about 50% of his theory. I've been reading his stuff for over thirty years, and I am still untangling the threads. Josh ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/