[Wittrs] Re: Meaning, Intent and Reference (Parsing Fodor?)

  • From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 00:18:16 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <jrstern@...> wrote:

> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
> >
> > Good philosophy, that is clear thinking about difficult concepts, ought to 
> > be doable in ordinary language.
>
> Yes, and no.
>
> If you try to do, say, quantum physics in ordinary language,
> then yes, you can give some general ideas, but if you want to do
> the calculations for an atomic bomb, you need more detail and rigor,
> which is to say, math.
>

Philosophy isn't quantum physics or even physics. It's subject matter is ideas, 
getting clear on them and having to resort to complex and arcane formulations 
in most cases is diametrically opposed to the idea of making things clearer, I 
think.

Of course not everyone agrees with my view of philosophy and I do agree that 
there are some concepts that may just be beyond achieving clarity in ordinary 
language (though I think these are exceptions).

As to the matter of what philosophy is, I grant that there are some (Hegelians, 
Heideggerians, Kantians, etc.) who think that to truly understand the world, 
one needs to move toward complexity, neologisms, specialized linguistic tools, 
etc. Philosophy, after all, is a big field with a big history but I'm of the 
opinion that, while there may be something to say for the idea of different 
strokes for different folks in different eras (Aristotle had his day, Kant his, 
and so forth), it must all boil down to enhancing understanding, whatever it 
takes and, of course, I think that choosing arcane and/or esoteric methods over 
straight forward ones is generally the wrong way to go.

That said, I wouldn't want to say Fodor is mistaken or even confused since I 
really haven't read enough of him, or grasped enough of what I have read, to 
make such a statement. (Obviously I feel differently concerning Searle whose 
writings I have read somewhat extensively -- Minds, Brains and Science; 
Language, Mind and Society; Consciousness and Language; The Mystery of 
Consciousness; Rationality in Action; plus assorted papers of his -- to feel I 
have enough of a grasp of his arguments to point out where I think he has got 
things wrong.)

<snip>


> > But clearly just manipulating zeroes and ones in a computer via an 
> > algorithm isn't understanding.
>
> That's not clear to me.
>
>
> > With Dennett I would argue that what's needed is a sufficiently complex 
> > process-based system operating in a certain way (the way this is physically 
> > realized).
>
> Ones and zeroes can be complex.
>

Yes and it is in the complex deployment of these (certain kinds of 
process-based systems) that one can envision achieving the subjectiveness we 
associate with having a mind and which we call "consciousness". But my point is 
that, by themselves, they are not instances of consciousness or any of the 
features we associate with consciousness (in this case the feature in question 
being understanding as in grasping meanings).


>
> > Short of a full blown field of study aimed at identifying Fodor's supposed 
> > language of thought, how does he say we would recognize it or describe it?
>
> You look where the light is good.
>
> He, as Dennett, reviews various psych experiments for consistency
> with theory.  Given sufficient visibility into neural brain activity,
> we could look for it there.
>
> Josh


My question was after something a little different. I was hoping you could 
provide a summary statement, in ordinary language, that tells us what Fodor 
means by his language of thought idea, i.e., what it is he thinks is there to 
discover? In other words, I was seeking a more concrete and precise statement 
of what he means by "language of thought" (whether it is metaphorical or an 
expanded usage a la Ramachandran or whether he is making some kind of more 
concrete claim as in the ways in which the neurons communicate with one another 
just are the thoughts themselves -- in which case is this an identity claim of 
thoughts and brain events in the way so many on this list and elsewhere use 
"identity" but which I have tended not to do with my invocation of the 
two-sided coin metaphor)?

Anyway, maybe I just failed to be sufficiently clear in my question in the 
earlier post. It wouldn't be the first time for that either.

SWM

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Other related posts:

  1. Home
  2. wittrsamr
  3. Archive
  4. 02-2010