[Wittrs] Re: Meaning, Intent and Reference (Parsing Fodor?)

  • From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 00:51:29 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
>
> Philosophy isn't quantum physics or even physics. It's subject matter is 
> ideas, getting clear on them and having to resort to complex and arcane 
> formulations in most cases is diametrically opposed to the idea of making 
> things clearer, I think.

If the world is complex, how could philosophy of the world be simple?

And, the world *is* complex.

> > > But clearly just manipulating zeroes and ones in a computer via an 
> > > algorithm isn't understanding.
> >
> > That's not clear to me.
> >
> > > With Dennett I would argue that what's needed is a sufficiently complex 
> > > process-based system operating in a certain way (the way this is 
> > > physically realized).
> >
> > Ones and zeroes can be complex.
>
> Yes and it is in the complex deployment of these (certain kinds of 
> process-based systems) that one can envision achieving the subjectiveness we 
> associate with having a mind and which we call "consciousness". But my point 
> is that, by themselves, they are not instances of consciousness or any of the 
> features we associate with consciousness (in this case the feature in 
> question being understanding as in grasping meanings).

I just can't grant that point.

It's like saying that little dots of color (aka pixels) do not comprise a 
picture.

Or little scribbles of ink, do not comprise letters and words.

Well, maybe that's true, but if it is true, does it matter?

The objection is that it takes something outside, to make the dots a picture, 
or the scribbles into words.  And this is true - that is, something like this, 
is true.  However, that thing outside would have no picture, no words, without 
the dots and scribbles.  The dots and scribbles - are not NOTHING.  The 
perception by that outside agency does not change the dots or scribbles, they 
are what they are, perceived or not, interpreted or not.  What then?

This is all utterly common, and yet also hard to nail down theoretically.

In the absence of a clear position on these matters, I don't think anyone can 
put together a coherent paragraph on philosophy of mind.

And the only positions I know of are (a) the agent is privileged, has original 
intentionality, and we have NO idea how that works, or (b) the "aboutness" that 
makes dots into pictures etc is attributional and "not real", or (c) 
behaviorial or Wittgensteinian approaches that don't want to know about such 
mechanics, they just note that they occur and then taxonomize them.  
Wittgenstein (and I think most other) reject the idea of photographs being any 
kind of foundation.  I think this is incoherent, like Searle's strawman of 
"syntax not being enough for intelligence".  Well of COURSE syntax alone is not 
intelligence, but syntax does not even occur alone, and hey, perhaps does not 
occur at all, in some readings, but if it occurs, it occurs in a physical 
manner and causal chain of events - and CANNOT be separated out.  This is "the 
systems reply" writ large.


> My question was after something a little different. I was hoping you could 
> provide a summary statement, in ordinary language, that tells us what Fodor 
> means by his language of thought idea, i.e., what it is he thinks is there to 
> discover?

Again, I can't imagine what answer would satisfy you.

You seem to think the complex can be made simple.  If anything, that is exactly 
what Wittgenstein tries to avoid, in his talk of grammars. (unfortunately, 
taking the grammatical route, means that you also then methodologically reject 
even the complex made complex but rigorously, systematically, you don't want to 
know)

"Language is like a tweeting bird!", or something like that, I think Captain 
Kirk said, was it to confound Norman on Mudd's Planet?

Clearly, Fodor means something very like a computer language, represented as a 
computer language is, ultimately, in either or both of symbolic marks on paper, 
or electrons in circuits, or other realizations.  Fodor makes no mentions of 
neural circuits, if that's what you're asking.  Due to the whole "multiple 
realizability" aspect of computation, the exact physical forms should not be 
important.  That *some* physical form is eventually found to correspond, is 
important, but that's not Fodor's department.  But, just to cause us all pain, 
Fodor insists that this computer language works only because and when it 
corresponds in some dual-aspect manner also to innate and preexisting concepts, 
that represent (eg, mirror) the world.

Now, clearly, if you HAVE something that represents and mirrors the world, that 
would be handy.  But there are always problems with such representations, 
limitations, and so nobody is happy using them as the foundation for an answer. 
 And nobody much likes Fodor using them as HALF a foundation, either.  So 
perhaps they are something we use when we can, as we can, so that they might be 
sufficient but not necessary?  That's about where I am on it.

Josh


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