[Wittrs] Re: Is Homeostasis caused or purposive?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 04:20:13 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
> > Scientific research that has determined that our way of experiencing
> the world in terms of how we think about it or perceive it is
> affected...
> in different ways dependent upon the part of the body affected Changes
> in kidney functioning, the various glands, loss of limbs, weight changes
> all are implicated in personality change. True, all these changes are
> mediated in the brain.
> But the critical question. Should we conceptualize all these bodily
> changes as causing the personality, where the person is just the sum of
> these causations, or should we conceptualize the person as the author of
> the changes based on how he lives the changes he feels in his body?
>
> The choice is between a mechanical or purposive model.
>
No, it is not. The models are applicable in different contexts. One doesn't
have to make such a choice.
> Now the world is physical...where physical refers...
>
> > ...to the fact that the world consists of what we sometimes call
> matter
> > and that matter is not animate in most instances
>
> and yet some instances. And in those instances, should we attribute
> intention, purpose, and just the same physical laws we attribute to the
> inanimate.
>
We do. Who is arguing otherwise? So if I'm not, why ask the question?
> > Yes, we can look at the universe...and recognize
> > that consciousness is just one of the phenomena found in the universe.
>
> Note we agree that we attribute consciousness to certain entities found
> in the universe. We don't literally look at C, the way we look at a
> rock. Given that, C is not phenomena in the way atoms are.
>
Hallelujah!
> > Then the question is whether it is part of the physical universe
>
> One answer. It is part of our universe of experiences but not part of
> our physical experiences. There are lots of experiences without a
> physical reference. If this was not the case, we would not have the
> concept "physical."
Depends what you mean by "physical" here. If you are talking about experience
of physical objects, physical entities, then no, of course not, consciousness
isn't that at all. But if you are talking about experience of anything, then
all experience involves the physical both in terms of experiencing whatever we
are experiencing and in terms of what it takes to have an experience at all,
i.e., brains and physical events that become sensory input via signals passed
along the neural pathways, etc.
> The concept, like all concepts, has limits. If you
> expand the concept to include everything, without distinction, the
> concept becomes useless.
>
You artificially narrow the concept by restricting it to physical objects and
whatever may be like them. But if "physical" is understood in a way that is
more in keeping with how we actually use the term then we get a different
picture. To use a term in a way that's consistent with ordinary language is
hardly to broaden it to "include everything". It's just to pay attention to
what we actually mean.
> > Consciousness comes from the same underlying forces,
> > principles, constituents the rest of the physical universe
>
> but can it be explained by physics? Physicists don't try.
Physicists are attending to other features of the universe.
>You think
> neurologists do. But I don't see them trying to show how C "comes from"
> the brain.
Go back and read Stanislas Dehaene then. He was quite explicit in that text we
read.
>Nor do they explain C is strictly causal, mechanical terms.
As we've seen, it's possible to have different understandings of the way we use
words like "causal" and "mechanical". Until that sort of thing gets
straightened out it's just round and round the same merry-go-round.
> They find correlations. And then they describe the brain (and the
> person) with purpose (abandoning physics. This contradiction doesn't
> bother them. They payoff is predicting outcomes, medical treatment, etc.
> I think both of us are interested in clarity.
>
We are I presume. That's the only basis for talking philosophy on lists like
this. I suggest you have another look at Dehaene whom you seem to have
conveniently forgotten about again, though we spent quite a bit of time earlier
on going over what he said in some detail and I posted excerpts for reference
several times on this list so that you wouldn't miss the points he was making
which were contrary to what you said he was doing. (No, I'm NOT going to post
those excerpts for a fourth or fifth time. They should be available in the
archives for reference if you decide to revisit the material.)
> > The right behavior at one level (what the person does or says)
> > or at another level (what the brain is actually doing).
>
> But how do you relate the causal level to the purposive. That's the rub.
>
The brain's operations cause the features we associate with consciousness and,
among those, is being purposeful, acting with purposes.
> > the subjective dimension of what we mean by "consciousness".
>
> Where is "subjectivity" and "what we mean" in physics?
>
> bruce
>
>
> =========================================
Subjectivity, being a subject, is to have a mental life, to have experiences,
to perceive, be aware, etc., etc. We are not doing physics here but philosophy
of mind which has to do with the interdisciplinary field known as cognitive
science. It is grounded in the same more basic sciences that everything else
is, namely the various aspects of physics, even if physics per se addresses
different features of the universe than the cognitive sciences.
SWM
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