[Wittrs] Re: Constitution vs Causation
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 12:19:06 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
SWM:
> > The fact that he (Dennett) doesn't use "cause" is irrelevant to the
> >point at issue. It's a matter of word choice, nothing more. Few people
> >speak in the exact same way. The issue is to find what they have in
> >mind, not try to apply some external and arbitrary meaning, say
> >Aristotle's, as a kind of absolute.
>
> the issue does not concern using Aristotle as an external absolute. the
> issue concerns the internal consistency of your claims.
>
> just a few days ago, in reply to Budd (see above) you noted that the
> verb to be [are] could denote an identity or a predicate relation; but,
> that it "certainly doesn't denote a causal relation". now, in your last
> post in this thread, you claim that the verb to be [is] does denote a
> causal relation.
>
Dennett says brains doing certain kinds of things are, in essence, what we mean
by "minds". Searle says brains doing certain kinds of things cause what we mean
by "minds". But Searle's use of "cause" is also seen in his claim about the
causes of water's features, e.g., wetness and liquidity. So Searle equates a
constitutive/identity
relation with a causal claim which is perfectly consistent with how we speak
(use the word "cause") in this context.
Does Searle mean Aristotle's notion of efficient cause by that usage?
Manifestly not? Does he mean the idea of logical identity (that something is
necessarily the same as itself)? Also no because the feature of wetness in
water is only encountered at our level of operation whereas no molecule of
water is wet nor would we find an aggregate of water molecules to be wet IF WE
COULD ENCOUNTER THEM ON THE ATOMIC LEVEL. Why not? Because wetness is a feature
found on THIS "macro" (Searle's term) level of operation.
Searle's use of "cause" captures this. Dennett eschews that usage because he
apparently thinks it's clearer and less confusing to speak about brains (and
the things they do) in this context rather than treat minds as seperate
entities from brains. And, indeed, we see lots of confusion in Searle including
his own tendency to fall into contradiction when he slips from accounts of
minds and computers to accounts of minds and brains.
Against that one can say Dennett SEEMS to be jettisoning the idea of mind
entirely as you do, Joe. But I would say that is just a misunderstanding of
Dennett since he nowhere demands we give up speaking about minds or
consciousness (as the behaviorists do, of minds at least, and Minsky wants to
do re: consciouness). His focus is rather at finding ways that explain the
occurrence of minds (and all we associate with them) in terms of the
physicalist account of brains and what they do. Against this, we have Searle
insisting on a separate account while telling us that yes, brains still do it!
There is no contradiction in suggesting that Dennett's account is one that aims
to describe mind as a manifestation of certain physical phenomena (as Searle's
account of wetness treats that feature as a manifestation of certain physical
phenomena) while noting that he eschews Searle's use of "cause" which, while
consistent with ordinary language, tends to add to the confusion because of the
difficulty many have keeping the different ideas of causation separate in the
discourse.
> >>hence, Dennett is saying something very different from what Searle
> >>says ('the mind is caused by the brain' --- Axiom 4 put in the passive
> >>voice).
>
> >>is Dennett using the is of identity? possibly. there is a school of
> >>thought known as the mind-brain identity theory, MBI, which says just
> >>that.
>
> >>is Dennett using the is of constitution? possibly.
>
> >>is Dennett using the is of causation? no. there is no is of causation.
>
> >I should have followed my instinct and ignored this one!
>
> do you have any instinct which tells you that, if the verb to be
> "certainly doesn't denote a causal relation" when Searle uses it; then,
> it also "certainly doesn't denote a causal relation" when Dennett uses
> it?
>
> Joe
>
See above. (You have this fixation, Joe, on locking terms into set definitions
-- apparently part of what you see as the logical game -- when that isn't how
language works. Definitions are the result of a process of observing and
reporting on actual usages by actual language users and usages vary, they have
ranges of application, they reflect nuances, etc. "Is" means lots of things as
does "cause" as does "constitutes", etc. The point is to unpack the meanings in
the given contexts rather than trying to shoehorn others' claims into certain
pre-existing categories that some of us decide are the only relevant ones. This
is an important Wittgensteinian insight which is one of the most significant
things we can take away from his later period work.)
SWM
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