SWM wrote: >Joseph Polanik wrote: >>just because a disagreement is expressed in language doesn't mean that >>there is no disagreement except as to the choice of which language to >>use to express a pre-existing agreement. >Quite right nor am I making THAT assertion. I am saying, rather, that >it just happens to be the case in this situation. >>I'll let Cayuse speak for himself; but, I believe that there is a real >>disagreement not just a difference between the language we use in >>which to express an underlying agreement. >Okay, what is it? Do either of you deny the occurrence of mental >phenomena (other than how you want to name them) neither of us denies that there is experience or that there are mental phenomena; but, we disagree as to a few cases; for example, whether there is an experience of self-awareness. >that we don't have uses for words like "self" and "I" and "me" in the >context of referencing such phenomena? the issue is not whether these words are used; but, whether they have referents when used. even the simple report 'I experience' has been problematic. >Cayuse thinks he is arguing that, if we dig down deeply enough, we find >no self in the "undercurrent of experience", but agrees that we think >we are selves and can refer to ourselves thusly in the same range of >circumstances that you think we can. >Cayuse thinks, however, that if you really drill down you fall out of >language and can say nothing more except that he persists in thinking >we can name the spot we fall out ("the all", "the microcosm", etc.) and >that some, like Wittgenstein, have done so intelligibly (by noting the >unintelligibility of trying to do so). since it appears that Cayuse might be in the process of reformulating his position, I'll let him address these points for himself. >You think that the very fact that there is experience implies an >experiencer (as do I, by the way), but Cayuse says that is part of the >illusion because there really is no experiencer to be found. Well, I >agree that the experiencer is a construct but then so is a notion of >experience so both are constructed notions. Insofar as they are, the >one implies the other, and insofar as the "real" reality is outside or >beyond the construct, nothing can be said (though Cayuse perversely >continues to hang onto the language of referencing here). I generally wouldn't say that the I is constructed; but, rather that it is generated. in either case, however, the important questions are whether that which is constructed/generated is something or nothing at all; and, whether that which is constructed/generated is capable of self-referencing. Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Manage Your AMR subscription: //www.freelists.org/list/wittrsamr For all your Wittrs needs: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/