[Wittrs] Re: [C] Re: Notes on Duncan Richter's essay 'Did Wittgenstein Disagree With Heidegger?'
- From: John Phillip DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2011 15:38:21 -0400
On Wed, 2011-04-20 at 18:10 -0700, Sean Wilson wrote:
> Really enjoy how you throw Wittgenstein's quotes in and give life to
> them.
Thank you.
> 1. The view you ascribe to me, I have never held. I have never viewed
> "pictures"
> as being a reductionist idea, and one that is inherently dismissive
> or
> stigmatizing.
Then shall I take it that you now have no problem in acknowledging that
the idea of people's thoughts being guided in various ways by pictures
is itself a picture (and a good and useful one)?
> (I think you may have read too much into that).
Perhaps.
>
>
> But perhaps this idea is something of a difference: the whole idea of
> "picturing" is elitist in nature.
I wonder about your use of "elitist" here. Normally, this is used
pejoratively - at least among those of us in societies with egalitarian
aspirations.
> This is because some pictures are indeed dull
> in some minds (or circumstances), while others are not.
I see much more interest in the use to which a picture is put. And a
seemingly dull, trite picture may yet have great utility, even
unforeseen applications.
>
> In fact, the key to enlightening a person is first to let him or her
> see that
> the phenom of picturing is taking place.
Again, I am disinclined to speak of "'the' key". "There is not a single
philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different
therapies, as it were." (PI 133)
> This is an elitist thing. People who cannot do it well are forced only
> to do
> analysis -- hoping THAT shows them the answer.
Don't be an ass.
(Feel free to ban me for that.)
First of all, to suppose that you know the reasons, motivations, and
aptitudes behind the methodological decisions of every philosopher is a
ridiculously laughable presumption on your part.
Second, it is entirely gratuitous. The value of a method is simply a
function of its effectiveness is a particular circumstance - recognizing
that individuals, puzzles, and circumstances vary - and to attempt to
say anything more for a method is to try to advance (meta)philosophical
theses, therefore un-Wittgensteinian.
(And I am being reminded of Moliere again.)
One must be content to show, in a particular case, that a method is not
going to achieve the effect desired. Show that the door requires one to
pull, rather than to push. Any attempt to generalize beyond that...
well, one may have a "nose" for similar cases, one may have guiding
suspicions, but to harden these into doctrine is again, putting forth
theses.
Incidentally, I have found that assembling reminders, comparing language
games, and constructing imaginary and intermediate cases (all
unquestionably Wittgensteinian modalities) have been more effective than
talking about pictures - not that I discount the latter. But this may
reflect the range of issues that interest me, may reflect my skill with
various techniques, or something else. I wouldn't presume to say.
Formal methods also have their place, particularly in the Philosophy of
Mathematics, Philosophical Logic, and the Philosophy of Science. Though
one must resist the temptation to be blinded by method or to allow the
"impressiveness" of method to conceal (even from oneself) poverty of
thought.
> This really is the difference
> between the analytic philosophers and those who have properly learnt
> Wittgenstein. The analytics live in a world where
> mathematically-oriented brain
> skills are thought to be the thing that produces the big answers. What
> it
> produces is a meaningless bore.
In some cases.
Although one should note that "boredom" is relative.
Forgive my hazy recollection, but there was a case where a student (?)
upon hearing and understanding Wittgenstein's critique of Cantor's
diagonal argument, still expressed an attraction to such arguments. To
which Wittgenstein replied that that was fine. If one simply liked that
sort of thing (Wittgenstein most assuredly did not!) but was clear about
what one was doing, there was nothing more to say.
>
> 2. You write: "To get into debates, going beyond describing the role
> that,
> e.g. Lavoisier's picture plays, into hand-waving and desk-pounding
> over whether
> it is "actual" is to go down the path of the "battle-cries" between
> Realists and
> Idealists, as per Zettel."
>
> I don't quite agree. My sense is that one can and should, when
> appropriate, do
> more with "pictures" than be descriptive.
Yes...
> In being therapeutic with them, one
> would come to see what other pictures entail -- and one might
> ultimately develop
> a very keen insight over the picturing process.
Okay...
> Indeed, what is it that an
> atheist who becomes spiritual does, but leave his or her dismal and
> stale
> account of the God story behind into something he or she could not
> see?
I suppose...
> You do
> remember the times that Wittgenstein thought that atheists were
> as repulsively narrow minded as were simple-minded Bible-thumpers?
I recall cases where Wittgenstein objected to particular attitudes of
particular atheists and saw such atheists as akin to certain religious
believers, both contributing to what he saw as a misunderstanding of
religious belief.
I do not recall his ever condemning all atheists.
To stigmatize all atheists as being like, e.g. Dawkins, would be as
foolish as to treat all believers as Pat Robertson.
> The problem
> in each case is not one of the "battle cry" -- the problem is simply
> that the
> picture is dull.
I would not say that it is either of those. But that would take us
pretty far afield.
> Remember all of the times that Wittgenstein was revolted by
> political discourse, by analytic philosophy, by false philosophic
> problems, by
> the fake nature of the being a philosophy professor, etc. etc. Why did
> this man
> walk the earth in disgust of so many things?
Not enough fiber in his diet.
Seriously though, assuming that there is one reason for all of this is
grotesquely reductionistic and ignores his willingness to often give
reasons in particular cases.
Recall again, the passage from On Certainty about an art critic finding
the right basis for criticizing a painting.
>
> It was because, simply, he could see their pictures -- could see
> through them,
> as it were. And his were better,
> because he taken his life to sit and think
> about them (and had greater abilities in this respect). Wittgenstein
> always
> noted that his greatest gift was taking over the thoughts of another
> person. If
> he entered the chain of thoughts of others, he could see where their
> mistakes
> were. He once said that this was his major intellectual gift.
I do not think this accounts for all his dissatisfaction with the world.
In fact, it suggests a narcissistic aestheticism and pettiness that I
would consider quite beneath him.
In any event, I am not seeing how any of what you've written addresses
my observation that the insistence that a picture isn't "'just' a
picture" but is "actual" is akin to the "battle-cries" of Realists and
Idealists. To shift the focus to aesthetic questions is to simply
change the subject.
>
Other related posts:
