Hilzoy, writing on www.washingtonmonthly.com: > Brad DeLong had a strange > dream<http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/01/new-deal-dreaming.html> > : > > "I just dreamed that it was the 1930s and I was briefing the Cravsth > lawyers for today's scotus oral argument in Schechter Poultry..." > > I sometimes have odd dreams related to my profession. There are the > standard anxiety nightmares -- I have a recurring one in which I discover > that I have been assigned to teach something I know nothing about, like > Intermediate Korean. But sometimes they are odder, like Brad's. As > background to the strangest one ever: > > One distinction*: analytic propositions are propositions in which you say > nothing about the subject that isn't true by definition. Synthetic > propositions, by contrast, tell you something new. Thus, "All bachelors are > unmarried" is analytic -- if you know what a bachelor is, you know that it > is true. But "All bachelors live in Manhattan", if true, would be synthetic: > it adds some information not contained in the very idea of a bachelor. > Another distinction: a priori propositions are propositions we can know to > be true without using some experience to verify them (e.g., looking to see); > a posteriori propositions can only be known via experience. (E.g., to know > whether or not it's true that my shirt is blue, I need to look at it, ask > someone else who has looked at it, etc. Thus, it's a posteriori.) > > It's fairly obvious that there are true synthetic a posteriori > propositions: e.g., I own a blue shirt. (True, but not by definition; > requires checking.) Likewise, there are true analytic a priori propositions: > e.g., All squares have four sides. (True in virtue of the definition of > 'square; thus, I do not have to go looking at all the squares to see that > it's true, or worry that there might be one square out there that has only > three sides. Black swans: not an issue here.) Kant asked: are there > synthetic a priori propositions -- propositions that we can know to be true > without checking them against experience, but which are not just true by > definition? He said yes. But logical positivists said no: every true claim > must be either true by definition, or one we need to check against > experience. And they were rather vehement on the topic. When I had this > dream, I was taking a course on logical positivism. So: > > I was standing in a hall full of people who were listening to a speaker > inveighing against synthetic a priori propositions. The atmosphere owed a > lot to speeches by Hitler on the Jews and Joseph McCarthy on Communists: the > speaker was standing behind one of those old-style microphones, shouting: We > must *root out* synthetic a priori propositions! We must *eliminate*them! > The crowd was getting increasingly worked up. I was standing by the wall, > watching, feeling deeply uneasy. > > Suddenly, I caught a glimpse of myself in a mirror. I was entirely > featureless and flat and rectangular, sort of like a large stick of gray > gum. And I realized: oh no, *I am a synthetic a priori proposition! In the > middle of this crowd of people who want to eliminate me!* There was no way > out of the hall that I could find, and in any case I didn't want to draw > attention to myself, so I just huddled by the wall, terrified, hoping no one > would notice that I was one of the very propositions they were so eager to > eliminate. Eventually, I woke up in a cold sweat. > > Question: do you have odd dreams inspired by your professional lives? If > so, what are they? > > *Footnote: Yes, Quine called this distinction into question, but that's not > relevant to my dream. > Does anyone here have philosophical dreams? John -- John McCreery The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN Tel. +81-45-314-9324 jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx http://www.wordworks.jp/