[lit-ideas] Re: The Order of Aurality
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2012 23:58:25 +0000 (GMT)
There is more to be said to Robert's point, by way of enlargement rather than
disagreement. Below I address a disagreement.
________________________________
From: Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
>Donal wrote:
"Presumably W's point, insofar as it involves explaining why such a
creature cannot understand our language because it does not share our
"form of life", is not a point merely about imagining a creature
lacking cognitive capacities to grasp language. The point cannot
simply be that a creature without a capacity to understand language
would not understand our language, but that a creature with a capacity
to understand its language may not understand ours because its "form
of life" is so different to ours."
Wittgenstein makes quite a different point. For Wittgenstein, language
use requires a form of life, but this does not mean that only those
engaged in that form of life can understand that language.>
So far it is clear that Phil here denies the point I attribute to Wittgenstein
viz. that only those with some shared 'form of life' can understand a given
language
Be that as it may, Phil gives the following in support - and, it seems to me,
ties his denial of my claim [that W believes only those with some shared 'form
of life' can understand a given language] to a version of the so-called
'private language argument' ['PLA']:-
> To make
this further claim, it would be necessary to also claim that,
alongside all the observable behaviors involved in that form of life,
there must be some mental activity that is hidden from outsiders,
thereby making the language itself hidden, or private.>
I am unsure that it is correct to connect the issue of the role of a 'form of
life' in this way with the so-called PLA.
First, I will indicate that they are not necessarily linked:- for there is no
obvious inconsistency in (a) upholding a form of PLA that asserts there cannot
be a 'private language' in the sense of a language whose
'rules' are only 'privately' known and applied and regulated by, say, one
'private' individual, and (b) upholding the view that any language [which is
'public' rather than 'private', consistent with (a)] can only be understood by
someone who shares a similar 'form of life' to the 'form of life' which
underpins the meanings of that language.
In other words, to say any language must be 'public' rather than 'private' (in
the terms of the PLA) is not necessarily to say that "any language is...open to
understanding by any language user." For there may be two sets of
language-users whose distinct 'forms of life' are so different that neither can
understand the others' language, and the PLA does not obviously deny this. The
PLA is not directed against the idea that some languages may not be understood
by users of some other kind of language but against the idea that the 'rules'
for applying any given language correctly could be simply a matter of 'private'
individual fiat.
We might perhaps admit that "For Wittgenstein, any language is, in principle,
open to understanding by any language user who shares a sufficiently similar
'form of life'" but not that, without that 'form of life' qualification, "For
Wittgenstein, any language is, in principle, open to understanding by any
language user (irrespective of whether their kind of language and 'form of
life' bear any similarity to the language in question)".
In fact, I suggest the phrase "in principle" may be dispensed with here as
otiose, and "open to understanding" is misleading here: for, though we might
say that the PLA tells us that any given language must be "open to
understanding" by some others, it does not necessarily imply that it must be
"open to understanding" byall others who use a language of any kind, where this
would include any creature with any kind of 'form of life' that uses any kind
of language .
While I think I understand the drift of Phil's points, I suggest they
mistakenly conflate the role of 'form of life' and the PLA. In short, it is
unclear to me how the so-called PLA imples that "any language is, in principle,
open to understanding by any language user" without any 'form of life'
qualification, as it seems to me that such a 'form of life' qualification would
not make any language 'private' in the way the PLA denies.
Donal
Bonzo's calling
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