Phil wrote: In short, while intentionality is a necessary part of language use, signification is equally necessary. This, however, would expand our understanding of what constitutes language use, including even music, with its intentionality and repetition of notes. Music is possible only if intentionality and signification are possible. So, yes, we can consider birds as using language when they sing insofar as we can discern intentionality and repetition. This would be in contrast to, for example, the burbling of a brook or the whistling of the wind through the branches of a tree. >>> Intentionality is -- as Derrida knew -- such a tricky term. How do we work our way from the words of an utterance to an /intended/ meaning? As others on this list will explain more eloquently the meaning of an utterance doesn't rest with its most immediate, 'surface' meaning. This is why the meaning of an utterance goes beyond the intended meaning -- however we arrive at the latter. Of course, in legal discourse the notion of intentionality takes on a special significance. Is it perhaps because of the increasing status of such discourse as the primary legitimating device of the current socioeconomic order that we now tend to /reduce/ meaning to intentionality? Also, One doesn't have to enlist Derrida to question the status of intentionality in meaning production. A bit of Foucault or even Barthes would do. At ease -- and meaning it, Torgeir Fjeld Oslo, Norway http://independent.academia.edu/TorgeirFjeld // http://facebook.com/phatic ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html