[lit-ideas] Re: Inner Moral Law
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2005 10:13:29 -0400
Andy Amago is confused about a number of things. First, a 'self-evident
truth' is, literally, what is true by its own evidence. It is not true
because of experience though experience is usually necessary to perceive
what is self-evident. I would think it a common-sense reading of the
DOI that the truths given therein are not taken to be pragmatic, that
is, what works, but timeless and enduring. Andy would have it both ways
though. Andy would have 'what works' be a self-evident truth. This is
nonsense because 'what works' is never the same thing all the time. So,
Andy must either give up the idea of a self-evident truth or he must
account for such truth in terms other than 'what works'. Since Andy
doesn't allow for an 'inner' moral law, he must give up the idea of a
self-evident truth, which puts him in conflict with both the framers of
the DOI and the DOI itself.
Andy is also confused about what constitutes moral activity. What else
is 'all men created equal' except a moral assertion regarding how all
men are to be treated? Now, one could argue that there is no such thing
as morality but Andy has already allowed for a moral law, just not an
'inner' moral law. So, Andy recognizes moral activity but apparently
such activity has nothing to do with how people are to be treated nor
how we are to go about living our lives. This is nonsense because
morality is about how we treat each other and how we go about living our
lives. The particular example Andy referred to was that of the pursuit
of happiness. According to Andy, happiness is just a goal, not
necessarily a moral goal. I suppose according to some contorted
definition this might be true, but if happiness is a kind of harmonious
living with oneself, one's fellow human beings and the world, and
morality is about one's having right relations, then happiness is a
moral goal. It is nonsense to claim that happiness is not a moral goal.
A third confusion found in Andy's comments is that since standards of
morality change over time, morality itself is relative. This, too, is
nonsense. People can share the moral conviction that doing harm to
another is wrong while disagreeing on the finer details of how this
conviction might be applied in daily life. This disagreement does not
mean that they don't share the same conviction. Rather, in the vast
majority of cases, people agree on what is right and what is wrong. One
way of accounting for this agreement is the presence of an 'inner' moral
law. Practices may differ, and people may not live up to their
convictions, but this does not negate the fact that there is agreement
to such an extent that we can be offended by the actions of people who
are separated from us both by culture and by time. Here we see the
nonsense of Andy's position: if morality is as relative as Andy would
have it be, then who is he to be offended by the actions of others? How
can the executives of pharma be judged according to Andy's standards
except that they be standards for all? Who is Andy to make judgments
about the beliefs of religious folks except that he shares in a common
understanding? How could such judgments be meaningful, much less
justified, except according to a standard common to all those Andy is
critical of? And what is this common standard except an 'inner' moral
law? In other words, Andy, in all his handwaving regarding the human
species, affirms the 'inner' moral law while claiming that such a thing
can only be 'alleged'.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Toronto, ON
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