[lit-ideas] Re: France, a Rogue State in 1801-05

  • From: "Judith Evans" <judithevans1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2006 18:24:27 +0100

Here's O'Brien on British Hegemony (sumarised by Niall Ferguson)

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>.
Having defined "hegemony," the next question becomes 
which of the two states, the United Kingdom or the 
United States, was more hegemonic? In the book's 
introduction -- a tour de force of truly magisterial 
scope and penetration -- O'Brien gives an unequivocal 
answer: the United States. To be sure, the United 
Kingdom had a moment of "hyperpower" in the 
immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, when, 
as one Prussian general noted, it was "mistress 
of the sea. ... Neither in this dominion nor in world
 trade has she now a single rival to fear." Yet the 
United Kingdom was never truly hegemonic in the
 century that followed. 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901fareviewessay82512/niall-ferguson/hegemony-or-empire.html


Here's Bill Kristol -- from the discussion I posted (the 
transcript's clearly pretty poor, but I think we can get the
idea)

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
(what I got from reading Kagan's book)...
 I mean at no point, let's say the 30 years from 1785 to 1815,
 I would say at no point in those 30 years could any
 sensible, irrational person have predicted what the 
world would look like, what the international political
 situation would have been five years hence, or maybe 
even three years hence. 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

Judy Evans, Cardiff
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Simon Ward 
  To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
  Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 6:01 PM
  Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: France, a Rogue State in 1801-05


  Lawrence,

  "...most Napoleonic historians emphasize military actions and ignore the 
political."

  There's a reason for this and a simple one, Napoleon's use of international 
politics was secondary to his use of military force. To say that his handling 
of politics, in the shape of treaties, was deficient, is to miss the point that 
these treaties were, for the most part, designed to be so unsupportive and 
inflexible that the only consequence would be renewed military action. Indeed, 
the same tactic was open to states opposing Napoleon. For example:

  "...[Count von Haugwitz] was compelled to be the bearer of proposals of 
mediation, which were in reality but a thinly veiled ultimatum...which sounded 
the death knell of nuetrality." (F.Loraine Petre Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia 
1806).

  As far as Britain was concerned, she never even bothered with treaties as far 
as Napoleonic France was concerned. The two countries were in a state of war 
from start to finish and the only political methods employed were those that 
sought to advance the military.

  "In fact, Kagan says, this is a problem with military histories in general.  
At West Point there is very little emphasis upon the political and he thinks 
that cost us in Iraq.  Military officers are now getting a crash course in 
politics.   Military Historians at West Point have bent over backwards in the 
past to avoid politics because Military Officers are supposed to be neutral.  
But deficiencies in the handling of political matters in Iraq are apparently 
causing some to rethink this."

  To me this is a roundabout way of saying that the Politicians screwed up 
Iraq. Nothing to do with inadequate military planning or the lack of 
anticipation regarding insurgencies after the main campaign, it was just that 
the political arrangements were at fault. It also points towards Kagan trying 
to find historical parallels that he can fit into his view of the world. 
Interesting that he should use something from the Napoleonic era rather than 
something more classical.

  You provide a selective quote from O'Brian. Try the following, the authors 
concluding paragraph:

  "In retrospect most of the advantages enjoyed by the monarchs and aristocrats 
who took over the state after the deposition of James II look path dependent. 
They flowed from geographical endowments; the detachment of the Tudor and 
Stuart regimes from geopolitics, the unintended consequences of civil war and 
above all from the fiscal sclerosis that afflicted Britain's major competitors 
on the mainland between 1649 and 1815. Fortunately the inexorable onset of that 
very same disease (that clearly infected Britain's fiscal and financial system 
for several decades after Waterloo) did not seriously compromise the states 
exercise of British hegemony for more than a century before the Great War - 
basically because the final struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France had exhausted the will and fiscal capacities of Britain's rivals to 
challenge its imperial, economic and geopolitical position in the world 
economy."

  Though open to interpretation, this suggests to me that prior to 1815 (indeed 
prior to the Napoleonic Wars), Britain was just one of a number of competitors 
for the position of Hegemon within a colonial framework. After 1815, with it's 
major competitors hamstrung by the defeat of Napoleon, Britain stood alone. 
Thus, Napoleon wasn't attacking a world order with Britain as Hegemon. Indeed 
it might be argued that he was using military means to create a position for 
France (under certain political constraints following the revolution) within a 
given framework.

  You say that Britain was the: 'Hegemonic guarantor of the World Order of the 
day "in struggles for hegemony at sea, for colonies and for dominant shares of 
international trade in commodities and services."' 

  Yet it makes no sense to conflate O'Brian with your additional words, 
because, prior to 1805, Britain was just one of a number of competing interests 
seeking to gain colonies. Britain could not be said to have been the guarantor 
within a system from which, if she could have held sway, she would have 
excluded the competing interests. After 1815 of course, the relative strengths 
had altered significantly and until WW1, Pax Britannia held sway. 

  Simon

Other related posts:

  1. Home
  2. lit-ideas
  3. Archive
  4. 08-2006