[lit-ideas] Re: France, a Rogue State in 1801-05

  • From: "Simon Ward" <sedward@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2006 18:01:11 +0100

Lawrence,

"...most Napoleonic historians emphasize military actions and ignore the 
political."

There's a reason for this and a simple one, Napoleon's use of international 
politics was secondary to his use of military force. To say that his handling 
of politics, in the shape of treaties, was deficient, is to miss the point that 
these treaties were, for the most part, designed to be so unsupportive and 
inflexible that the only consequence would be renewed military action. Indeed, 
the same tactic was open to states opposing Napoleon. For example:

"...[Count von Haugwitz] was compelled to be the bearer of proposals of 
mediation, which were in reality but a thinly veiled ultimatum...which sounded 
the death knell of nuetrality." (F.Loraine Petre Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia 
1806).

As far as Britain was concerned, she never even bothered with treaties as far 
as Napoleonic France was concerned. The two countries were in a state of war 
from start to finish and the only political methods employed were those that 
sought to advance the military.

"In fact, Kagan says, this is a problem with military histories in general.  At 
West Point there is very little emphasis upon the political and he thinks that 
cost us in Iraq.  Military officers are now getting a crash course in politics. 
  Military Historians at West Point have bent over backwards in the past to 
avoid politics because Military Officers are supposed to be neutral.  But 
deficiencies in the handling of political matters in Iraq are apparently 
causing some to rethink this."

To me this is a roundabout way of saying that the Politicians screwed up Iraq. 
Nothing to do with inadequate military planning or the lack of anticipation 
regarding insurgencies after the main campaign, it was just that the political 
arrangements were at fault. It also points towards Kagan trying to find 
historical parallels that he can fit into his view of the world. Interesting 
that he should use something from the Napoleonic era rather than something more 
classical.

You provide a selective quote from O'Brian. Try the following, the authors 
concluding paragraph:

"In retrospect most of the advantages enjoyed by the monarchs and aristocrats 
who took over the state after the deposition of James II look path dependent. 
They flowed from geographical endowments; the detachment of the Tudor and 
Stuart regimes from geopolitics, the unintended consequences of civil war and 
above all from the fiscal sclerosis that afflicted Britain's major competitors 
on the mainland between 1649 and 1815. Fortunately the inexorable onset of that 
very same disease (that clearly infected Britain's fiscal and financial system 
for several decades after Waterloo) did not seriously compromise the states 
exercise of British hegemony for more than a century before the Great War - 
basically because the final struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France had exhausted the will and fiscal capacities of Britain's rivals to 
challenge its imperial, economic and geopolitical position in the world 
economy."

Though open to interpretation, this suggests to me that prior to 1815 (indeed 
prior to the Napoleonic Wars), Britain was just one of a number of competitors 
for the position of Hegemon within a colonial framework. After 1815, with it's 
major competitors hamstrung by the defeat of Napoleon, Britain stood alone. 
Thus, Napoleon wasn't attacking a world order with Britain as Hegemon. Indeed 
it might be argued that he was using military means to create a position for 
France (under certain political constraints following the revolution) within a 
given framework.

You say that Britain was the: 'Hegemonic guarantor of the World Order of the 
day "in struggles for hegemony at sea, for colonies and for dominant shares of 
international trade in commodities and services."' 

Yet it makes no sense to conflate O'Brian with your additional words, because, 
prior to 1805, Britain was just one of a number of competing interests seeking 
to gain colonies. Britain could not be said to have been the guarantor within a 
system from which, if she could have held sway, she would have excluded the 
competing interests. After 1815 of course, the relative strengths had altered 
significantly and until WW1, Pax Britannia held sway. 

Simon

----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Lawrence Helm 
  To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
  Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 2:56 AM
  Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: France, a Rogue State in 1801-05


  Simon,



  Well, that's an improvement over you last note.  But you still didn't finish 
my note.  My emphasis was on the nature of the Rogue State which you ignore.  
To what extent Britain supported the World Order Napoleon was opposing is of 
secondary importance, but after hearing both you and Kagan, Kagan sounds far 
more reasonable.  The one thing that Kagan said that he believes is new to me 
is that most Napoleonic historians emphasize military actions and ignore the 
political.  He thinks it was the inept handling of political matters that did 
Napoleon in.  In fact, Kagan says, this is a problem with military histories in 
general.  At West Point there is very little emphasis upon the political and he 
thinks that cost us in Iraq.  Military officers are now getting a crash course 
in politics.   Military Historians at West Point have bent over backwards in 
the past to avoid politics because Military Officers are supposed to be 
neutral.  But deficiencies in the handling of political matters in Iraq are 
apparently causing some to rethink this.  



  As to Britain's Hegemony during the period prior to Kagan's, for example: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/economicHistory/pdf/WP6501.pdf : "Over the 
period 1648-1815 the English state may well have ruled over the most rapidly 
growing of Europe's national economies. Furthermore, that favourable 
development certainly carried whole sections of society over thresholds of 
income and promoted patterns of expenditure, whereby purchases by households on 
goods and services taxed by governments began first to contribute and (as 
private expenditures rose and diversified) to augment public revenues from 
indirect taxes. . . ."



  "The dramatic rise of a fiscal state (which, liberal historians, taking their 
cue from Adam Smith, neglect to recognize as being positive and functional for 
the growth of the domestic economy) occurred for several reasons which are best 
exposed by way of comparisons with other European powers, (especially Spain, 
Portugal, France and Holland and other rivals). These states ultimately lacked 
the fiscal and financial capacity required to compete with Britain in struggles 
for hegemony at sea, for colonies and for dominant shares of international 
trade in commodities and services. That deficiency certainly delayed their 
transitions to industrial market economies."



  This quote supports Kagan's argument.  Don't forget, Kagan is saying that 
previous historians emphasized the Military at the expense of the political.  
You dismiss Kagan by emphasizing Trafalgar, a military event.  Britain was 
prior to Kagan's period the Hegemonic guarantor of the World Order of the day 
"in struggles for hegemony at sea, for colonies and for dominant shares of 
international trade in commodities and services."    A serious challenge of 
Britain's hegemony had not been put to a serious military test until Napoleon 
put it. 



  Lawrence








------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] 
On Behalf Of Simon Ward
  Sent: Sunday, August 13, 2006 5:54 PM
  To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: France, a Rogue State in 1801-05



  Lawrence, if you're relying on Kagan for your view of European history during 
the early nineteenth century, you place yourself at a distinct disadvantage. 
I'm not going to trade references on this, merely assure you that Kagan is on a 
revisionist path. 



  Prior to 1805, the 'world order' was a matter of competing economic 
interests, essentially colonialist in nature, disturbed by the French 
Revolution and subsequently Napoleon's own empire building. Only after 
Trafalgar did Britain have complete naval domination and only after Napoleon's 
defeat at Waterloo could she be termed a Hegemon. Between 1805 and 1815, 
Britain's naval domination enabled her to establish market precedence outside 
Europe, which, for the most part, was blockaded against her by Napoleon. In 
some respects, it's fair to say that Napoleon, rather than defeating Britain, 
actually created the conditions for her to be that Hegemon after 1815.



  It's revealing that the page Judy linked to (a discussion by Kagan on this 
new work), makes no mention whatsoever of Trafalgar (unless the word was 
indiscernible, in which case it was Kristol rather than Kagan). After all it 
was only after Napoleon learnt of the French and Spanish defeat at Trafalgar 
that he planned and implemented his Austerlitz campaign. 



  The more I look at this, the more I suspect Kagan and Kristol are seeking to 
create a revisionist view of history based on their Neocon slant. You've got a 
lot of convincing to do Lawrence. 



  For an alternative view of 'grand history' try:



  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Rise_and_Fall_of_the_Great_Powers



  Simon

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