Stuart writes: "Dennett, in the context of explicitly critiquing Searle's CRA says that it takes a Cartesian dualist to conclude that more of the same would not make a difference in the CR, i.e., the argument known as the CRA. Searle makes THAT argument and defends it. Thus Dennett's point is directed at Searle and his thinking on the matter which is what I initially said Dennett's argument addressed and what the text I found and transcribed here demonstrates. Your ongoing claims aimed at undermining this point are just an exercise in sophistry." The point is that no matter how many _functional properties_ in the form of abstract computations one adds, all you get is more functional properties. At best, you get closer to simulating this or that with higher degrees of resolution. Searle's point still stands and Peter at Analytic exposed you waffling between the notions of more hardware or more software. By "more of the same," Searle is talking about functional properties (read: 2nd order properties). Now, if you can understand that, then you would see Dennett's charge of crypto-dualism not following. OTOH, if you insist on conflating functional prperties with 1st order properties, then, given the EQUIVOCATION, you can, via egregious _ignoratio elenchi_, conclude to crypto-dualism. Remember, Searle is emphatically not a property dualist. If anything, a property pluralist, as opposed to eliminativists who are property dualists vis a vis mind-body since they can't deny they are awake while claiming to hazard guesses about mind, which isn't there for the zombies.. That was so much fun. Let's do it again and again! Ps. I was looking for the argument (I thought) I posted--the one you asked for and (I thought) I gave. I'll look harder so I can see if you took your crack at it. :-) Cheers, Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/