[Wittrs] Who and What is a Cartesian?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2010 12:57:11 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> Bogus Claim 2: Dennett Agrees With Mirsky on Defining Cartesian Dualism
>
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>yes, I challenged your claim that Dennett accused Searle of Cartesian
> >>dualism ... there is no accusation made against Searle. there is only
> >>an accurate statement about what Cartesian dualists believe.
>
> >If you read the whole text, you will recall that Dennett presents this
> >as his critique of Searle's CRA. Now if he is saying that the CRA works
> >if you're a Cartesian dualist and the point is that Searle is making
> >this argument AND claiming it works as an argument (its conclusions are
> >established as true by the argument), then whom do you think Dennett is
> >referring to when he answers his own question of "why should anyone
> >think this is true?" with "Cartesian dualists would think so"?
>
> he has given an accurate account of what Cartesian dualists believe (a
> human is a body and a soul (physical stuff and mind stuff) interacting;
> the soul is the part responsible for the understanding). Dennett is
> inviting the reader to perpetrate a fallacy, thus:
>
> Dennett: why should anyone think this is true?
>
> Reader : Hmmm. Cartesians dualist would believe this. Searle believes
> this. therefore Searle is a Cartesian dualist.
>
> the reader has just committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
>
Dennett isn't making a formal argument, just pointing out that a Cartesian
dualist idea of mind is the reason someone might be inclined to grant that, if
X alone can't do Y, then more of X can't either. What he doesn't say in THAT
particular bit of text is that there is no other reason to think so, on his
view. But that related claim IS part of his larger thesis in the book where he
makes the case that we CAN account for Y by putting lots of X's together in an
integrated, interactive system. His thesis about consciousness hinges on
providing an account of consciousness that treats it like a system-level
property. Having shown how this can be done, he points out that the only reason
to continue to deny it is that one cannot conceive of or accept the notion that
consciousness could be a result of constituent elements which are not,
themselves, conscious.
Note that THIS has NOTHING to do with claims that computers can't produce
consciousness because they are the wrong type of physical platform as made by
people like Edelman and Hawkins (which may or may not be right based on
separate empirical grounds). Nor has it anything to do with claims that Dennett
doesn't make his case for a system-level account of consciousness adequately.
In fact, if he has left something important out, he could be said to have
gotten it wrong (and you and Gordon have frequently argued, albeit to my mind
unsuccessfully, that Dennett HAS left something out).
Dennett's more narrow point in the quoted passage is to critique Searle's CRA
by showing why it appears compelling even if Dennett's proposal might be right
because, if it is, in fact, compelling, then it would be an argument against
the possibility of Dennett's account. But if it only appears compelling, while
in fact not being so, then it is not an argument against his account.
His focus is thus on what makes it look compelling and why accepting that it is
is a mistake.
It's a mistake, he tells us, because it hinges on embracing a conception of
consciousness known as Cartesian dualism which nearly all credible philosophers
today, from Searle on, are at pains to disassociate from. (By the way, and as I
have often said, I DO NOT assume dualism is wrong, only that there is no reason
to resort to it and that doing so involves far more problematic issues than not
doing so.)
Unlike my argument (which hinges on SHOWING what the CRA contains and why what
it contains DOESN'T support the CRA's conclusion, regardless of other arguments
for the same conclusion), Dennett is merely showing that a hidden supposition
in the CRA is what gives it an appearance of "truth", i.e., why its conclusion
SEEMS "obvious" to so many.
But beyond all this, the point of my transcribing THAT text onto this list was
to show that Dennett DOES see dualism as being at the crux of the CRA as I do
(contra your claim that he said no such thing) and not to argue for whether
Dennett is right (though, of course, I think he is).
But instead of acknowledging that I had demonstrated my claim about Dennett's
position (as you should have, since I had) you did your usual thing and tried
to change the basis of the discussion by making it about whether Dennett or I
were right in seeing dualism in the CRA rather than about whether Dennett saw
dualism in the CRA!
Note that the argument for the role of dualism in the CRA is one issue (and one
I am certainly prepared to defend). But the argument that Dennett never invoked
dualism has now been resolved by an appropriate citation (which you kindly
reinforced by posting again here) and should now be behind us (though if past
is prologue, that will turn out to have been wishful thinking on my part).
> >So, despite Dennett's actually having said it takes a Cartesian
> >dualist to believe the CRA's conclusion, you concluded that, in fact,
> >he wasn't calling Searle a Cartesian dualist.
>
> he is baiting his audience, trolling for weak-minded people who can't or
> won't think clearly; and, he found you.
>
Not even worth a response considering your game of changing the rules when
discussions go against you, setting up strawman arguments to buttress your
positions, etc., etc. Note, as well, that by switching from the substance of
the case to an allegation above that I am "weak minded" (as if my position
depended on Dennett's!) you've clearly moved into ad hominem territory, i.e.,
yet another logical fallacy -- yet you are the one who is always asserting that
others commit fallacies, not you.
You would do better to keep the arguments straight as I have explained them
above. Whether you will see this or not, though, is certainly in doubt at this
point.
> >You proceeded to claim that if one could not show that Searle embraced
> >Descartes' philosophy in all its particulars, one could not claim
> >Searle was a Cartesian dualist.
>
> >But, as I noted, the issue wasn't whether anyone was saying Searle
> >embraced all of Descartes' positions but whether Searle's idea of mind
> >was consistent with the idea of mind held by Descartes
>
> the idea of mind that Descartes held is that there is an immaterial mind
> (a.k.a the rational soul) that survives the death of the body with its
> memories intact.
>
Again, speaking of "Cartesian dualism" is not necessarily to speak of the full
panoply of Descartes' position, nor is this about particular terminologies
("rational soul" vs. "irreducible mind"). It is common to refer to "Cartesian
dualism" as the position that equates mind with an irreducible something or a
stand-alone ontological entity in an otherwise physical universe.
> you've admitted that there is no evidence Searle believes (either
> explicitly or implicitly) the idea of mind that Descartes actually held;
I have explicitly said that no one is claiming that Searle is an explicit
dualist (of any sort) or that he is a follower of Descartes' historical
doctrines. You are once again trying to confuse the notion that to think of
mind in a particular way (to embrace Descartes' view of mind, that is, to see
mind as a Cartesian dualist would) is to be an acolyte or subscriber to the
range of Descartes' historical philosophical claims!
It looks like you are just going to cling to this particular bit of smoke for
as long as you can. I guess you are hoping that I'll tire of correcting you or
that your endless repetitions of this falsehood will finally stick of its own
weight and drive other thoughts from readers' minds here. Well, maybe.
Endlessly repeating a mantra does have a certain psychological effect on human
beings.
> but, you wish to label Searle as a Cartesian dualist anyway; so, the
> question naturally arises as to your criteria for classifying
> philosophers as Cartesian dualists.
>
Already given you, numerous times. It has NOTHING to do with being an explicit
follower of Descartes or with embracing the full panoply of his historical
doctrines. See above for more detail.
> >>since then, I've been asking whether a person can be labeled a
> >>Cartesian dualist by you without postulating or having two different
> >>kinds of 'stuff' that interact.
>
> >My response has always been the same. If we mean dualist in the way
> >Descartes was (asserting that the presence of consciousness in the
> >universe can only be explained by supposing something outside the rest
> >of the physical world), then yes.
>
> I've always thought that was your position.
>
> Joe
>
Then you should have seen at once that this has nothing to do with a claim that
Searle is either explicitly a dualist or that he subscribes to the full range
of Descartes' doctrinal tenets, in which case all your huffing and puffing
about THAT is shown to be what it always was, so much smoke designed to
distract readers here from the main focus of the discussion.
SWM
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