In _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his critics_, there is a paper by Dennett called something like "Granny's Campaign for Safe Science" where Dennett seems to rip Fodor a new one and in passing labels Searle some sort of dualist but doesn't specify Searle's so-called dualism. The idea is simple. If you are a Wittgensteinian criteriologist (and/or quietist, eliminativist, epiphenomenalist, minimalist of whatever stamp might yet be printed) about consciousness (remember that consciousness as such cannot be studied by science according to Dennett because only third-person evidence can count), then any assertion to the contrary will automatically be interpreted as: 1. Idiosyncratic. 2. Antiscience. 3. Incoherent (Hacker who thinks that the proposal that the brain causes consciousness is incoherent. That's why Searle coins "biological naturalism" to be such as to be sensitive to the facts and different from the conceptual dualism that is inherent in (it really is don't you know) eliminative, quietistic, criteriological, epiphenomenal, property dualist, materialist (in its mostly non-idiosyncratic reductive forms), computationalist, and even connectionist forms of grappling with the so-called mind-body problem. After Dennett's spanking of Fodor, Fodor replies with such swiftness that it appears that Dennett is pissing block letters in the cold snowjob of philosophical rigor while Fodor is doing so much better what with his ability to show up the block letters with cursive. Now, after all that, please don't eat the snow! Or, read the exchange and learn about just how breezy Dennett can be and how gullible a public he may be presupposing. After all that, imagine Fodor and another collaborating on a project published just this year: _What Darwin Got Wrong_. After the knee-jerks, read that too! Cheers, Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/