--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > >> You believe agents can derive the meanings of symbols > >> from knowledge only of their forms and of the rules for > >> manipulating them according to those forms. > > > > > > Absolutely, if you look at what it is an agent is doing > > when reading words on a page. I see the symbols, and their > > shapes tell me what they mean thus I derive meaning from the > > shapes. > > > That's the question you need to address. > > Gah! You just demonstrated that you have absolutely no idea what you're > talking about, Stuart! No wonder Budd has made no progress with you! > Or, given your response above, that I have made no progress with you! > You would not understand the words in this sentence if they appeared in > Chinese. Right? The issue is what does understanding the meaning of the symbols consist of! The English symbols are not, in principle, any different than the Chinese except that I am familiar with one type and not with the other. So what does it mean to be familiar with either? What does it mean to KNOW English or Chinese??? Remember the guy in that cartoon looking at a Chinese symbol and thinking of the image of a horse! Is that magic do you think? What does it mean to get the meanings of symbols in such cases? Do we all have certain pictures in our heads? Are they the same pictures, if we have them, and, if they're not, do we not share the same meanings? What kinds of pictures occur? A single picture corresponding to a given symbol or some series of pictures or associations with other things that include pictures and maybe other kinds of recollections (recalled sounds, smells, tastes, etc.? Maybe a memory of riding a horse? Or of a teacher flashing a picture of one and muttering the word "horse" or showing us the written word "horse"? Is this about magic or is it about a complex system capable of making such relational connections when given a particular input? Can you even think of what else might count as understanding beyond what I have just described? If you can, what would it be? > You would have no way to know their meanings solely from knowing their forms > or from knowing any form-based rules for manipulating them. Right? > Wrong, if knowing is making the kinds of associations I have just described above because the only way we learn things is by relating their forms to whatever counts as their meaning (a referent? a complex of associations?). Once having learned a set of associations with a given input, then receiving that input would prompt the reoccurrence of the associations in the right sort of system. In us this appears to occur as a dynamic process because the associations we make are in constant flux (both Edelman and Hawkins make the interesting point that human and computer memory work differently though I think Hawkins' is the more useful account). One might add that the stability of meaning (where we can share understandings with others) is a function of the degree to which there is stability in that dynamism. But there is no reason, in principle, that a computer could not operate in this way, as well, i.e., receiving inputs, associating them with a layered network of other relational connections such that at some point the computer gets a representation of a horse in a form that matches the form we get (say the right symbol) and the computer, confronted with a Chinese symbol meaning horse and having learned that meaning (as we also have to learn it), recognizes it BECAUSE it pulls up the right set of associations stored in its memory (the learned response). > And here's why: syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient > for semantics. Axiom 3 = true. > > -gts Oh my god, you are STILL arguing by insisting. No matter how many times you repeat the above, Gordon, it does not become truer or more convincing to those of us who don't find it convincing in the first place! It's obvious that you and some others here do find it convincing. But just repeating your conviction IS NOT AN ARGUMENT. All you are doing is reminding us of YOUR belief and THAT is NOT a reason that anyone else should believe it. There is no logical implication from the fact that X believes something to the claim that Y must therefore also believe it (unless, of course, you add some other factors such as that X and Y represent the same entity)! I am not a logic freak, Gordon, and very often make points that have more to do with the nuances of language, with context, etc., than with syllogistic reasoning, but in this kind of argument logic is indispensable. Yes, you can use psychological techniques such as incessant repetition to push a point, but this isn't about that nor are such polemical maneuvers part of philosophical argument. I really don't see why you are having so much trouble getting this but then you are plainly not alone. But do recall that arguing your case must involve more than just REPEATING your claim(s). Anyway, why not answer the questions I posed to you about what, in my account of knowing, is missing so that we can figure out where the magic you profess to see is happening in any instance of knowing? SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/