--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: <snip> > Stuart continues: > > > "I think Searle's argument is finally just an expression of belief as your > earlier method of arguing, by declaring the things you believed in, > inadvertently revealed." > > Should I repeat Searle's _reason_ for believing that programs can't cause > anything? > > Remember, you can now quit talking about ontology and instead focus on > reasons why you might think Searle's distinction between first-order brute > causal properties and second-order functional properties is mistaken. > Because no one ever argued for programs qua abstractions causing anything! It is and always been about computational processes running on computers which is to say physical events on physical platforms. There is no basis for distinguishing computational processes on computers as "second-order functional properties" in order to claim they lack causal efficacy. They have as much causal efficacy as brain processes running in brains. > I argue that it is impossible to validly go from Searle's irrelevant (if it > is) distinction to a claim of implicit dualism in his CRA. > Make that argument then, rather than just declaring it. > At best, he misdecribes how computers work and misdescribes AI by > distinguishing between strong and weak versions, yada, yada. How one goes > from that/those misdescription(s) (if it is/they are) to his very thesis as > if it isn't his thesis is a piece of magic that is truly one of your best > pieces of work to date. Bravo! > > Cheers, > Budd > > Where's the argument? Is it in the "yada, yada"? Or in the characterizations of "that/those misdescriptions"? Or is it just in the declaration that to argue for implicit dualism as a "piece of magic"? You promised an argument, presumably to counter mine. Okay, I'll bite. But where is it? SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/