--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > --- On Thu, 4/8/10, SWM <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > > And who defines what counts as a "serious" reply, by the > > way? Is Dennett's not a serious reply then? > > As Searle pointed out, Dennett misconstrues the CRT (CR thought > experiment) as about consciousness instead of syntax/semantics. That is surely one of Searle's more ridiculous responses, as Hauser noted in that text of Searle's asserting this which you routed us to (but which you declined to pay any serious attention to on the grounds that it reflected a view with which you disagreed). Note that Searle repeatedly uses the CRA as an argument about consciousness (Minds, Brains and Science; Language, Mind and Society, The Mystery of Consciousness) and, moreover, if this isn't about consciousness then it isn't about anything worth discussing because so-called "strong AI" is about replicating consciousness on a synthetic, computational platform, not about replicating something called "semantics". Note, as well, that Searle seems to believe that Dennett's thesis about what consciousness is is mistaken because Dennett allegedly makes the mistake of thinking computer programs (Searle's "syntax") can produce consciousness (which include Searle's "semantics"). So it's about "semantics" but not consciousness? As Hauser rightly notes, give us a break! > No doubt Searle formalized his argument partly in response to Dennett's > strawman characterization of it. > Searle continuously reformulated his argument over the years to meet the slew of objections raised against it. But let me ask you this: Why would Searle have needed to "reformulate" his CRA in response to Dennett's claims about consciousness or anyone's (and Dennett explicitly addresses the question of consciousness, after all, even if Searle now wants to pretend he doesn't), if Dennett's arguments were "strawman" as you suppose? If they were, they could be readily shown to be that and the CRA could have stood as originally presented. Instead Searle made changes to the formulation of the claim, changes that would only have been necessary if the original formulation was unclear, inadequate or both. > > Are the Churchlands not serious? > > The Churchlands miss the point for the reasons stated in the same Scientific > American article in which Searle formalized his argument. > But are they not "serious" as you allege? We already know that Searle claims they miss the point. Others, myself included, think Searle misses the point, by the way, by failing to recognize the distinction between understanding "understanding" as a system level property rather than as a process level one. So is this to be about competing charges over who misses what point? And is such a charge enough, in itself, to sustain a claim that someone has gotten something wrong? (If it is enough to justify a claim that the Churchlands are wrong, why isn't it enough to say Searle is?) Finally, does someone claiming someone else has "missed the point" count as support for a claim that they aren't "serious" critics? Can you give us criteria for what counts as being a "serious" critic or a "serious" argument and can you identify some candidates for these two categories? Who, on your view, is a "serious" critic of Searle's CRA and what counts as a "serious" criticism of it? > I've aimed my efforts here at helping YOU understand the formal argument that > neither Dennett nor the Churchlands have actually addressed. > Dennett certainly does address it in the text I provided though not with the logical rigor that I've attempted. (Whether he has done so elsewhere, I don't know.) I am not as familiar enough with the Churchlands' arguments to say whether they have dealt with the logic of the CRA, but their main point about the system being the locus of the understanding is right (and does address the issue I have raised!) precisely because it is consistent with the idea that consciousness (understanding, or whatever you want to make this about at this point in the debate) can be understood as a system level property. If it can, the CR and its CRA have nothing to say about systems that are more robustly specked than the CR. It doesn't matter that the CR doesn't understand Chinese and that nothing in it understands Chinese either (as Searle often notes in making his case) BECAUSE THE CR IS UNDERSPECKED (as Dennett's argument points out, as well). That is, the CR doesn't contain enough processes doing enough things in the right (interactive) way to achieve what brains achieve. Thus the failure of the CR to understand Chinese says nothing about what its constituent elements might be capable of doing in other configurations and arrangements. > But as I've mentioned, you continue to conflate the third axiom with the > conclusion, just as does Dennett. > > -gts > > But elsewhere you distinguished between arguing against the third premise, as I have done, and arguing against the CRA qua argument as a whole as you suggest Dennett and other official (more heavily credentialed) Searle critics have done (thus allowing you to say that they at least understand the third premise while some, I[?] don't)! And yet here you now assert that I am making the same mistake in my argument that you have imputed to Dennett, namely that we are both arguing against the "third axiom" (which I call the "third premise")! So, on your view, my argument and Dennett's are of a piece though Dennett (you at least seem willing to acknowledge) understands the third premise (and presumably grasps its truth) while I don't -- even while we're both "conflat[ing] the third axiom with the [CRA's] conclusion" in arguing against it? I think defending Searle's position (as you are doing) finally leads to such convoluted claims as this because it always seems to come down to precisely these kinds of contradictions! SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/