[Wittrs] Re: The CRA Does Not Require a Presumption of Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 03 May 2010 13:29:56 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> >>I showed that the logical relations between the axioms and the
> >>conclusions of the CRA do NOT require an assumption of dualism
> >>(contrary to your frequently stated claims).
>
> >No you didn't.
>
> here's you from [2010-03-21 - 10:11 PM - #4800]:
>
> The problem with the CRA isn't that it requires a dualist presumption as
> a suppressed premise to the argument ... The problem, rather, is that
> the CRA is WRONG because the conclusion doesn't work without that
> suppressed premise
>
As usual you misread and take out of context. In that text I was making a dual
argument, and the text you cite was the aspect that focused in on the CRA as an
argument, i.e., whether its premises supported its conclusion.
As I've said many times, though to no avail where you're concerned, all of the
premises, including the third, MUST be true for the CRA's conclusion to work,
i.e., for the CRA to work AS AN ARGUMENT for its conclusions. My further claim
is that the only way the third premise can be read as true, absent independent
evidence (of which there is none invoked by Searle in his description of the
CRA and his laying out of the CRA) is for us to presume that understanding is
an irreducible feature in the universe (dualism). But the third premise masks
the problem because of its textual ambiguity (the equivocal usage it
represents).
Since equivocation is a fallacy in logic and since an equivocation is present
in the CRA as presented by Searle, the CRA is a flawed argument (an argument
depending on a fallacy is invalid). But if we remove the equivocation (which
can be done, of course), there is still no support for the claim that syntax
cannot cause (as in produce) semantics, as Searle claims, unless one assumes
dualism in the way one explains the occurrence of mind in the world.
> >If you like reproduce the segment you think does that and we can take
> >another look.
>
> not a chance.
>
> if I leave out any of the steps, you'll turn around and claim that I
> left out an assumption of dualism or some such thing.
>
If you thought you could do it and demonstrate your case, I'm guessing you
would so your refusal counts as evidence that you can't.
> >Just don't throw the whole 28 step monstrosity up here again as I am
> >not interested in spending my time unpacking it.
>
> if you don't want to look at it, that's your choice; but, if you stick
> your head in the sand and produce an opinion anyway; then, I'm going to
> wonder what passes for philosophy at Ludwig's Ordinary Language Sport
> Utility Bar.
>
It's clear you are left to wonder since it seems to me you don't understand the
issue anyway.
> over here (across the street from Ludwig's), at Tony's Linguistic Pub,
> an uninformed opinion is considered ... uninformative.
>
And smoke and mirrors remains smoke and mirrors, even if one does it by
throwing up so much smoke even the mirrors are finally obscured.
> >[Joe's formal proof of the CRA is] only logically valid if it doesn't
> >contain any fallacies. While it can be written to eliminate the fallacy
> >of equivocation that it has in Searle's rendition of it
>
> oh, yes. thanks for reminding me of another feature of the proof: it
> doesn't use the fallacy of equivocation; although, in my opinion,
> neither does Searle's version.
>
That just shows that your opinion is not to be relied on. But, of course, you
can have any old opinion you want. No one can take that away from you.
> and while we are on the subject of what is not in the proof, I'll just
> add that the so-called suppressed fourth premise that you imagined you
> saw is not required either.
>
> [SWM (2010-03-27 - 09:49 PM - #4935)]: "My point is that there's a
> fourth, suppressed premise, that Searle doesn't notice, i.e., that the
> only way the third premise (the one about not being constitutive of nor
> sufficient for) can be true, WITHOUT ADDING ANY EMPIRICAL INFORMATION
> (as in research to confirm Hawkins thinking or Edelman's), is if we
> think consciousness has a certain characteristic, namely that it must be
> a process property and therefore irreducible to constituents that are
> qualitatively different than itself."
>
That's just another way of pointing out the assumption of dualism which you
have already denied albeit without much credibility thus far. So all you do is
reassert your ongoing denial.
> wrong again, Stuart. the proof does not require any such premise.
>
>
> Joe
>
Ah yes, argument by assertion, the last resort of some.
Anyway, as I said yesterday Joe, this is no longer worth a lot of my time. I'll
continue to respond here and there but no longer with the kind of detailed
explanations and effort I've used formerly. That is a waste of energy where
you're concerned.
SWM
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