[Wittrs] The CRA Does Not Require a Presumption of Dualism
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 02 May 2010 17:15:31 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>Your "proof" did not prove anything. It merely showed a series of
>>>relationships which, if they obtained, lead to a certain conclusion
>>I accomplished just a bit more than that.
>>I showed that the logical relations between the axioms and the
>>conclusions of the CRA do NOT require an assumption of dualism
>>(contrary to your frequently stated claims).
>No you didn't.
here's you from [2010-03-21 - 10:11 PM - #4800]:
The problem with the CRA isn't that it requires a dualist presumption as
a suppressed premise to the argument ... The problem, rather, is that
the CRA is WRONG because the conclusion doesn't work without that
suppressed premise
>If you like reproduce the segment you think does that and we can take
>another look.
not a chance.
if I leave out any of the steps, you'll turn around and claim that I
left out an assumption of dualism or some such thing.
>Just don't throw the whole 28 step monstrosity up here again as I am
>not interested in spending my time unpacking it.
if you don't want to look at it, that's your choice; but, if you stick
your head in the sand and produce an opinion anyway; then, I'm going to
wonder what passes for philosophy at Ludwig's Ordinary Language Sport
Utility Bar.
over here (across the street from Ludwig's), at Tony's Linguistic Pub,
an uninformed opinion is considered ... uninformative.
>[Joe's formal proof of the CRA is] only logically valid if it doesn't
>contain any fallacies. While it can be written to eliminate the fallacy
>of equivocation that it has in Searle's rendition of it
oh, yes. thanks for reminding me of another feature of the proof: it
doesn't use the fallacy of equivocation; although, in my opinion,
neither does Searle's version.
and while we are on the subject of what is not in the proof, I'll just
add that the so-called suppressed fourth premise that you imagined you
saw is not required either.
[SWM (2010-03-27 - 09:49 PM - #4935)]: "My point is that there's a
fourth, suppressed premise, that Searle doesn't notice, i.e., that the
only way the third premise (the one about not being constitutive of nor
sufficient for) can be true, WITHOUT ADDING ANY EMPIRICAL INFORMATION
(as in research to confirm Hawkins thinking or Edelman's), is if we
think consciousness has a certain characteristic, namely that it must be
a process property and therefore irreducible to constituents that are
qualitatively different than itself."
wrong again, Stuart. the proof does not require any such premise.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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