[Wittrs] Re: Stuart's Allegation of Dualism is SAD but Irrelevant
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 03 May 2010 13:52:55 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart's Allegation of Dualism is SAD but Irrelevant
<snip>
> your opinion as to whether 'dualism' is a pejorative term is irrelevant
> because the allegation of dualism is itself irrelevant.
>
> suppose Searle had a mood fluctuation and became a catholic (or a
> protestant, or a jew or a buddhist or an atheist or ... whatever). would
> having any of any of those beliefs affect the truth value of the third
> axiom?
>
You miss the point -- again. The issue is what does it take to believe that
understanding cannot be constituted by a more robust system consisting of the
same elements as are found in the CR? Searle's claim that "syntax does not
constitute and is not sufficient for semantics" depends on a belief that for
syntax to do either of those two things, semantics (understanding) MUST be
present in any system containing those elements, i.e., in the CR. Since it
isn't there, the argument goes, no system made of those elements can do the job
either. But IF understanding is a function of a more complex, more robust
arrangement of those elements, then it could. So the argument relies on
believing that understanding CANNOT be understood THAT way, i.e., that it must
be an ontological basic in the system (the CR), that is it must be there at the
constituent element level.
> no? then, irregardless of whether it is pejorative to say that someone
> has one of these beliefs, the argument that the third axiom is false
> because Searle (or someone else) has one of these beliefs is fallacious
> --- its an ad hominem argument.
>
Nope, it's integral to the point about why anyone would believe more of the
same couldn't do what the limited quantity can't accomplish in the CR. It says
nothing about Searle personally, doesn't challenge his intelligence,
perspicacity or credentials. It merely shows the flaw in his thinking and, no
doubt, in yours.
> suppose Searle had a really serious mood fluctuation and joined a voodoo
> cult. Is that going to alter the truth value of the third axiom?
>
The issue is on what basis do we take the third premise to be true? Do we have
some scientific results to interpret? Actually, no. Do we have a conceptual
claim? You bet. The reason to believe in the truth of the third premise hinges
on a certain conception of understanding (and consciousness). Referring to the
truth or falsity of the third premise, absent the reason for taking it to be
true or false, simply misses the whole point.
> no? well, suppose Searle joined a fertility cult and participated in
> bizarre sexual rituals by the light of the full moon during the festival
> of Beltane to promote crop fertility. would *that* alter the truth value
> of the third axiom?
>
Again, the third premise is either true or false (or nonsense, of course) and
our reason for thinking it one or the other is the issue, not whether any
particular proponent of its truth (or falsity) has a particular mindset. By
this insistence of yours of conflating some notion of absolute truth with
reasons for thinking anything true, you again demonstrate a complete lack of
understanding of what this is about. The point of an argument is to support a
claim. The issue before us is to answer the question of why we should take the
third premise to be true and what would it take to establish that truth? Absent
the establishment of reasons, it is pointless to speak of truth or falsity.
> no? well, why should I believe that of all the belief systems in all the
> world, interactive substance dualism is the only one that has the power
> to alter the truth value of the third axiom?
>
> Joe
>
> --
I'm not sure why you believe any of the odd claims you make. As noted, the
point of an argument is to make a case, to give reasons for believing in the
truth or falsity of some statement. But by the above you are apparently making
the rather strange claim (if not quite explicitly) that we can believe or
disbelieve in something's truth or falsity on the grounds that it is true or
false. This misses the point of how we know the things we know and why we make
arguments.
SWM
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