[Wittrs] Re: Searle in his own words!
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2010 21:40:05 -0000
Stuart writes:
"So this passage doesn't support a claim that my point, that his denial of
computationally caused consiousness contradicts his affirmation of brain caused
consciousness, is wrong."
Yes, and I spelled out why. Here's another way of putting it:
1. NonS/H systems (brains) cause cons. (abductive inference--except for those
who think such an abductive inference conceptually incoherent (Hacker, prolly
Dennett, given eliminativism or quietism, er, maybe not Dennett then, who can
say?)
2. S/H systems, for Stuart, are "just like" brains what with all the
electricity.
3. All nonS/H systems can be interpreted as if S/H systems (resulting in
otiose explanations if we can get one in 1st order property terms but never
mind this if you're a committed conflationist of computational and 1st order
properties).
4. Searle argues against 2. because he distinguishes S/H from nonS/H by noting
that the essence of S/H involves functional properties which are not causal and
admits in the Sci. Amer. article that it is okay, on one definition, to say
that a computer can _think_ (we are computers accord. to 3.). This is not a
contradiction because Searle, while not arguing against 3., is nevertheless
pointing out that explanations as if some nonS/H system is S/H are otiose when
we have a causal explanation already in 1st order property terms.
All the above is just ducky for me. Here's how to make hay, Stuart style:
Simply say that Searle argues against 2. for no good reason.. ;-)
Please excuse the funny ambiguity above!
Now, if we may finally be done with Stuart and his inept attempt to show
problems for Searle by ignoring the distinctions he makes and supporting his
biological naturalism without knowing it, some might want to investigate some
papers that make all sorts of distinctions like the ones in _Meaning in Mind_,
where Fodor gets to reply to his staunchest critics.
Another intense book on philosophy of mind:
_Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind_, Ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and
Jonathan Cohen, 2007, which includes a paper by Fodor: "The revenge of the
Given."
Note: Maybe there is a contradiction in Stuart vis a vis thinking that brains
must cause cons. computationally while conflating computation with causation?
Maybe that wouldn't count as a contradiction since it merely rests on a muddle,
though.
Anyway, I hope to have shown that Stuart just isn't buying Searle's reason for
the first premise.
He also isn't buying that every formulation of his CRA (the target article
didn't contain a three step proof, his 1984 did, his Sci. Am. listed axioms,
and his APA Address lists eight summary points).
These all have essentially the same content due to Searle's distinction between
computational properties as functional properties which don't cause anything
(except mindless behehavior when RUNNING in concert with hardware) and brutish
1st order properties of actual brains which cause consciousness in some
diachronic way(s).
So I leave it where I had to leave it six years ago. I suggested we nail down
Searle's newish argument (same content though but Stuart pretends he can't
believe it..) in his APA Address.
I even offered to discuss it with Gordon..
I'm also willing to move on and talk about something else or nothing at all,
given how well I've painted both Searle and what motivated Dennett in the first
place.
Cheers,
Budd
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